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Summary 
The dissertation presents a detailed investigation of Sophocles' Oedipus and 
Shakespeare's Hamlet in the context of Freud's comparison of the plays, sketched out in 
a number of his early writings (most notably The Interpretation of Dreams) but never 
pursued at length either by him or by any later critics. The interest of the current 
investigation is not inspired simply by the absence of such a detailed comparison, on the 
one hand, and by its constant implication in the modem analysis of the plays in question, 
on the other. The particular inspiration for the current project is the work of Jean 
Laplanche that in the last forty years has been dedicated to a fundamental re- 
conceptualisation of Freud's theory of the human subject by way of return to the 
questions of the seduction and otherness. Equally inspiring for the current project have 
been the recent developments in the non-psychoanalytic analyses of tragedy (ancient 
Greek, Elizabethan, and as genre as such) that consistently aspire to cross the boundaries 
of the traditional textual-historicist approach to the literary text in order to accommodate 
the particularly heterogeneous nature of their object of study. 
Thus, the current project provides a comprehensive analysis of Sophocles' 
Oedipus and Shakespeare's Hamlet, successively, at the intersection of psychoanalytic 
and other (philological and philosophical) approaches to tragedy, paying attention not 
only to the texts of the tragedies themselves but to the narrative-mythological, dramatic, 
and, in the case of Sophocles, translational tradition to which they pertain. The relevance 
of Freudian categories to the texts and genre in question is thus thoroughly examined. As 
a result, the conclusion is reached that it is specifically through Laplanchean re- 
conceptualisation of Freud's notion of seduction (and the related notions of the enigmatic 
message, the other, translation and transference) that a psychoanalytic approach becomes 
more amenable to the needs of literary analysis. The application of Laplanchean 
categories to the analysis of these tragedies helps to elucidate the role of the father with 
new precision (in comparison with the previous mother-centred approaches to these 
tragedies). In its main body, the dissertation consists of a general Introduction, analytical 
sections on Sophocles' Oedipus and Shakespeare's Hamlet, Conclusion, and the list of 
the consulted works. 
1. Introduction 
`It is not without interest to take note of the dissymmetries between the tragedy of 
Oedipus and the tragedy of Hamlet. It would be too elaborate an exercise to list them all in detail, but I will nevertheless give you a few indications'. (Lacan, `Desire' 43) 
An extended engagement with either Sophocles' Oedipus or Shakespeare's 
Hamlet is hard to justify. Neither play has suffered from lack of attention since its first 
presentation (on stage and in print) which, in each case, was also the result of a greater 
and far more ancient popularity of the title character. 
It should seem equally superfluous to attempt a combined treatment of the two 
plays in the context of modern scholarship heavily influenced, as it has been, by the 
work of Sigmund Freud, who came up with the most influential comparison of the two 
plays. However, if a researcher first ties the title characters of the plays to the respective 
playwrights and then each pair to each other, the relevant bibliography sharply 
diminishes. ' The irony of this situation is deepened by the fact (epitomised in the 
epigraph) that even in the psychoanalytically informed criticism a combined detailed 
analysis of these plays is yet to be undertaken. How could this be possible? 
There is no single answer to this question since it relates to an enormous field of 
cultural production. However, the chief factor that has contributed to this status quo is 
certainly the problem of interdisciplinary correspondence between the roles of these 
plays in psychoanalysis and literary criticism. 
In psychoanalysis, they enjoy the privilege of having been called on to illustrate 
the discipline-forming shift from the theory of seduction to infantile sexuality; at the 
1 Regular recent checks with the MLA electronic catalogue revealed 4079 entries for 'Hamlet' and 681 for 
'Oedipus'; 3749 for 'Shakespeare Hamlet', 361 for 'Shakespeare's Hamlet', 179 for 'Sophocles('/s) 
Oedipus'; 25 for 'Oedipus and Hamlet' and 8 for `Shakespeare Hamlet and Sophocles Oedipus'. 
same time their psychoanalytic comparison subordinates them to a heterogeneous 
theoretical paradigm which heavily restricts the scope of analytical engagement. Freud's 
fullest combined treatment of the plays in The Interpretation of Dreams has long been a 
subject of critique (often together with the initial sketch of the comparison from the 
letter to Fliess of October 15,1897). Sophocles' play is presented there as a revelation, 
as if in `the work of a psycho-analysis', of the unconscious wishes for patricide and 
incest `forced upon us by Nature': `King Oedipus, who slew his father Laius and 
married his mother Jocasta, merely shows us the fulfilment of our own childhood 
wishes' (363,365,364) 2 Shakespeare's play, which `has its roots in the same' 
instinctual `soil', represents a neurotic locked into a hopeless struggle with these wishes, 
brought about by `the secular advance of repression' (366). Unlike Oedipus, where 
Freud sees the identity of the wishing subject cunningly delayed until the very end, 
Hamlet comes onstage already tormented by their incarnation in the figure of Claudius 
newly married to Hamlet's mother. The Ghost's story only intensifies this torment by 
supplying the image of the incestuous marriage with the scene of fratri-, and from 
Hamlet's point of view, patri-cide. Hamlet's identification with Claudius' twin crimes is, 
in Freud's opinion, Oedipal in nature; it is the key to Hamlet's delay and the tragedy's 
baffling effect. 3 However problematic such a reading may have seemed since its first 
publication in 1900, Jean Starobinski in his 1972 `Hamlet and Oedipus', expressly 
elaborating on the example of Ernest Jones, lucidly defended its validity precisely on the 
2 The corresponding passage in the letter to Fliess reads: `the Greek legend seizes upon a compulsion 
which everyone recognizes because he senses its existence in himself. Everyone in the audience was once 
a budding Oedipus in fantasy and each recoils in horror from the dream fulfilment here transplanted into 
reality' (Masson 272). 
3 `How does Hamlet the hysteric justify his words, "Thus conscience does make cowards of us 
all? "... How better than through the torment he suffers from the obscure memory that he himself had 
contemplated the same deed against his father out of passion for his mother... ' (Masson 273). 
2 
grounds of its purpose to illustrate a scientific theory. It is true that the impact of this 
theory on the plays themselves results in the notion that 
Oedipus has no unconscious because he is our unconscious... He does not need 
any depth of his own because he is our depth ... To attribute a psychology to him 
would be foolish: he is already an instantiation of psychology. Far from being a 
possible object of psychological study, he has become a functional element in the 
creation of a psychological science-In modem terms, Oedipus is instinct or, 
rather, its figurative counterpart. (156,160, italics original) 
It is also true that although Starobinski grants Hamlet a `three-dimensional' 
psychological interiority, as opposed to Oedipus' `opaque, residueless plenitude of a 
psychic image' (160), this interiority is practically exhausted, in Freud's reading, by this 
`opaque' image. 4 Nevertheless, provided that Freud's psychological theory of `instinct' 
is accepted, the comparative reading must remain valid within the limits of its specialist 
agenda. After all, Freud himself clearly acknowledges these limits in the closing remarks 
on the plays in The Interpretation of Dreams: 
... just as all neurotic symptoms, and, for that matter, dreams, are capable 
of being `over-interpreted' and indeed need to be, if they are to be fully 
understood, so all genuinely creative writings are the product of more than a 
single motive and more than a single impulse in the poet's mind, and are open to 
more than a single interpretation. In what I have written I have only attempted to 
interpret the deepest layer of impulses in the mind of the creative writer. (368, 
quotation marks original) 
In literary criticism, a comprehensive comparison between these two and other tragedies 
in general has not fared much better because of similar disciplinary considerations. After 
the initial enthusiasm of the `grand debate between the ancients and the modems in the 
late seventeenth-century France', which saw many contemporary English critics engage 
4 The opposition between Oedipus as a depthless character and Hamlet as the one endowed with 
psychological interiority is certainly reminiscent of John Jones' 1968 study On Aristotle and Greek 
Tragedy. 
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in comparisons of Hamlet with classical masterpieces, such an approach to tragedy 
became increasingly problematic: `As with the French Querelle, the debate [in England] 
leads towards the recognition that the same standard cannot be applied to works so 
disparate in time' (Grazia, `Hamlet' 489). And although the comparison remained 
implicit in the next stage of the debate where (notably with Coleridge) it was no longer 
`a matter of determining superiority' but `of defining difference' (489), the analyses 
became more restricted to a single historical context. Just as Freud's psychoanalysis 
purported to concentrate on the `Nature' of the unconscious with no possibility of 
accommodating a fully developed philology, so did literary criticism come to focus on 
the specificity of character and, later, language in a given drama and thus a given 
historical period. 
The apogee of this focus, expressed in a conscious opposition to Freudian 
comparativism, was elaborated by Starobinski's contemporary Jean-Pierre Vemant in 
the series of essays included in his and Pierre Vidal-Nacquet's 1972 Myth and Tragedy 
in Ancient Greece (translated into English in 1988). Particularly in 'Oedipus without the 
Complex', Vemant insists that `... the meaning present within the work.. . must 
be 
painstakingly reconstructed through a study at every level of the message that a 
legendary tale or a tragic fiction constitutes' (86). From his point of view, the Freudian 
approach is inadequate to the study of the literary text because its `point of departure is 
an intimate experience undergone by the public, which is historically unlocated' and 
which then is `projected onto the work in question regardless of its own sociocultural 
context' (87). Such an approach, according to Vernant's curiously ambiguous phrasing, 
'has all the semblance of the rigor of an argument based on a vicious circle' (87, italics 
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added). 5 Vemant's own alternative is `historical psychology' that postulates the 
possibility of arrival at an understanding of the audience's `intimate experience' only 
after, not before, the painstaking `linguistic, thematic, dramatic' analysis of the tragedy 
in question (87). Accordingly, this understanding purports to be very different from 
Freud's because it concerns itself with binding of subjectivity to historical structures 
rather than its universal essence. 
Despite this tendency in the studies of tragedy towards historically specific 
structuralism, cross-period comparisons certainly continued to exist after the peak of the 
`grand debate between the ancients and the moderns'. They tended towards 
aesthetic/philosophical approaches based, as it was in Freud's case, on a larger and non- 
literary theoretical framework. However, even within this domain, there was no 
precedent for an exclusive comparison between Sophocles' Oedipus and Shakespeare's 
Hamlet before Freud. It was more habitual for the seventeenth and eighteenth-century 
English critics to compare Hamlet with Orestes than Oedipus. 6 This is still partly true of 
Hegel's The Philosophy of Fine Art (1835), Freud's closest outstanding precedent in the 
theoretical appropriations of tragedy, which readily juxtaposes Hamlet with Orestes 
when it comes to discuss the tragic conflict arising `from a spiritual violation of spiritual 
forces through human action' and its dramatic consequences: 
$ What Versant appears to mean is certainly that Freud's argument has only `semblance of the rigor' 
because in fact it is based on a 'vicious circle'. However, the phrase can equally imply the opposite: i. e. 
that the `vicious circle' is only a `semblance'. 
6 Nicholas Rowe in the first eighteenth-century edition of Shakespeare (1709) announces that `Hamlet is 
founded upon much the same Tale with the Electra of Sophocles' (qtd. in Grazia, 'Hamlet' 489). Other 
critics who followed the suit of this comparison included Charles Gildon (Remarks on the Plays of 
Shakespeare (1710)), Jean-Bernard Le Blanc (Letters on the English and French Nations (1747)), John 
Upton (Critical Observations on Shakespeare (1748)), William Richardson (A Philosophical Analysis 
(1774)), Georges Stubbes (Some Remarks on the 'The Tragedy of Hamlet' reproduced in the 1790 edition 
of Hamlet by Malone) (qtd. in Grazia, Hamlet 489, n. 38-39). Freud's contemporary Gilbert Murray 
published his Hamlet and Orestes as late as 1914. The most recent case for privileging Hamlet-Orestes 
parallel has been made by Louise Schleiner in 'Latinized Greek Drama in Shakespeare's Writing of 
"Hamlet" ' (1990). 
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Agamemnon... sacrifices Iphigenia, and so violates the feeling of her 
mother... Clytemnestra, in consequence, murders her spouse. Orestes avenges the 
murder of his father and king by assassinating his mother. In a similar way in 
"Hamlet" the father is sent to his grave by a stratagem, and the mother of Hamlet 
insults the manes of the dead man by a precipitate marriage with his murderer. 
(Paolucci and Paolucci 125) 
However, earlier, in The Phenomenology of Mind (1807), Hegel does add Oedipus to 
this pairing in the illustration of the constitutive division of consciousness into 
`knowledge' and `not knowledge': 
The present reality, therefore, is one thing in itself, and another for 
consciousness .... The one [undivided spiritual substance] is the aspect of light, 
the god of the Oracle, who as regards its natural aspect [Light] has sprung from 
the all-illuminating Sun, knows all and reveals all, Phoebus and Zeus, who is his 
Father. But the commands of this truth-speaking god, and his proclamations of 
what is, are really deceptive and fallacious. For this knowledge is, in its very 
principle, directly not knowledge, because consciousness in acting is inherently 
this opposition. He [Oedipus], who had the power to unlock the riddle of the 
sphinx, and he [Orestes] too who trusted with childlike confidence, are, 
therefore, both sent to destruction through what the god reveals to them ... There is a type of consciousness that is purer-and more sober, more thorough, and 
more solid ... This type of consciousness.. . lets his revenge tarry for the revelation 
which the spirit of his father makes regarding the crime that did him to death, 
and institutes other proofs in addition - for the reason that the spirit giving the 
revelation might possibly be the devil. (Paolucci and Paolucci 294-95, italics 
original) 
There is an obvious similarity between Hegel's and Freud's use of tragedy as a 
schematic illustration of theory: where the former uses the Greek and Elizabethan 
protagonists to articulate the development of `Spirit' through the successive types of 
consciousness, the latter is tracing the evolution of `Nature' and its repression in the 
`emotional life of mankind'. 
Thus there appears to be no possibility of combining various approaches to 
tragedy because, while they may be similar in structure, each of them - psychoanalytic, 
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philosophical, philological - is pursuing its own specific interests. This is true in spite of 
the obvious fact that in the years after Freud there developed a significant 
psychoanalytic literary scholarship. Starobinski's dictum on Oedipus -Tar from being a 
possible object of psychological study, he has become a functional element in the 
creation of a psychological science' - has hardly been challenged. Rudnytsky's Freud 
and Oedipus (1987), remaining the only book-long engagement with the topic of 
Oedipus, is much more interested in tracing pre-Freudian philosophical appropriation of 
the character than in the complexities of Sophocles' text. In the context of this interest, 
Oedipus' identity as the prototype of self-knowledge and ultimately the subject of the 
paradigmatic unconscious wishes is not disputed. Instead, it is made to look more 
credible through the attention to the apparent fact that in his treatment of the plot 
Sophocles, unlike Aeschylus and Euripides, has `suppressed any [external] explanatory 
principle' leading to these wishes - such as the curse under which Aeschylus' Oedipus 
falls due to Laius' abduction and rape of Chrysippus (Rudnytsky 255). Thus what 
Rudnytsky sees as Sophocles' dismissal of Laius' `escapades' leads him directly to 
Freud's designation of Oedipus as the tragic subject of the deepest `self-knowledge' 
rather than a victim of `symbolic paternal seduction' (225, italics original). 
In an exemplary and again virtually the only book-long psychoanalytic literary 
study of Hamlet, Avi Erlich does forcefully question the schematic application of the 
Oedipus complex but only in relation to Shakespeare's play. 7 In an almost Vernantian 
7 Hamlet's Absent Father (1977). Unlike this study, Kurt Eissler's Discourse on Hamlet and Hamlet 
(1971), despite having 'called attention to the importance of father figures in Hamlet and thus brought a 
welcome break from the Freud-Jones emphasis on Claudius' (Erlich 25), remains more orthodoxly 
Freudian with regard to the question of the Oedipus complex itself. Walter N. King's Hamlet's Search for 
Meaning (1982) broadens the discussion of Hamlet's identification into the area of Erikson's ego- 
psychology and Frankl's logotherapy thus veering away from the specificity of Freudian reading. 
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refusal to accept the Freudian reading of it as an unquestionable `point of departure and 
the key to the decipherment' (Vernant 88), Erlich performs a painstaking textual analysis 
of the play and the main psychoanalytic and non-psychoanalytic contemporary readings 
of it to prove that it is Hamlet's identification with his `absent', `ghostly' father, rather 
than the oedipal Claudius, that is the root of the psychic and dramatic problem in the 
plot. Although the supporting analysis engages extensively with the text, the 
psychoanalytic side of it remains trapped in an excessively psychobiographical 
dimension of the original Freudian reading8. In order to demonstrate the psychoanalytic 
specificity of the father's absence and Hamlet's identification with it, Erlich unearths - 
that is, infers from the text - numerous details of the, supposedly real, primal scene in 
which Hamlet the child witnessed his father being `castrated' and turned into `incorporal 
air' by Gertrude (79,85). Erlich defines this scene as the source of the fantasy that 
guides Hamlet through the play - i. e. that 
... his father [come back] strong enough to punish the patricidal Claudius. If Hamlet were himself to punish Claudius, he would be openly admitting that the 
Father in heaven, that his father, has not punished and will not be able to punish; 
hence he delays, waiting for a father who will be strong in the end, even if the 
end is not until the day of judgment. (32, italics original) 
However relevant this fantasy may be to the plot, its relation to the straightforwardly 
conceived primal scene between the old Hamlet and Gertrude is hard to accept. Despite 
all the meticulous attention to the poetry of the play where, in Erlich's view, the images 
Hinted at already in the above quoted letter to Fliess: `I am not thinking of Shakespeare's conscious 
intention, but believe, rather, that a real event stimulated the poet to his representation, in that his 
unconscious understood the unconscious of his hero' (Masson 272) - and developed in The Interpretation 
of Dreams: 'For it can of course only be the poet's own mind which confronts us in Hamlet. I observe in a 
book on Shakespeare by Georg Brandes (1896) a statement that Hamlet was written immediately after the 
death of Shakespeare's father (1601)... It is known, too, that Shakespeare's own son who dies at an early 
age bore the name `Hamnet', which is identical with `Hamlet' (368). 
8 
of this scene are recognisably evoked9, its traumatic impact on Hamlet is inexplicable 
without the attention to the other scene - that of the fratricide - and thus Hamlet's 
identification with Claudius. Thus while Erlich does draw attention to the problem of 
identification of the primal scene in the play, his analysis does not move far beyond 
adjustment of attention to one rather than the other (represented and implicit) scenes. 
The problem of primacy itself and its relation to trauma in Freud's theory is not 
addressed, which prevents Erlich from articulating fully the relevance of the Oedipus 
complex problem to Shakespeare's play as its representative, rather than one particular, 
example. 10 
Adjustment of analytical focus characterises the earlier major psychoanalytic 
interpretation of Hamlet - that by Jacques Lacan in a section of the seminar VI on 
`Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet' (quoted in the epigraph). Even 
though it comes close to Erlich's thesis about Hamlet's identification with the absent, 
ghostly father, the actual identification which Lacan singles out in his more advanced - 
i. e. structuralist rather than psychobiographical - study is the one between Hamlet and 
Gertrude. Lacan's emphasis is on the fact that, each in their turn, Gertrude and Hamlet 
appear equally unable to choose between the old Hamlet and Claudius. Although this 
attention to Hamlet-Gertrude relationship is certainly justified in terms of Shakespeare's 
text, Lacannever pursues its implications with regard to Freud's original reading of the 
play in conjunction with Sophocles outside the `few indications' he delivers. The chief 
9 E. g., Erlich takes Gertrude's words to Hamlet 'Your bedded hair like life in excrements/ Start up and 
stand an end. 0 gentle son, /Upon the heat and flame of thy distemper/ 
Sprinkle cool patience' (3.4.122-24) to evoke `liquid relief' of 'something "bedded" leaping to an 
erection' in direct reference to the reaction that Hamlet had when as a child he witnessed 'the primal 
scene' between his parents (84). 
10 The absence of any engagement with Sophocles' play only adds to the limiting peculiarities of Erlich's 
approach to Hamlet via the Oedipus complex. 
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one of them does little more than reiterate the original Freudian distinction between 
Hamlet as `the subject who knows' and Oedipus 'who is actually completely innocent, 
unconscious, and unaware' (Lacan 42,43). 
Lacan's theory of desire as granted symbolically in return for the subject's 
surrender of direct incestuous enjoyment (castration) - and, correlatively, the 
disablement of Hamlet's desire by the sight of this enjoyment in Gertrude and Claudius 
rejecting the castration embodied in the Ghost - proved a strong inspiration for Marjorie 
Garber's engagement with Hamlet in Shakespeare's Ghost Writers: Literature as 
Uncanny Causality (1987), Janet Adelman's Suffocating Mothers (1992), and Julia 
Reinhard Lupton and Kenneth Reinhard's After Oedipus: Shakespeare in 
Psychoanalysis (1993). While Adelman concentrates on Hamlet's maternal relationship 
in both historical and dramatic contexts of the Elizabethan/Jacobean period, Garber, and 
Lupton and Reinhard do engage at length with Freud's original reading of Hamlet. 
However, they do it, on the one hand, to trace the personal circumstances of its 
emergence in Freudian thought and, on the other, again to adjust it to their own 
theoretical terms rather than to contrast it with a detailed reading of Sophocles alongside 
Shakespeare. Substituting Freud for Sophocles, the two studies remain tied to the 
fundamental framework of the Freudian reading of the two plays which, indeed, implies 
a kind of `uncanny causality' between them, with Oedipus' drama allegedly inhering in 
Hamlet's mind. The only major adjustment that they offer is the reversal of this causality 
in favour of Hamlet (and Freud), having duly noted that it is Oedipus, with his opacity as 
a representative of psychic instinct, that needs to be explained: `[Oedipus'] story of 
killing the father, which would seem to express Freud's filial ambivalence, in fact 
10 
represses it: the murdered father can forever remain innocent while the son shoulders the 
guilt' (Garber 168-69). For Lupton and Reinhard, and incidentally Jonathan Crewe, 
The hermeneutic of discovery as well as the concurrent dynamic of appropriation 
would indeed seem to make Hamlet rather than Oedipus Rex the crucial 
`Freudian' work, since it is in relation to it rather than the Greek play that the 
discovery of the oedipal structure of unconscious desire can be (re)effected. 
(Crewe, `Naught So Damned' 41, qtd. in Lupton and Reinhard 15, quotation 
marks and italics original) 
Thus in this reversal of perspective, prompted in particular by contemporary probings 
into Freud's personal circumstances at the time of publication of The Interpretation of 
Dreams, Oedipus, in contradiction to Starobinski, acquires the psychological depth 
which he furnished Hamlet with in Freud's original reading. However, for the literary 
critics like Vernant on the classicist side and Stephen Greenblatt on the Shakespearean 
side (whose most recent pronouncement on the issue was Hamlet in Purgatory), this 
switch should remain perfunctory because it does not engage deeply enough with the 
dramatic and historical substance of both texts and therefore does not demonstrate its 
relevance to them. " 
After this bibliographical excursion, it should become clearer how it is that a 
detailed engagement with Oedipus and Hamlet has not yet been undertaken since the 
publication of The Interpretation of Dreams. The question now is certainly whether this 
engagement at the intersection between psychoanalytic and literary criticism is 
11 'The overwhelming emphasis on the psychological dimension, crowned by psychoanalytical readings of 
the play..., has the odd effect of eliminating the Ghost as ghost, turning it into the prince's traumatic 
memory or, alternatively into a conventional piece of dispensable stage machinery ... But we... can perhaps begin.. 
. 
by recognizing that the psychological in Shakespeare's tragedy is constructed almost entirely out 
of the theological, and specifically out of the issue of remembrance that, as we have seen, lay at the heart 
of the crucial early sixteenth-century debate about Purgatory' (Greenblatt 229). Indeed, for Garber, for 
example, the Ghost is a 'memory trace' (129), and for Erlich it is a `projection' of the 'troubled 
imagination' (39). 
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necessary and viable. If it is to be agreed that psychoanalysis is limited to the instinctual- 
biological paradigm; and if it is to be agreed that tragedy as genre squarely belongs to 
the philological and traditionally historicist studies, then the answers to the two parts of 
the above question would have to be negative. 
However, a careful reading of Freud, Sophocles, and Shakespeare cannot result 
in the required agreements. Psychoanalysis cannot be reduced to a straightforward 
biological paradigm, which became obvious already with Lacan's influential revision of 
Freudian theory centring on structural linguistics. At the same time tragedy has been 
long established as a thoroughly heterogeneous phenomenon, irreducible to its textual 
existence and immediate historical contexts. Its psychological, `historically unlocated' 
element is indisputable even for Vemant who clearly recognises its volatility precisely 
through the need to bind it into a certain historico-psychological causality model. How 
exactly, then, can the relationship between psychoanalysis and the study of tragedy be 
restated so that it can overcome the largely artificial divisions between their analytical 
paradigms? 
The example of Oedipus and Hamlet is certainly the key to the answer because it 
is not only the point of intersection between psychoanalysis and literary criticism but 
more importantly the point of their divergence. Therefore, it is necessary to revisit that 
point if its reconfiguration is to be envisaged. A simple return, however, with an increase 
in attention to the textual details of the plays and the intricacies of Freudian and post- 
Freudian metapsychology certainly will not do, as the above surveyed selection of 
sources has shown. The return needs to confront the specific theoretical problematics of 
Freud's approach to Oedipus and Hamlet which mark his attempt to strike a new path, in 
his theory and in literary criticism, at that point. 
12 
As has already been pointed out above, the structure of that approach is similar to 
the standard philosophical use of tragedy, exemplified already by Plato and Aristotle. 
What it purports to demonstrate, however, is certainly different: if philosophy placed 
consciousness at the centre of character, Freud displaced it in favour of the unconscious 
and repressed (incestuous) sexuality which in The Interpretation of Dreams is rooted in 
`Nature'. He was certainly anticipating a furore, given his choice of literary texts to 
illustrate his discovery. This is evident in his correspondence with Fliess two years prior 
to the first publication of The Interpretation. After Freud confided his hunch about the 
source of power that Oedipus and Hamlet continued to exert over audiences in the much 
quoted letter of October 15,1897, he wrote another one three weeks later wondering: 
`You said nothing about my interpretation of Oedipus Rex and Hamlet. Since I have not 
told it to anyone else, because I can well imagine in advance the bewildered rejection, I 
should like to have a short comment on it from you' (Masson 277). Later, Freud added 
the following footnotes to his passage on Oedipus in later editions of The Interpretation: 
[Footnote added 1914: ] None of the findings of psychoanalytic research has 
provoked such embittered denials, such fierce opposition - or such amusing 
contortions - on the part of critics as this indication of the childhood impulses 
towards incest which persist in the unconscious.... [Added 1919: ] Later studies 
have shown that the `Oedipus complex', which was touched upon for the first 
time in the above paragraphs in the Interpretation of Dreams, throws a light of 
undreamt-of importance on the history of the human race and the evolution of 
religion and morality (365; n. 2). 
Indeed, despite his apparent hesitation in the letters to Fliess, Freud was certainly 
enjoying the `amusing contortions' of the opposition to his main thesis. Apart from the 
notoriety effect, which he may have been pursuing, the basis of his enjoyment certainly 
lay in what he considered a solid foundation of his theory which he outlined more 
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explicitly in The Introductory Lectures to Psychoanalysis published between 1915-17. 
This foundation was certainly his redefinition of human `Nature' because it was indeed 
this nature that his opponents12 appealed to as a witness in their rejection of his theory: 
You know what horror is felt, or at least professed, in human society at 
such [incestuous] intercourse, and what stress is laid on the prohibitions against 
it. Some people have supposed that breeding considerations on the part of Nature 
have found psychical representation in this prohibition, since inbreeding would 
impair racial characters. Others have maintained that, as a result of living 
together from early childhood onwards, sexual desire has been diverted from the 
people in question. In both cases, it may be remarked, an avoidance of incest 
would be secured automatically, and it would not be clear why such severe 
prohibitions were called for, which would point rather to the presence of a strong 
desire for it. Psycho-analytic researches have shown unmistakably that the choice 
of an incestuous love-object is, on the contrary, the first and invariable one, and 
that it is not until later that resistance to it sets in; it is no doubt impossible to 
trace back this resistance to individual psychology. (210) 
When it comes to Freud's demonstration of the same logic at work in Oedipus and 
Hamlet, it remains rather at the level of his conviction that the reality in the plays is `the 
same ... at root' (332) as the clinically established reality of the naturally incestuous first 
choice of the sexual object. What betrays the contradiction between the two realities is, 
first of all, the word `forced' which, in faithfulness to Sophocles' plot, Freud uses to 
describe Nature's influence in The Interpretation: 
Like Oedipus, we live in ignorance of these wishes, repugnant to 
morality, which have been forced upon us by Nature, and after their 
revelation we may all of us well seek to close our eyes to the scenes of 
our childhood (365). 
That is, if, according to . 
`psychoanalytic researches', the first sexual choice is naturally 
incestuous, in what sense can it also be `forced upon us' and, more particularly Oedipus, 
12 E. g., Edward Westermarck with his concept of 'reverse imprinting' from The History of Human 
Marriage (first published in 1891). 
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by the same `Nature'? The obvious answer that is provided by Sophocles' text and by 
the recent painstaking rereading of Freudian metapsychology by Jean Laplanche is that 
the choice in question cannot be limited to nature as such - that is, the biological- 
instinctual mechanism that is responsible for the endogenous, stage-by-stage 
development of sexuality in Freud's later theory of drives. What is missing from Freud's 
conceptualisation from The Interpretation onwards is the impact of the nurturer on this 
development. 
Indeed, the role of `Nature' in Sophocles is played by Apollo's oracle which is 
hard to interpret as simply a representation of Oedipus' hidden (unconscious) wishes as 
Freud does. On the contrary, what can be attributed to Oedipus is resistance to their 
encroaching imposition from outside. To be sure, Freud mentions in The Introductory 
Lectures the resistance that `sets in' `later'; however, in Sophocles' text, the resistance is 
present at the very moment of Oedipus' birth. Under the influence of the oracle which 
presents parricide to him not as wish but as an unconditional fact, Laius violently 
inscribes his negation of it into Oedipus' body (and, effectively, his name) at the 
moment of his birth when Oedipus obviously cannot be the subject of the respective 
wishes and actions. 13 This inscription, meaningful for Laius and Jocasta, remains for 
Oedipus a physically present but completely incomprehensible deformity 14 until the 
arrival of the Corinthian. Conversely, the oracular messages he receives from Apollo and 
13 Which is point is poignantly made by Jocasta: 'As for the child I bore him, not three days passed / 
before he yoked the ball joints of its feet, / then cast it, by others hands, on a trackless mountain) That 
Time Apollo did not make our child/ a patricide... ' (717-21, Gould). 
14 'It is impossible to tell from this word [kakon, 'evil', 'trouble']' that Oedipus uses to refer to it 'whether 
Sophocles meant us to think of a painful or even crippling infirmity or merely disfiguring marks (perhaps 
even slight ones) of which Oedipus was ashamed' (Gould 123, note to the line 1033). As it is often the 
case in the play, the ambiguity of this word in intrinsic to Oedipus' ambivalence about this matter, at once 
long-forgotten and evoking strong emotion once it is mentioned ('A fearful rebuke those tokens left for 
me! ' (1035, Gould). 
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Teiresias are comprehensible at the level of language but completely incomprehensible 
in relation to his volition. Thus it is clear that, in Freudian terms, the patricidal and 
incestuous `wishes' in this case are not only imposed on Oedipus by heterogeneous, 
external agents since (before) his birth, but that the heterogeneity of this imposition, far 
from being a function of `Nature', simultaneously constitutes the negation/repression of 
these wishes. 
In all fairness to Freud, and contrary to his detractors who, like Vernant, impute 
to him a straightforward ascription of these `wishes' to Oedipus's, there is a clear 
perception not only of their imposition in his accounting for the effect of the play as a 
`tragedy of destiny' 16 but also a subtle suggestion of their repressive externality: 
His destiny moves us only.. . because the oracle laid the same curse upon us... King Oedipus, who slew his father Laius and married his mother Jocasta, merely 
shows us the fulfilment of our own childhood wishes.. . Here is one in whom 
these primaeval wishes of our childhood have been fulfilled, and we shrink back 
from him with the whole force of the repression by which those wishes have 
since that time been held down within us. While the poet, as he unravels the past, 
brings to light the guilt of Oedipus, he is at the same time compelling us to 
recognize our own inner minds, in which those same impulses, though 
suppressed, are still to be found... Like Oedipus, we live in ignorance of these 
wishes, repugnant to morality, which have been forced upon us by Nature, and 
after their revelation we may all of us well seek to close our eyes to the scenes of 
our childhood. (364-65 italics added) 
There is a striking slippage between the oracle's `curse', `us', and `Nature' as the 
imposingtrepressive agency vis-ä-vis Oedipus. As much as Freud wanted to make nature 
the universal, biological foundation of this causal chain, it is certainly the odd one out. 
ýs `Oedipus Without Complex', p. 108. 
16 However obsolete this designation might have already been virtually at the time of the first publication 
of The Interpretation, according to Richard Armstrong: `Virtually as he was writing the Interpretation of 
Dreams, the great philologist Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf [in his "Excurse zum Oedipus des 
Sophokles" published in 1899] was destroying the kind of reading Freud provides here as the manifest 
content of Oedipus Rex [i. e. the abstract struggle between free will and determinism] (Oedipus as 
Evidence). 
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For it can play the role assigned to it among the other members of the chain only through 
personification (reflected not the least in the use of capital `N'). Thus, contrary to 
Starobinski, there is a definite, albeit repressed, germ of psychological three- 
dimensionality in Freud's reading of Oedipus. The only sense in which this character 
can be said to have no psychological `depth of his own' is that this depth is literally not 
his own but formed through an outside imposition of the repressed acts of 
parricide/incest. Such a vision of psychology in Sophocles would allow psychoanalysis 
to adjust its relationship to the literary studies of tragedy effectively balancing 
concentration on the unconscious with attention to the crucial facts of the tragedy's 
context and dramatic substance. Moreover, it would provide a possibility for a similar 
balanced approach to the psychology in Hamlet which is also preoccupied with Hamlet's 
resistance to the obscene `nature' imposed by and personified in Claudius and 
Gertrude's `remembrance of ourselves', enhanced later by the ambiguity of sin and 
pathos in the Ghost. Why did Freud seem impelled to gloss this imposition over with the 
idea of endogenously formed sexual wishes? 
Freudian studies have offered many answers to this question, especially since the 
1960s which saw the publication of Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis' 
`Fantasy and the Origins of Sexuality' (1964; translated into English in 1968). A 
different and more notorious publication on the matter, Jeffrey Masson's The Assault on 
Truth: Freud's Suppression of the Seduction Theory, came out in 1984 almost 
simultaneously with the English translations of Marie Balmary's Psychoanalysing 
Psychoanalysis (1982) and Marianne Krüll's Freud and his Father (1986) which 
received much less attention. All of these studies, in their different ways, concentrated 
closely on Freud's so-called `suppression' or abandonment of the seduction theory of 
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neuroses announced privately in a letter of September 27,1897, to Fliess (written only 
three weeks before the one where Freud first sketched his comparison of Oedipus and 
Hamlet). The major distinction between Laplanche/Pontalis and 
Balmary/Masson/Krüll's takes on the matter pertains to their understanding of the reality 
status of seduction and its `suppression' by Freud. By 1897, Freud himself saw this 
status as a crucial stumbling block, formed by a convergence of serious analytical 
frustrations: 
[First, ] the continual disappointment in my efforts to bring a single analysis to a 
real conclusion;... Then, the surprise that in all cases, the father, not excluding my 
own, had to be accused of being perverse - the realization of the unexpected 
frequency of hysteria, with precisely the same conditions prevailing in each, 
whereas surely such widespread perversions against children are not very 
probable... Then, third, the certain insight that there are no indications of reality 
in the unconscious, so that one cannot distinguish between truth and 
fiction... Fourth, the consideration that in the most deep-reaching psychosis the 
unconscious memory does not break through, so that the secret of childhood 
experiences is not disclosed even in the most confused delirium. (Masson 264- 
65, italics original) 
In the face of this convergence, Freud found himself forced to redefine the foundation of 
the unconscious, the object of (primal) repression, as the subject's own `phantasy' based 
on the endogenous development of sexuality and repression from the first days of 
infancy - rather than imposed by the external, `perverse', adult agent whose primacy he 
was still affirming to Fliess less than a year before'7. This is, indeed, the point where 
Freud's theory deviates from the `reality' of seduction in his analytical practice and in 
17 'It seems tome more and more that the essential point of hysteria is that it results from perversion on 
the part of the seducer, and more and more that heredity is seduction by the father. Thus an alternation 
emerges between generations: 
1" generation -perversion 
2"a generation - hysteria... 
[all hysteric attacks] are aimed at another person -... mostly at the prehistoric, unforgettable other person 
who is never equaled by anyone later' (Masson 212-13). 
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Oedipus and Hamlet. Freud's interpretation of them in the light of this deviation 
certainly did not strike a note completely unrelated to the interpretative tendencies at the 
time. '8 But it is certainly deeply ironic that the plays he chose to inaugurate his 
disavowal of the reality of (paternal) seduction in favour of the endogenous infantile 
sexuality were the two tragedies where the `guilt' which `the poet.. . brings to light' and 
to which the audience uniquely reacts has everything to do with the parental and wider 
cultural impact on the child. On the other hand, such a step had its own indisputable 
logic in the face of the other alternative where the seduction theory postulating real 
sexual assault as the basis of neuroses compelled Freud to suspect and condemn virtually 
every father of every family without the possibility of proving this sine qua non. Only 
by discarding this narrowly empirical-pathological understanding of seduction could 
Freud start elaborating a new approach to theorising the unconscious that would account 
for its apparently universal presence. In Freud's own words in the last chapter of The 
Interpretation, 
Whether we are to attribute reality to unconscious wishes, I cannot say. It must 
be denied, of course, to any transitional or intermediate thoughts [i. e. the purely 
fantasmatic psychological field]. If we look at unconscious wishes reduced to 
their most fundamental and truest shape, we shall have to conclude, no doubt, 
that psychical reality [i. e. that of the unconscious wishes] is a particular form of 
existence which is not to be confused with material reality. (782, italics original) 
For Balmary, KrUll, and especially Masson, Freud's turning away from the `material' 
reality of seduction amounts not so much to a theoretical misstep but to an effective 
11 A. C. Bradley's Shakespearean Tragedy which alleged that Hamlet, once a healthy and decisive 
individual, was portrayed by Shakespeare as suffering from `melancholia' was written almost 
simultaneously with The Interpretation of Dreams (and published in 1905). 
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complicity in the actual sexual assaults on children19. It is hard to disagree with 
Laplanche who characterised their analyses as working within a `crude opposition 
between reality and fantasy', whereas the whole point of Freud's work was certainly to 
raise psychological studies `beyond that opposition' to a genuinely theoretical level 
(New Foundations 122). However, if classifying the unconscious content as `phantasy' 
grafted onto an increasingly monadical concept of human biology seemed to Freud a 
worthy path for his theoretical breakthrough, Laplanche defines it also as the 
fundamental `going-astray'. The inadequacy of the concept of `Nature' as the force 
imposing the primary sexual choice and shaping the psychic constitution of the subject 
became obvious in the general development of Freud's thought as it was in its above 
discussed application to Oedipus and Hamlet. What Freud needed to approach the 
unconscious in all its baffling specificity was a category that would fall outside both 
narrow pathological empiricism and quasi-biological realism. Conversely, the study of 
tragedy has also been tending towards an approach that would overcome the limitations 
of the traditional philosophical, psychological, and philological readings20. The point 
where these two critical necessities seem to meet very productively is the category of the 
message introduced by Jean Laplanche in the course of his restoration and 
comprehensive revision of Freud's seduction theory, with the unmistakable echo in the 
above quoted polemics of Vemant against Freud. ' In what sense does message, with 
"The most recent work that is developing this thesis is Mary Marcel's Freud's Traumatic Memory: 
Reclaiming the Seduction Theory (2005). 
20 A number of recent studies of the matter - Michelle Gellrich's Tragedy and Theory (1988), Susan 
Gearhart's The Interrupted Dialectic (1992), and Terry Eagleton's Sweet Violence: the Idea of the Tragic 
(2003) - have all been investigating the possibility of a more inclusive, `heuristic' approach to tragedy 
(Gellrich 8). 
21 `... the meaning present within the work... must be painstakingly reconstructed through a study at every 
level of the message that a legendary tale or a tragic fiction constitutes' ('Oedipus Without the Complex' 
86). 
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Laplanche, become a fundamental category in psychoanalytic theory and in what sense 
can it be relevant to the study of the two particular tragedies in question? 
Laplanche uses this, at first sight, broad term to return to Freud's abandonment 
of the empirical seduction in favour of 'Nature' and tease out the elusive `truth' of the 
unconscious that is glimpsed and lost in the transition between these two stages in 
Freud's theory. The term `message' helps to achieve a recovery of this truth by 
mobilising its etymology based on the hierarchical dualism of the missive and its 
carrier. 22 That is, Laplanche sees the discovery of the 'third' kind of reality in the 
unconscious carried by Freud throughout his oeuvre but at the same time repressed in 
both his pre-1897 pathological and post-1897 biological conceptions of it. The crux of 
that discovery is indeed that sexuality does not develop `naturally' within the biological 
stage-to-stage progression but betrays a pattern of Nachträglichkeit ('deferred action' or 
`afterwardsnessi23). Initially developed on the basis of Charcot's theory of hereditary 
predisposition to hysteria, this notion helped Freud to describe the peculiar constitution 
of sexual trauma, split between the real but completely missed sexual seduction in the 
victim's `pre-sexual' age and the neutral event that awakened the affective memory of 
that seduction and thus precipitated the trauma (and neurosis) after puberty. With his 
attention turned away from the pathology of seduction to biology, Freud did not abandon 
this dualist model because he was convinced of its relevance to the traumatic impact of 
u From early to late medieval periods, European vernacular languages (Anglo-Norman, Middle English, 
Old French, Old Occitan, Catalan, Spanish, Italian) employed their equivalents of `message' both in the 
sense of `communication, news' and 'messenger, envoy' combining the `post-classical Latin missiaticum' 
(message, errand) and `missiaticus' (messenger, envoy). The carrier here is thus certainly subordinated 
and overshadowed by the charge. In particular, Old French attests the use of `message' as `communication 
by a divinely inspired messenger', which introduces an extra level of distinction between the 
communicator and communique (Oxford English Dictionary). 
23 The first variant of translation is proposed by James Strachey in the English translation of the Standard 
Edition of Freud's works; the second one is devised by Laplanche to render the particularity of Freud's 
usage more effectively. 
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sexuality even though he may have placed both events of sexual trauma in the pre- 
pubertal period (From the History of Infantile Neurosis) or placed one of them in the 
prehistory of mankind (Totem and Taboo). Despite the marginalisation of the external 
seducing agency here in favour of the individual's ontogenetic or phylogenetic past, the 
latter still betrayed, for Freud, the traumatic `bedrock' which was independent from the 
individual's fantasising activity as such and which drew this activity, as in the case of 
the real seduction, into its orbit as the individual matured (Laplanche and Pontalis, 
Language, 336,332). Laplanche certainly does not dispute the confrontation between 
the child and sexuality in a fantasised, repressed form long before the child's biological 
and mental development is able to account for it. However, even for Freud its exclusive 
phylogenetic conditioning is hardly conceivable precisely because of the conjunction 
between the child's prematurity and early confrontation with sexuality in both 
fantasmatic and repressed (real) form, necessary for its later traumatic impact24. Thus, 
for Laplanche and, as he argues, for Freud, it is not biology itself but the position of 
child's biological and cultural dependence on the adult with a fully developed sexuality 
that creates the foundation for the latter's traumatic development. The child's sexual 
fantasy here does not arise automatically at the juncture of `the pressure of the instinct' 
and phylogenetically transmitted scenario that corresponds to its (imaginary) fulfilment 
mechanically triggered by the adult's presence. On the contrary, it is the adult's fully 
formed unconscious that is triggered by the child's presence (the adult's former self) into 
24 `The uniformity of the content of the sexual life of children, together with the unvarying character of the 
modifying tendencies which are later brought to bear upon it, will easily account for the constant sameness 
which as a rule characterizes the phantasies that are constructed around the period of childhood, 
irrespective of how greatly or how little real experiences have contributed towards them. It is entirely 
characteristic of the nuclear complex of infancy [i. e. the Oedipus complex] that the child's father should 
be assigned the part of a sexual opponent and of an interferer with auto-erotic sexual activities; and real 
events are usually to a large extent responsible for bringing this about' (Freud, 'Notes' 208n., italics 
added). 
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imposing its own repressed, fantasmatic presence onto their interaction. Thus it is 
through this enigma emanating from the adult other that the child is confronted with the 
unconscious and the necessity to translate its `message'. 
Laplanche opts for the term `message' also to emphasise the `primal', pre-verbal 
character of this confrontation in a purposeful opposition to Lacan's narrowly linguistic 
concept of the unconscious `structured like a languagei25. Laplanche draws attention to 
the child's infans and biologically vulnerable state which concentrates his or her 
interaction with the adult primarily not on verbal communication but on bodily functions 
and which establishes the physical acts of parental care as the primary channel of the 
unconscious/repressed sexual communication. Attention to this foundational level of 
interaction allows Laplanche to articulate a realistic conception of seduction as a 
`primal', `universal' element in human development that is found `beyond even the most 
general contingency' (New Foundations 89). 
The term `message' certainly cannot re-establish the primacy of seduction in 
psychoanalysis without employing its `enigmatic' qualifier in a specific sense as well. 
For the unconscious sexual message received by the child from the adult is enigmatic 
not only because of the developmental difference between them but because of what 
Laplanche calls `the primordial split' between the adult and the message itself 
('Transference' 221). Because the adult's unconscious was formed in exactly the same 
situation of ontological inequality, he or she is only an unconscious transmitter but not 
the originator of the message. The message thus always remains at the periphery of the 
25 This schematically replaces Freud's 'Nature' with the 'symbolic order' of signifiers into which the child 
is inserted just as another signifier, $. The symbol represents the S-ubject `barred' from its essence by the 
empty'I' of discourse (hence $) which, in return, allows the subject access to `desire' in the symbolic 
order based on the rule of metaphoric-metonymic transposition of signifiers. Before accession to this 
order, the subject as such does not exist for Lacan - therefore, access to the primal situation can only be 
infinitely approximated. 
23 
subject's psychosomatic organisation as a `foreign body'26 whose origin (original 
meaning) is intrinsically inaccessible. Hence its `enigma' and Laplanche's preference for 
Freud's early term `translation' as the technical description of the subject's engagement 
with the message - as opposed to `interpretation' which represses the message's intrinsic 
alterity. 
Having thus redefined the primacy of seduction, Laplanche certainly has not 
done away with its pathogenic dimension. The primal nature of seduction means that the 
subject's translating activity can never be entirely successful. Like Apollo's oracle or the 
Ghost of King Hamlet, the enigmatic message initiates and guides the subject's 
translation of this message beyond the subject's ability to disengage from this process. 7 
In reality, freedom of translation certainly exists, but it is made relative not only by the 
fact of the subject's birth but also by the immediate (familial) and larger cultural 
circumstances determining his or her confrontation with the adult world. The 
combination of these complex factors can significantly enable or disable the 
translatability of the enigmatic message. Accordingly, Laplanche distinguishes between 
two modes of its transmission -'implantation' and `intromission' -that exert the 
respective effects. In the case of implantation, the message's foreign substance is 
introduced, as it were, osmotically, in a `common, everyday, normal or neurotic' manner 
into the `psychophysiological skin' of the subject, which `'allows the individual to take 
things up actively, at once translating and repressing' ('Implantation, Intromission' 136). 
By contrast, intromission is the invasive, `psychotic' mode which relies primarily on 
26 The term introduced already by Freud already in Studies in Hysteria where he uses it to describe the 
lasting effect of the adult's 'entry' into the child's life (6). 
21 This extends even beyond death which, in Oedipus' and Hamlet's respective realities, only makes the 
confrontation with the primal enigma absolute (unlike life where repression and thus temporary respite are 
still possible). 
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bodily orifices to put `into the interior an element resistant to all metabolisation' (136). 
The fundamental point about this distinction is that implantation and intromission are 
present in every given case of seduction, with the balancing between them accounting 
for each case's degree of pathology. This distinction allows Laplanche not only to 
differentiate between the translatable and untranslatable components in the enigmatic 
message (and thus to account for the formation of different psychic agencies28) but to 
articulate the specific reality of the unconscious as growing out of a prolonged and 
intricate process of exposure to implantation/intromission and the correlative work of 
metabolisation. Such a dynamic concept of the unconscious solves Freud's dilemma of 
the infinite regression either into the real or phylogenetic past in search of the ultimate 
primal scene by making it clear that the primal element comes into being and achieves 
its full traumatic impact not in the actual or purely fantasised first encounter between the 
child and adult sexuality but afterwards29 - or in the case of a tragedy, towards the end. 
It is through successive scenes that the former child is led into a pattern of increasing 
entanglement in the primal circumstances of the enigma, irreducible to any one real or 
imagined encounter. 
Although Laplanche's revision of the seduction theory affirms `the cultural' as 
its fundamental dimension and seems closely related to the plots of Oedipus and Hamlet, 
he has never revisited in depth Freud's comparison of the two tragedies ('Transference' 
222). However, he does return to the problematics of this comparison at another level in 
his dealing with another one of Freud's privileged comparisons where the founder of 
psychoanalysis aligns himself with Copernicus and Darwin on account of the blow that 
28 E. g., the superego as a `psychotic enclave' of the untranslatable, intromitted material. 
29 nachträglich or'apres-coup'. 
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his discovery of the unconscious dealt to human self-centredness ('A Difficulty in the 
Path of Psychoanalysis'). While Freud may have considered himself a new Copernicus 
after (apparently) solving the riddle of neuroses with the concept of their allogenic 
origin, he, in Laplanche's view, only posited for himself and his followers another riddle 
by attempting to fit his discovery later into the self-centred (endogenous) paradigm. That 
is why Laplanche considers Freud not only `his own Copernicus' but also `his own 
Ptolemy', having carefully demonstrated that neither tendency ever won a complete 
victory in Freud's thought. Hence Laplanche's designation of Freud's project as the 
`unfinished Copernican revolution' ('Revolution' 60). Such a representation of Freud's 
theoretical duality which microcosmically reflects `the revolution in astronomy' that 
`lasted neatly two millennia' and had different figures responsible for its `intuitions of 
truth' and `goings-astray' helps to underscore the primacy of Freud's identification with 
Oedipus and Hamlet - not only as those who manage to discover the most hidden secrets 
but also as those who also monumentallyfail in these discoveries. 
It is such a balanced perception of homology between Freud, Oedipus, and 
Hamlet based on the Copernican-Ptolemaic ambivalence of their dramatic/investigative 
trajectories that can provide specific terms for a comprehensive approach to the 
comparison between the two plays within the psychoanalytic perspective. It helps to 
focus analytical attention on the wealth of material on alterity pervading the oeuvres in 
question at every level - mythical, dramatic, and textual - without sacrificing the 
theoretical context of Freud's original linldng of the plays. It is no longer necessary, for 
a psychoanalytic analysis of the myth-based tragedy (such as Oedipus and, in a different 
sense, Hamlet), to insist on a distinction between the universal mythical identity of 
Oedipus and the fact that already for Marie Delcourt it was impossible to recognise 
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Oedipus' identity as a universal pre-given: `Il n'y a pas d' cEdipe primitif. Ce qui est 
primitif, ce sont les themes qui, en s'articulant les uns aux autres, sont devenus d'abord 
les gestes d' cEdipe, puis sa vie et enfin son caractere' (ix)30. A similar pattern is 
established by William F. Hansen in his recent translation and detailed commentary on 
the Amleth tradition (Saxo Grammaticus and the Life of Hamlet). The contradictory and 
incomplete nature of the content throughout the narrative and dramatic tradition in 
question can now be an intrinsic part of the psychoanalytic literary analysis, constituting 
an important layer of reference for the theoretically informed study of the alterity 
determining the inter-generic relation between myth and tragedy. 
A related and no less important layer of reference in this study, which a 
Laplanchean rereading of Freud helps to integrate into the analysis, is the material 
existence of the texts in question. What is quite rarely acknowledged outside the editors' 
and translators' commentary on Sophocles' Oedipus is not only the range of conjecture 
inherent in their work with the text but the very basis for this situation. It is known from 
Life of Lycurgus31 that 'already within some 70 years after the death of Sophocles' (Jebb 
lviii) - that is, `between 338 and 326 B. C. ' (Lloyd-Jones 16) - 
the Athenian actors had tampered in such wise with the texts of the three great 
dramatists that the orator Lycurgus caused a standard copy to be deposited in the 
public archives of Athens, and a regulation to be made that an authorised person 
should follow in a written text the performances given on the stage, with a view 
to controlling unwarranted change (Jebb lviii). 
30 'There is no Oedipus [as an individual character] to begin with. What is there is a mutual articulation of 
a number of themes which, at first, become the deeds of Oedipus, then his life, and then his character. ' 
31 'The chief source for the life of Lycurgus is the Pseudo-Plutarch's biography of him in the Lives of the 
Ten Orators. This seems to be derived from the work of Caecilius of Calacte (first century B. C. ), who 
perhaps drew on the earliest life of Lycurgus, that written by Philiscus just after the orator's death. ' (Burtt 
x). 
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Although Jebb's dramatic view of the discrepancy between the manuscripts of 
Sophocles available to the modem editors and the supposed originals is significantly 
corrected by Lloyd-Jones in favour of a much stronger continuity, the initial gap of 
seventy odd years between Sophocles' death and Lycurgus' preservation decree cannot 
be easily dismissed32. All the known work that has been done on these texts postdates 
and logically follows, sometimes to the extreme, Lycurgus' initiative33. In the 
introduction to his recent edition and translation of Sophocles' plays (1994), Lloyd- 
Jones reiterates, as a very probable fact, the opinion of W. S. Barrett (Euripides, 
Hippolytos (1964)) who argues that the so-called official copy of the plays produced 
under Lycurgus `is likely to have been no more than an ordinary text of its day, carrying 
most of the modifications established by actors during the preceding century' (Lloyd- 
Jones, Oedipus 17). In addition, the quality and sophistication of work on the 
manuscripts was steadily declining after the age of Augustus with the full-scale revival 
coming only after the end of the Thirty Years' War with the landmark edition of Brunck 
in 1786. Thus, even given the fact that `on the whole, the text of Sophocles has fared 
better in the MSS. than that of either Aeschylus or Euripides' and that the scholars have 
the relative benefit of relying on a big difference in quality between the Laurentian 
manuscript (Byzantium, c. 11th century) and the rest, Jebb's description of Sophocles' 
text as `a country with generally good roads, but an occasional deficiency of bridges' 
(lviii) still defines the essence of its current state for modem editors like Gould and 
32 The gap between the disputed date of the original production of Oedipus and Lycurgus' decree is 
approximately one hundred years. 
3 It is known that Ptolemy III Euergetes I retained the official copy which he borrowed from Athens for 
the Alexandrian Library in the early 3`d century despite the fifteen talent fine. This made the 2"d century 
editions of the three tragedians by Aristophanes of Byzantium, Aristarchus, and Didymus Khalkdnteros 
possible and thus promoted the transmission of the texts beyond their time - although, necessarily, without 
any guarantee of their proximity to the originals. 
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Lloyd-Jones and, therefore, should be seriously taken into account in the analysis which 
grapples with the conflict between the acts and desire of the protagonist at the level of 
content. 
The situation with the text of Shakespeare's Hamlet and its three main versions 
has certainly received much more attention. Relatively more proximity to what might 
have been the original script (Q2) has not resulted in the resolution of the complexity of 
this situation. On the contrary, the textual scholarship on Hamlet and Shakespeare in 
general has become a prime ground for questioning not only the author's role in the 
constitution of the dramatic text but of the text itself as the origin of dramatic 
performance. The studies of Sophocles' texts lead exactly to the same problem of origin 
positioned between the author's text, the performance text, and the editors' text. And it 
is certainly the theatrically pragmatic dimension of the text that is increasingly 
acknowledged as the main formative aspect in its development, with the supposed 
original constituting often only a relative and imperfect starting point of the text's 
potentially endless evolution through productions. 4 The unique position of Sophocles' 
Oedipus and Shakespeare's Hamlet in relation to this perspective is that they thematise 
the uncertainty of the protagonist's relation to his acts at the level of plot as well as the 
text - and thus productively contribute to the psychoanalytic focus on alterity. 
There certainly exist studies which have already attempted to approach the 
relationship between Oedipus and Hamlet at the intersection between mythology, drama, 
and psychoanalysis - for example, Andre Lorant's 1982 'Hamlet et (Edipe', which is 
34 Extensively discussed by Emrys Jones in Scenic Form in Shakespeare (1971) and John Jones in 
Shakespeare at Work (1995) from a generically theatrical point of view, and most recently addressed by 
Pascale Aebischer in Shakespeare's Violated Bodies: stage and screen performance (2004) with a 
distinctly theoretical (feminist and psychoanalytic) approach. 
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trying to amplify the work of Freud, Ernest Jones, and Starobinski with mythological 
detail based on the work of Marie Delcourt's (Edipe; ou La legende du conquerant and 
reading of Saxo's tale of Amleth. It offers interesting juxtapositions for further analysis 
(e. g., the function of the Sphinx and the Ghost in the play in relation to their evolution in 
the respective traditions); however, it leaves the engagement with the problematics of 
the main juxtaposition - that between Freud and other approaches to the comparison - 
outside of its scope. 
A more compelling example of comparison between the two plays has been 
offered by Adrian Poole in the chapter `Questions and Answers: Sophocles, 
Shakespeare' of his Tragedy: Shakespeare and the Greek Example (1987). Without 
drawing explicitly on the complexities of the intra-psychoanalytical debate of the last 
forty years, the chapter provides its own critique of Freud's comparison of the two plays. 
In a most intuitive relation to the latter, it emphasises the central role that the `gulf' (93) 
between `questions and answers' - and thus the enigma and its interpretation - plays in 
the constitution of the protagonists and respective conflicts. It is certainly the dramatic 
representation of and critical approaches to this 'gulf' n Sophocles and Shakespeare, at 
all the levels discussed above (narrative-mythological, textual-dramatic, and theoretical), 
that will be the focus of attention in the following two sections of analysis devoted 
respectively to Oedipus and Hamlet. 
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2.1 Oedipus - Philosopher? 
In the course of the last three centuries, at least, the story of Oedipus, the 
legendary prehistorical king of Greek Thebes, has become one of the most 
overappropriated narratives in Western culture. This process made Oedipus in his turn 
arguably the most historic mythical figure of the Greek heroic age. It is certainly 
noteworthy that it is in its 5th century Sophoclean tragic form that his story has managed 
to gain its enormous currency throughout the European cultural tradition. 
As we have indicated above, the need for a reasonable interdisciplinary 
approach to Sophocles' Oedipus has already been realised. The recent publication of 
Oedipus, Philosopher (1993) by Jean-Joseph Goux is a highly representative attempt to 
address this need. Through its extensive scope and ambitious agenda, it has managed to 
problematise our understanding of the Oedipus myth and Sophocles' tragedy with a new 
topical force. Therefore, before we launch into our own analysis of the play, we would 
need to consider at greater length the interpretative claims of this study, which will also 
help us to analyse the known tradition of the Oedipus myth with regard to the 
peculiarities of its transformations in Sophocles' text. 
In an effort to provide a historically exhaustive and methodologically rigorous 
analysis of the Theban legend, Oedipus, Philosopher traditionally challenges its classic 
schematic appropriations - those by Freud and Levi-Strauss - in order to reinscribe it as 
a symbol of cultural deviation founding Western rationalism and modernity. What 
constitutes this intrinsic deviation, according to Goux, is the peculiar `filiarchal', 
`autocratic' or `autological' spirit that underlies both Oedipus' character and, 
subsequently, the philosophers and men of modernity. Its essence is foreclosure and 
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denial of ancestry - and, consequently, any knowledge conceived as tradition. 
`Filiarchy' realises itself here through self-engendering and `autodidacticism', resulting 
in the historically increasing `deprojection' of the previous projecting of the divine upon 
the human subject who becomes the centre of the modem universe, democratically freed 
from law as tradition and ruled instead by law as achievement. 
In order to present the Oedipus myth and subsequent European culture as the 
developing epitome of this humanism, Goux constructs a convincing genealogical line 
originating in Oedipus symbolically and, at least, Socrates and Protagoras historically. 
The evolution of this anthropocentric line then spans through primarily such figures as 
Descartes, Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx, and Nietzsche. The unifying symbol for this 
genealogy is taken to be Oedipus' way of dealing with the Sphinx and her riddle. His 
assumed response to it - `Man' - is taken here as a specifically intellectual, verbal 
answer to the monster's enigma, as opposed to the traditionally prescribed bloody 
combat. Such way of dealing with monsters is meant, Goux insists, to mark the end of 
supremacy of the gods and the unspeakable over human consciousness. Conceived in 
this manner, Oedipus' confrontation with the Sphinx, indeed, cannot help being an 
appropriate symbol for the Cartesian cogito, Hegelian dissolution of the `unconscious 
symbolics' (Die unbewusste Simbolik) by the modem subject, Feuerbachian and Marxist 
ideological deconstruction of religion as well as its Nietzschean decomposition that 
inaugurates the Übermensch. 
The deviancy of such anthropocentrism is proved for Goux by its supposed 
origin in the myth of parricide and incest. Furthermore, submitting the myth to 
structuralist segmentation, Goux makes Oedipus' encounter with the Sphinx bear the 
most of the weight in support of his claim that the other two crucial elements, the 
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parricide and incest, constitute only a two-fold consequential punishment for the 
`anomalous' absence of the bloodshed, self-sacrifice, and resurrection sequence in the 
hero's confrontation with the monster, now replaced by the `sacrilegious intellectual 
presumptuousness'. 
This structuralist disregard for the chronology of the myth, where the 
confrontation with the Sphinx comes in between the parricide and incest, becomes more 
understandable when Goux enlists a lengthy support from Plato in discussing the 
composition of human soul and particularly the soul of the tyrant made up of all possible 
sorts of hubris - intellectual, sexual, and governmental - which, for Goux and allegedly 
Plato, is precisely the picture of Oedipus. For them both, the tragic fate of Oedipus is the 
result of a preventable ethical flaw consisting in the failure to realise and maintain a 
balance in the tripartite unity of the human soul which, according to Plato, is composed 
of man representing intellect, lion representing passionate strength and courage, and a 
polycephalic beast representing sexuality. Oedipus' fault, according to this economy, is 
the assumption that the soul consists only of the human intellectual element, which, 
consequently, represses the other two and causes their violent transformation and 
eruption. Finally, this logo- and anthropocentrism, which in the end falls prey to the 
`avoided initiation' into its own repressed passions, is what distinguishes Oedipus and 
his deviantly philosophical myth from the so-called monomyth of royal initiation (the 
term denoting normal myth, introduced by Joseph Campbell in The Hero With a 
Thousand Faces). This, apparently universal, kind of myth leads its hero through a 
similarly tripartite pattern of symbolic encounters with male and female figures where, 
necessarily, with and not in spite of the gods' help, the hero kills the right king who is 
not his father; kills (and not intellectually humiliates) the right female monster; and, 
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finally, marries the right woman who is a daughter of the right king, and not his queen- 
mother. For the examples of such monomyth in ancient Greece, Goux refers his reader 
to the stories of Jason the Argonaut, Perseus the Gorgon conqueror, and Bellerophontes 
the Chimaira slayer. 
Such a reading of Oedipus and his myth, despite its obvious philosophical as. 
well as cultural strength, appears deeply problematic from a variety of points. It will be 
impossible to consider them all here at length, especially those concerned with 
subsequent philosophical and cultural reincarnation of Oedipus. However, what is 
possible and necessary is to address Goux's particular reading of the Oedipus myth and 
Sophocles' tragedy themselves that, although reasonable in its attempt to deal with 
philosophical and cultural limitations of the previous interpretations, is quite distorted 
and sometimes unsettling. 
The main point to consider is Goux's understanding of Oedipus as a tragic 
figure. It is based, as we have seen, on the notion of a reprehensible deviation and the 
inevitable catastrophe at the end. This perfectly agrees with the ethics of Plato, the 
philosopher who banished tragedy from his ideal kingdom. Can we, thus, take Goux's 
interpretation as a Platonic translation of Aristotle's notion of hamartia? 
The disputed meaning of this word can be reasonably designated by its general 
use in ancient Greek as well as in The Poetics in relation to the tragic hero. It generally 
means `missing a target', especially, when throwing a spear, shooting an arrow etc. For 
Aristotle, this word refers to a feature in the character of the tragic hero, not necessarily 
bad in himself, yet which makes him imperfect enough to justify his downfall, thus not 
allowing for a perfectly virtuous man to be destroyed by the gods, which, according to 
Aristotle, would cause only disgust in the audience and fail to produce a good tragedy. 
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Equally, the tragedy would be a failure for Aristotle, if the tragic hero is a vile 
transgressor, in this case rightfully destroyed by the gods, because hamartia in tragedy 
must be inextricably linked with eleos and phobos traditionally translated as pity and 
fear. 35 
What pity or sympathy, indeed, should we feel for a villain? Precisely this 
question arises repeatedly when one reads Goux's analysis of Oedipus, relating mainly 
to Sophocles' dramatic rendering of the story. Not only is Oedipus guilty of the 
intellectual and, apparently, by consequence, murderous and sexual hubris in that 
analysis, but he is also rightly punished by Apollo at the end by the revelation of the full 
truth. In `missing a target with a spear' there is a rare balance of ambiguity between the 
thrust of the aiming hand and the course of the spear - that is, between human intention 
and the will of gods. For Aristotle, thus, Sophocles' Oedipus is still a hero and, actually, 
a model one, neither a villain nor a saint in his quest for truth, while for Plato and Goux 
for this same reason he is entirely and fundamentally deviant. Not only his `missing the 
target' but the `throwing of the spear' itself as opposed to that of Jason, Perseus, and 
Bellerophontes is considered essentially wrong in its intent. 
We could certainly look for the reasons of this puzzling discrepancy between 
Aristotle's and Plato's understanding of Oedipus in particular and tragedy in general in 
their respective philosophies, curiously mirrored in Goux's discussion of the issue. But 
this will not do justice to the tradition of the myth itself. To be sure, Goux's 
understanding of Oedipus is very philosophical, that is logically consistent and culturally 
3S Walter Kaufmann insists that `there is no single word that is just right for rendering Aristotle's eleos. 
But a great poet once expressed the requisite meaning in a single line. The tragic emotion is not pity but 
what Goethe's Faust says as he sees Gretchen in the dungeon, out of her mind: Der Menschheit ganzer 
Jammer fasst mich an [line 4406] - we feel seized and shaken by the whole misery of humanity' (Tragedy 
and Philosophy 52). 
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well grounded within a carefully delineated ethical context. But what does the tradition 
itself have to say about Oedipus as a relentless and doomed autodidact? 
Although the sources earlier than 5t' century BC are mostly very fragmentary, it 
is still possible to reconstruct certain contours of his evolution. Both Richard Jebb's 
extensive introduction to his 1883 translation of The Oedipus Tyrannus and Timothy 
Gantz's 1993 two-volume monograph on the Early Greek Myth, which will demarcate 
our field of reference, agree (as do many others on which they draw) that the earliest 
available accounts of the Oedipus story are to be found in Homer. 
The twenty-third book of the Iliad mentions Mekisteus, `the son of Talaos and 
brother of Adrastos' (Gantz 501), `who came to Thebes of yore when Oedipus had 
fallen, to his burying' (otherwise rendered as `funeral games') (Jebb xii). Both Jebb and 
Gantz are quite certain that it would be quite `remarkable' (Jebb xii) and `not in accord 
with the tone of the epic language' (Gantz 501) to understand the word `fallen' here - 
which derives from a verb designating a series of related heavy battle sounds such as 
soldiers' feet thudding, spears hurtling, or dead bodies falling to the ground - as a 
'sudden fall from greatness' (Jebb, xii). Rather, Oedipus' death here results from some 
kind of violence, most probably `at the hand of an assassin' or adversary in battle (Jebb 
xii). 
The Nekyia, the eleventh book of the Odyssey, does not directly support the Iliad 
reference but gives the first, more or less full account of Oedipus' story when Odysseus 
sees 
... the mother of Oedipus, fair Epicastb, who wrought dread deed with unwitting mind, in that she wedded her son; but he had slain his father ere he wedded her; and presently 
the gods made these things known among men. Yet he still ruled over the Cadmeans in 
lovely Thebes suffering anguish by the dire counsels of the gods; but she went to the 
house of Hades, the strong warder, when she had fastened a noose on high from the' 
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roof-beam, possessed by her pain; and to him she bequeathed sorrows full many even all 
that a mother's Avengers [Erynies] bring to pass. (Jebb xii, italics added) 
As we can quite safely infer from these, probably, complementary accounts, the 
Homeric Oedipus survived the revelation of the truth of his `crimes' and continued to 
rule over Thebes, being respectively honoured after his death, perhaps, in a battle or in a 
coup d'etat, by funeral games. This is later, if a bit indirectly, supported by the Works 
and Days of Hesiod that describe `the great heroes of the fourth age at Thebes' fighting 
`for the flocks of Oedipus' (Jebb xiii). Besides, the existing fragment of Ehoiai, 
attributed to Hesiod and known also as the Catalogue of Women, seems to bring the 
Iliad and Odyssey accounts even closer to portraying Oedipus' funeral as `a social event 
attended', apparently, `by all women of Thebes [let alone men] and accompanied by 
much wonderment over the corpse of much-grieved Oedipus', while `a scholiast to the 
Iliad passage adds that Argeia, daughter of Adrastos [i. e. niece of the above mentioned 
Mekisteus]' and `at some point the wife of Polyneices, came "with others" ' (Gantz 
502). 
Considering this evidence, we can conclude that the Oedipus of this earliest 
available tradition is rather passive in terms of challenging the gods about the truth of his 
life. It is rather the gods that lead him in some way to the marriage with TpicasW and 
then `presently' (this word, aphar, in the above-quoted Iliad passage can also mean 
`suddenly', `shortly after') make the situation revealed, thus suggesting `the swift 
Erynies', the mother's avengers, as the agents. The swiftness of revelation and 
retribution here almost surely precludes the possibility of offspring from the marriage 
which thus links the Homeric version of the myth to the later accounts of Pherekydes 
and Pausanias, who both say that Oedipus remarried after Epicaste/Jocasta's suicide and 
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that it was Euryganeia (apparently, Jocasta's sister) who gave birth to the four traditional 
children of Oedipus. There are no references here either to the deliverance of Thebes 
from the Sphinx (which, while it might be implied in Oedipus' marriage to Epicaste, is, 
as we will see, not always the case), or Oedipus' self-blinding, or Apollo's oracles and 
the city's plague. 
After an extensive survey of various texts and scholia related to the Oedipus 
story both before and after Sophocles, Jebb and Gantz as well as other similar studies 
(notably the above mentioned Oedipe ou le legend du conquerant) agree that until 5th 
century Attic dramatists, the constitution and connection of what we now consider as 
major incidents of the Oedipus myth, such as visiting Delphi, parricide, encounter with 
the Sphinx, incest and revelation were not as fixed as we generally assume they were. 
And they certainly did not straightforwardly depend on what today is viewed as 
Oedipus' autodidactic quest for his identity. We have just seen that there is no 
connection between the Sphinx and Oedipus in Homer (who never mentions the monster 
at all in connection with Oedipus) and no remarkable one in Hesiod (who simply says in 
Theogony that she was `the bane of Thebes' (Gantz 495)). On the other hand, it is `fair 
Epicaste' who possesses the `unwitting mind' with which she, and not Oedipus, is said 
in Homer to have `wrought [the] dread deed' of marrying her son. This, certainly, is far 
from a conclusive piece of evidence that Oedipus' marriage was not a result of some 
kind of accomplishment on his part (again, such as vanquishing the Sphinx, for 
example). Yet, as has been noted above, the Homeric and Hesiodic Oedipus, at least as 
far as we can judge by the sources, is extremely passive in 'suffering the anguish by the 
gods', being `much-grieved' and, finally, `fallen' most probably at somebody's hand, 
leaving `his flocks' to be fought over. Also, presumably not blinded by himself or 
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anybody else as it happens in later tradition, he continues to rule and is honoured at his 
decease while it is Epicaste who obtains the tragic prominence in the Odyssey by her 
sensitivity to the revelations and the active heroic status in her grief-driven suicide. 
Given all the noted peculiarities, we can now pay a closer attention to the later complex 
variation in the motifs of Oedipus' fulfilment of his fate in relation to the advent of 
Apollo and his prophecies. 
In Sophocles' treatment of the story Apollo has a central role because Laius, 
Jocasta and Oedipus seek help and prophecies from him at crucial points in their lives, 
which culminates in the series of fateful encounters. Their determination here, unlike 
that in previous tradition, is deeply concerned with knowledge of their individual as well 
as each other's lives, if only unconsciously related until the crucial juncture. But outside 
and both immediately before and after Sophocles, the situation is apparently very 
different. 
First of all, there is hardly any evidence of an oracle given to or sought by 
Oedipus until Sophocles, which shifts the focus in the causal motivation and, indeed, his 
whole character from intellectual hubris or relentless thirst for truth into different 
psychological and necessarily geographical directions. For example, Gantz attests a 
reference to the scholia for Euripides' Phoinissai attesting a version (with a lost 
beginning) where Oedipus is found and adopted in Argos by Hippodameia, daughter of 
Oinomaos, who presents him to Pelops, instead of Polybus and Merope of Corinth, as 
his own son. When Laius, traditionally, appears in Pelops' house to abduct Chrysippus, 
Pelops' natural son and in this case assumed brother of Oedipus, the latter young man 
`in trying to intervene kills his [unknown] father. ' And `when Iokaste arrives to claim 
the body, he then meets and marries her, thus completing the disaster' (Gantz 492). 
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Although, as Gantz notes, this version is only arguably an early one, it presents us with a 
remarkable ingenuity in the way in which the necessity of Pelops' curse on Laius and 
thus the traditionally known cause for Oedipus' exposure as an infant is obviated. As 
this version's beginning is lost, we will never know how Oedipus got to Hippodameia 
and Pelops in the first place. On the other hand, this version also emphatically lacks 
travelling to Delphi and the encounter with the Sphinx, suggesting that the final 
revelation should have come some other way - perhaps, much like the `sudden' or 
`swift' action of the gods in Homer's Nekyia. However, unlike Homer's version, 
Oedipus here is certainly not the passive victim of the misfortune engineered from 
above, but looks very much like the character in the Iliad and Ehoiai who is a loyal and 
ardent defender of those whom he considers his own family and his own city. 
There is more than one account, including that in Euripides' Phoinissai and 
perhaps his lost Oedipus itself, of a definitely later-than-Homer Oedipus who kills Laius 
on the way to (and not after visiting) Delphi, thus still dissociating the prophetic doom 
and concern for knowledge from the plane of the hero's motives and resulting actions, 
while already putting him on the way to it. Oedipus here is always an outnumbered 
traveller who acts in self-defence and, though in Euripides he knows that he is dealing 
with a king, neither of the parties is warned by the oracles at the time of their encounter. 
Besides, Oedipus himself is a son of a king, in which case it is Laius who acts rather 
hubristically toward his unknown son and conspicuous nobleman, while Oedipus 
performs a feat of valour standing up to the outnumbering challenge. The Phoinissai 
scholia note here, as some other versions do, that after the killing, Oedipus brings Laius' 
horses back to Polybus, refusing to go on to Delphi and thus not receiving an oracle. As 
an explanation, the scholia say that `[Oedipus] felt he could not consult the god in his 
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polluted condition. ' Although Gantz here (493) doubts the authenticity of this note and 
says that no other source in the scholia supports it, the fact that scholiast could offer 
what resembles piety as a motive of Oedipus' behaviour in the given context is rather 
remarkable in view of other contemporary and especially later interpretations of this 
myth. On the other hand, equally doubtful, Gantz notes, is another scholia note here that 
Oedipus obtained purification at Corinth, `back home', and then went on to Delphi to 
receive the oracle. What is rather implied by the remnants of Euripides' Oedipus is that 
Oedipus, once at Corinth after the murder of Laius, learned about Creon's 
announcement of Jocasta's hand in return for the victory over the Sphinx and went 
directly there in order to try out his luck and not in a terrified flight from his alleged 
parents Polybus and Merope (or Periboia, as Apollodoros and other late mythographers 
quoted by the scholia also call the wife of Polybus in this variant of the story). 
Therefore, we could hardly expect the encounter with the Sphinx to be a half- 
conscious intellectual sacrilege, since Oedipus here is not the presumptuous `knowfoot' 
of Goux, derived, mostly, from Sophocles. He again approaches the type of what Goux 
would consider rather a monomythic hero like Perseus, wanting to try out his strength 
and luck in freeing a woman and city from a monster. Here he is also quite passive in 
discovering the truth about his parentage, and, as the fragments of Euripides' lost 
Oedipus suggest, it is Creon, aggrieved by the fate of his late brother-in-law and envious 
of Oedipus' position who takes the lead in the search for truth. This brings us to the 
necessity to reconsider Oedipus' role in the encounter with the Sphinx, which for Goux 
constitutes the profound epitome of the filiarchal deprojective autodidacticism of the 
hero. 
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At the level of narrative tradition (rather than anthropological research 
concerning the rites of initiation and the Sphinx's role in them, that would carry us 
beyond the verifiable data) the chief problem with relations between Oedipus and the 
Sphinx is that it is not actually attested either in art or myth until early to mid 50, 
century, that is Aeschylus' Theban trilogy (467 BC) and the famous Vatican cup `on 
which Oidipous contemplates the creature as she perches on a column' (Gantz 494). The 
`words kai tri [... ] (and three-[footed? ]), appearing on the cup between Oidipous and the 
Sphinx' in conjunction with the contemplative pose clearly suggest the famous riddle 
(Gantz 496). Aeschylus' lost Sphinx should have clearly dramatised the scene, while 
Sophocles' Oedipus never throws any light on the character of the encounter itself only 
alluding to the wording and solving of the riddle. Aeschylus' only reference to the 
episode in The Seven Against Thebes says simply that Oedipus' `removed her', calling 
her, in Hesiodic fashion, `the man-snatching bane' (11.775-77). 
Nevertheless, the Sphinx is certainly attested as early as late seventh and sixth 
centuries as `the bane of Thebes' (Gantz 495) in Theogony and Oedipodeia. The art of 
the same period has numerous representations of her snatching naked unbearded youths, 
on two occasions picturing her flying and pursuing young men with one of them, not 
unlike Odysseus and his ram, either clawed to or hiding under her belly (as is seen on a 
Red-Figure lekythos in Kiel and the description of Parthenopaios' shield in Aeschylus' 
The Seven). That the Sphinx had any particular reason to pester Thebes is not attested 
until 5t' century drama and the indication of her posing any riddles before snatching a 
youth does not appear until late 60'-early 5th century both in art and tragic poetry. Given 
her older fame as simply `the bane' rather than a `riddle-singer', Gantz quite logically 
surmises that, at first, she did not need any riddle or any other pretext to ravish a city. 
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Thus, not until Sophocles is it absolutely certain that the Sphinx did ask riddles of 
Thebans and not until Asclepiades of Samos (3d century BC) the famous text of the 
riddle surfaces, quoted in dactylic hexameters. Gantz notes here (496) that this particular 
meter gives an ambiguous clue as to its origin: on the one hand, it certainly points 
towards an early epic source, such as Oedipodeia; on the other, Asclepiades is generally 
known to take his stories from tragedies and the dactylic hexameter is exactly the meter 
that was used to represent the riddles on stage. Aeschylus' Sphinx could almost certainly 
have provided an answer, but it, or any other tragedy, could also draw from an epic 
source itself. 
Finally, and, most importantly, neither early epic nor tragedy is clear on the exact 
way in which the Sphinx was `removed'. Aeschylus' extant texts do not specify 
anything; Sophocles implies that it had something to do with answering the riddle. 
Euripides' text does not say anything other than to imply a wording of the riddle 
different from the `classic' Asclepiades' one (reproduced also by Athenaeus roughly 
around the same time), thus pointing to some unknown earlier source. And this is 
precisely where the modem reader, such as Goux or indeed any other analyst, feels 
compelled to resort to various sorts of associative conflation. 
In Sophocles' Oedipus, the complex identity problem of the protagonist and, 
especially, the enigmatic pronouncements of Teiresias are positively related to the 
Asclepiades/Athenaeus version of the riddle about: 
'two-footed, four-footed and three-footed upon the earth, 
it has a single voice, and alone of those on land or in the air or sea 
it changes form. And when it goes supported on its most number of feet, 
then the speed of its limbs is the weakest. (Gantz 496) 
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However, as to the victory over and especially the downfall of the Sphinx, nothing 
positive is suggested by Sophocles. Oedipus, of course, quotes his victory as a proof of 
his own, as opposed to the divinely inspired, intellect in the quarrel with Teiresias. Here 
lies one of the cornerstones of Goux's argument that having overcome the Sphinx 
verbally, intellectually, and without the help of the gods, Oedipus offends her into an 
ignominious suicide as well as the gods into a dreadful retribution. 
Sophocles, that is, Goux's main point of reference, does not actually say 
anything about the Sphinx's suicide. Moreover, given the rather volatile temper which 
Oedipus showed in defending himself against Laius (and which example Goux invests 
with the enormous symbolic value of a criminal upsurge of filiarchal violence), it should 
not be, on the one hand, a great exaggeration to suppose that Oedipus might have used 
violence as well as verbal intelligence against the Sphinx as well. On the other hand, if 
the offence against this sacred monster was as great as Goux suggests and if the Sphinx 
was indeed the wild 'savage-jawed maiden' (as called by Pindar, Sophocles' older 
contemporary) ravaging youths on 6t' century cups, she could have also been the one to 
try and revenge herself on the shameless wit in her usual manner - that is, forcing 
Oedipus to confront her in a physical combat. Nevertheless, the author of Oedipus, 
Philosopher prefers to believe that the Sphinx threw herself off the cliff to her death -a 
strange death, indeed, for a winged creature whose flying abilities are attested at least by 
Aeschylus and Kiel art representation. Be that as it may, this version of Oedipus' dealing 
with the Sphinx and her death as suicide comes to us explicitly only with Palaiphatos in 
the fourth century, which could again indirectly corroborate Goux's understanding of the 
situation in Sophocles 51h century drama or have nothing to do with it. Finally, according 
to Gantz, a late fifth (rather than fourth) century Red-figure squat lekythos (a wide oil 
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flask) provides a representation much closer in time to the creation and production of 
Sophocles' tragedy where Oedipus, indeed, `aims a spear at a cowering or collapsed 
Sphinx' (Gantz 497) with a column in the background from which the Sphinx was most 
probably knocked off or had fallen. 
Which was or is, then, the true Oedipus? Looking back at all the bits of evidence 
that have been assembled here from early and later sources, with Oedipus as a warrior, 
honoured at his demise, a ruler and defender of the relatives, a youth eager to try out his 
strength and luck with monsters, arguably unconcerned with his parentage, oracles or 
truth until it `presently/suddenly' strikes him, one would perhaps not find it difficult to 
realise that the difference between `mono-` and `deviant' myths is much more 
ambiguous and is hardly intrinsic to the mythic tradition. 
Various critics have certainly found their respective ways of dealing with this 
heterogeneity, using it to construct an interpretative pattern to the best of their 
understanding. To come back to the Sphinx once again, we should note that the 
remarkable point in Goux's treatment here was to move away from the classical poetic 
sources that invariably associate her with disaster and pestilence to later ancient and 
modern mythographers who present the Sphinx as presiding over initiation rites. There, 
she is, according to Goux, imported by Cadmos, the mythical founder of Thebes, from 
Egypt to ensure the proper royal investiture of his line of descent. And as the ancient 
pre-historical idea of initiation was rather based on the ritual death-and-rebirth cycle, 
one had to succumb to the monster, offering pious silence as the answer to the riddle, in 
order to be ravished and then reborn. Sophocles' Oedipus is presented in these accounts 
as equidistant or rather turning from this ancient tradition and the subsequent modern 
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one that, allegedly, abolishes the mysteries of initiation for the practice of perpetual 
revolt and tyrannical democracy. 
But even in this seemingly justifiable reading of the Sphinx's role in ancient 
culture and, perhaps, the Oedipus myth, there is a considerable. omission of the variation 
in the tradition. Goux here, as well as in most of his argument, himself performs, as it 
were, an Oedipal feat of foreshortening myth for the sake of a chosen philosophical 
`perspective' (which is also his symbol-word, designating the deprojective-humanistic 
transformation of representation in favour of the individual as opposed to the divine, 
`aspective', that is, `non-looking/searching' point of view). This feat becomes 
particularly clear when one comes across Pausanias' account of the Oedipus myth (2°a 
century BC) which, on the one hand, is very much in line with Goux stating that the 
Sphinx did actually preside over the royal initiation in Thebes and that the riddle came to 
her via Cadmos who got it from the Delphic oracle. On the other hand, however, 
according to Pausanias (Gantz 498), the Sphinx here is not the mythic triadic monster 
but an illegitimate daughter of Laius to whom he had confided the riddle. When he died, 
it was she (not Creon or Jocasta) who ruled in Thebes using the riddle to ward off and, 
probably, destroy all other illegitimate male claimants to the throne, thus performing her 
usual `man-snatching' role. But, unfortunately for Goux, the Oedipus of this version 
succeeds in quite a monomythic way by learning the answer to the riddle in an oracular 
dream after many others have been `eaten' by his half-sister. The same Pausanias (as 
well as Pherecydes of Syros, a 6th century BC philosopher), in line with Hesiodic and 
Homeric tradition, specifies that there were no children between Oedipus and Jocasta, 
making Euryganeia Oedipus' second wife and mother of his children. Also, a very early 
source, Epimenides, the Cretan poet and prophet of the 60' century BC who is later 
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known to rid Athens of impurity after the murder of Cylon (640 BC) that resulted in a 
plague besetting the city, names Eurycleia, according to the Phoinissai scholia, as wife 
of Laius and mother of Oedipus. He does not clarify the point whether Oedipus 
eventually marries her or Jocasta, his step-mother in this case, with whom Laius refuses 
to have any children because of the oracle (which is, at least, not the case in the 
Phoinissai itself). By way of conclusion at this point, it should be noted that the tradition 
in which Oedipus appears very close to what Goux would regard as a properly initiated, 
monomyth hero and ruler is unmistakably present in the variants of the myth, however 
fragmented their current state might be. 
If we need any further evidence for the complex ambiguity of relations 
between the `monomythic' Jason, Perseus, Bellerophontes, and the `deviant' Oedipus, 
we should bear in mind that every one of the first three heroes, following as they might 
the `normal' tripartite course of initiation by the `exposer-dispatcher-donor' kings, as 
well as the parallel progression from the maternal to non-maternal female through a 
bloody combat with a female monster with the necessary help of the gods, end up in a 
very Oedipian way. Jason insults Medeia, the helper-mediator of the gods, and has 
himself or his children treacherously killed by her. In other versions he serves only as an 
unwitting vehicle to bring her to rule in Corinth. Perseus offers to go'after the Gorgon's 
head only after Polydectes promises that he will not take Perseus' mother Danae as wife 
until Perseus returns. After he accomplishes the deed, he normally petrifies Polydectes 
and all his court, taking his mother away to their homeland, sometimes even without his 
new wife Andromeda. At the end, he quite significantly organises or at least takes part in 
a five-fold competition involving his grandfather and the exposer-king Acrisios whom 
he unwittingly kills when throwing a discus that is believed to be carried off its course by 
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the gods and hits the grandfather exactly on his foot (from which accident the 
grandfather quite uncannily dies in order to fulfil the oracle that he will be killed by his 
grandson). Bellerophontes, whose very name is actually a nickname meaning `the one 
who killed Belos' (his brother), performs all possible sorts of combat feats on the winged 
horse-creature Pegasus only to presume at the end that he is now fit to dine with gods 
themselves on the lofty Olympus. Before reaching the Olympus' peak, Bellerophontes is 
either thrown off by Pegasus due to Zeus' trick or falls off the horse himself after having 
looked down. As a result of this crashing fall, he becomes blind, lame, accursed, and 
disappears roaming as a beggar. 
What is to be made of all this mythical variation when Oedipus in his myth will 
still remain the one who kills his father and almost invariably marries his mother, while 
not always being either the agent of the final discovery or the one who loses sight, 
wealth and position, and again not always producing incestuous posterity? The simplest 
answer that should reveal, at least, one essential proposition behind this introductory 
comparative analysis of the mythic tradition is that Oedipus' presentation as the deviant 
proto-philosopher by Goux must undoubtedly be a particular and, for that matter, not 
earlier than late 5`h century product. Goux would certainly not argue with this because 
his study speaks about the same in the groundbreaking civilisational revolution in 5th 
century Greece that dispelled the previous tradition. He would also probably wonder at 
the purpose of this analysis which while trying to oppose his views seems hesitant about 
redefining the deviant character of Oedipus at this point in favour of, for example, a 
monomythic hero. 
However, for us it is much more important to see and even insist that it is 
precisely Goux, and to a certain extent later philosophy, that chose to appropriate 
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Oedipus as their `deviant' symbol and thus turn his myth into a deviation, despite the 
available evidence. It is this appropriation that tends to put him into a modem rationalist 
perspective, minimising his not too negligible affinity with the previous problematically 
mythopoeic culture steeped in the dramatic presence of the irrational. 
Whether Sophocles' Oedipus indeed denies the centrality of the irrational or is a 
victim of a recent analytical rationalisation will be one of the chief topics of the 
following analysis of the play. As post-script to this part, we can say that the logic of 
death and rebirth ritual, that is the destructive regeneration, to which Goux appeals, does 
not seem to alienate or preclude deviation as its mode, or even as its ultimate result. It is 
virtually the way in which myth in its attempt to discover and propel itself onto a new 
level subsists, through endless variation and straying. Its action appears to be essentially 
directed not only onto the victim-subject of initiation who is to be destroyed and reborn 
but, more importantly, onto its own self. A more accurate vision of the ontology of 
myth, in our opinion, is thus expressed by Frank Boas (and also Levi-Strauss quoting 
him) who says that 
`It would seem that mythological worlds have been built up only to be shattered again, 
and that new worlds were built from the fragments. ' (L6vi-Strauss 206) 
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2.2 `I, famous to all, Oedipus-by-name. ' 
The founding concern of all the influential studies on Sophocles' Oedipus, 
whether predominantly philological or more interdisciplinary, is to come to some clear 
terms with what is perceived in the play as Oedipus' tragedy. It is not only due to the 
extreme poignancy of the presented events, which would be characteristic of many other 
great tragedies. In the specific case of Sophocles' Oedipus, its intense focus on finding 
the true answers, which is central to the tragic reversal, both induces a perception of 
truth but also essentially problematises the very notion through its revelation as a 
specific negative, `absent', or `missed' presence in Oedipus' whole experience. Thus, on 
the one hand, the general and critical audience feels impelled, or in Laplanchean terms, 
seduced, to extract truth from the play but also becomes specifically alert and uncertain 
about the validity and feasibility of this imperative and its potential results. The truth 
here emerges not as a straightforward, univocal directive but as an aporla, `something 
we don't know that we know', an ärretos, `something we cannot say' (the word with 
which Oedipus hails Teiresias' entrance) - and yet also something we `must hear', 
akousteon (Oedipus' word of injunction to the old Shepherd to tell the horrible, already 
suspected truth at 1.1170). This impossibility of truth in the play, a matter both calling 
for and defying its own interpretation, is what culminates throughout the drama and 
what, apparently centered on the protagonist's experience, invariably tends to unsettle 
the rest of the dramatic personae, the audience, and, thus most importantly, the truth's 
very contours. 
What is to be made of Oedipus? - Laius and Jocasta seem to have asked 
themselves after the prophecy Jocasta refers to at 1.711 'came' to Laius ('elthe Lai¢') 
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from Apollo's `servants' (`huperetön' 1.712). This appears to be the first and exemplary 
moment the story of Oedipus enters the tragic sphere, which complexly mirrors the 
impact it must have had on Sophocles and his contemporary and subsequent audience. In 
both cases, though in different senses, the prophecy/story proves inassimilable and is 
expelled into the prophetic obscurity it has `come' (elthe) from - that is, onto the 
mountain, onto the theatrical stage, into critical debate, and, also dreams (as Plato and 
Freud would suggest). The expulsion of Oedipus resulting from confrontation with his 
prophecy/story marks the beginning of Laius and Jocasta's tragedy. The confrontation 
with the same question proves equally impossible for the - then young and now - old 
Shepherd, which makes him hand the baby with pierced ankles over to another shepherd 
from Corinth so that he does not have to `do away with' (analösaimi, 1174, related to 
`analyse') the baby nor leave him and his prophecy within his land. This, certainly, in 
both cases, while apparently driving the prophecy away, leaves its permanent trace in 
those who confront it, which effectively turns them into facets of its truth. In view of this 
prophecy and truth dynamic, the question is what is to be made of the connection 
between their rejection and return. 
What is to be made of me? - Oedipus asks his Corinthian parents after the drunk 
banqueter lets out that Oedipus `plastös ds eien patri' ('was a counterfeit [son] of [his] 
father', 780). With this question and Polybus and Merope's failure to produce a 
convincing answer, the tragedy enters Oedipus' as well as their life to the extent that 
they lose their only son. 36 Apollo himself gives the impression of being exasperated 
36 The phrasing of the reported drunken taunt suggests that Polybus did not know that Oedipus was not his 
son by birth. This seems to be further corroborated by the fact that on his deathbed he apparently sends the 
messenger who makes his fatal appearance at 1.924 to call Oedipus 'back home' to take over the throne of 
Corinth. The Corinthian theme in Oedipus ' plot thus reflectively elaborates the ironic absent presence of 
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when confronted with his own truth in the face of young Oedipus who came to question 
him about his parentage. He `[sends] [Oedipus] away/ dishonoring [his] demand. 
Instead, other /wretched horrors he flashed forth in his speech' (Gould, 788-90, pp. 99- 
100) 37 Apollo is unable to answer Oedipus' question with an explanatory truth; he 
chooses to `flash forth', profainein, as a daimon does in the absolute jouissance of self- 
manifestation. 8 It is the major indication that either in the form of prophecy given to 
Laius or Oedipus, or in the form of Oedipus' question to Apollo, the truth remains 
inassimilable and asynchronic with regards to any given moment of utterance. This is 
reflected in the resulting paradox of Oedipus' crucial vow to remain a true son without 
finding out the truth about his parents and himself. This very determination to deny the 
prophecy, however, paves Oedipus' way towards Thebes, that is, towards its fulfilment. 
After he leaves Delphi, he meets and kills an old man with a small retinue, disposes of 
the Sphinx ravaging Thebes, marries the local widow-queen and produces four children 
in the succeeding years. This prophecy-fulfiling cluster of events, whose recapture is 
emphatically drawn together at the very center of Sophocles' play, corroborates the 
impression of the nature of truth which can be seen in the dealings between Laius and 
Jocasta, young Oedipus and Apollo observed before. The truth of the prophecy/story 
takes' effect only insofar as it is denied, expelled, and missed. 
However, Sophocles' play proper which has all the above mentioned events as 
background, also suggests that the truth is partitioned and manifests itself in at least 
three crucial hypostases: first, when it comes to be denied/expelled as impossible and 
truth, where Polybus wished to see the son he never knew he did not have, while Jocasta in the end cannot 
bear to see the son she never knew she had. 
"Apollo's apparent refusal to answer the question directly is one of the central mysteries of the plot. It is 
rendered flagrant by the fact that his answer to Creon's query is much clearer. 
38 Or as the sudden beacon at the beginning of Agamemnon. 
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thus sets out on its path; second, when it is consummated through the freedom and 
honest determination of ignorance by the missing parties; and third, when it returns, 
`unexpectedly', `flashing forth' as a revelation. In the play we have accounts of the first 
and the second stages while the action itself is mostly concerned with the third, `un- 
expected' (para-doxos) return stage dramatising the reversal of the denial and missing of 
the prophecy fulfilment by all the characters. The problem with the third stage, as the 
play appears to show, is that the realisation of this fulfilment does not dissolve the 
paradox of the prophecy's negated nature in the previous two stages. The energy of the 
well-intended denial and determination of ignorance to carry it through, when it reaches 
the point of the `unexpected return' of the denied, proves a devastating and 
uncontrollable force as it `re-turns', i. e. literally turns back on its own master: Jocasta 
rushes into the palace and hangs herself followed shortly by Oedipus who blinds 
himself, unable to bear the sight of the newly revealed truth even after death. This 
moment of revelation and its affective consequences provide a violent reiteration of the 
prophecy not only for the main characters but also and necessarily for the audience both 
on and off stage. 
This crucial shift in perspective is emphatically projected by the Chorus in the 
last seven lines of the play. There have been disputes about the origin and value of these 
lines which scholiasts and various interpreters felt were detracting from the quality of 
the preceding material. Nevertheless, the final words of Sophoclean Chorus are very 
much in line with the preceding treatment of the Oedipus myth; they tie together the key 
issues relying on the most significant word-images in the play and offer their final 
pronouncement on the problem of excellence, knowledge, destiny and belonging as an 
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ultimate existential challenge (full of ironic echoes, especially of Oedipus' opening 
speech): 
People of Thebes, my country, see: here is that Oedipus - 
he who "knew" the famous riddle, and attained the highest power, 
whom all citizens admired, even envying his luck! 
See the billows of wild troubles which he has entered now! 
here is the truth of each man's life: we must wait, and see his end, 
scrutinize his dying day, and refuse to call him happy 
till he has crossed the border of his life without pain. 
(Gould, 11.1524-30, quotation marks original, italics 
added) 
This is as far as inability to accept oneself logically gets in the play dedicated to 
systematic undermining of one's identity. The paradox of `happiness' informing 
Sophocles' Oedipus still remains a starting point for all major investigations of the play 
and its related tradition, which more often than not try to resolve it in terms of some 
fallacy of the understanding of the initial conditions. Is this paradox a genuine 
ontological given or the result of individual hamartia in judgment? What is the role and 
nature of expectations that are at work in the tragic genre and what is the degree and 
nature of reversal with which they meet at the end? The following will be a close 
analysis of the play focused not only on these major questions as such but on their 
evolution through the intricate exchange of questions and answers in every scene. 
Any question always stipulates the terms of its expected answer and, normally, 
suggests, at least, approximately, the distance between the two. The relations of 
proximity between questions and answers as well as between characters and the plot in 
Sophocles' Oedipus suggest much less certainty and appear to follow an altogether 
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peculiar regularity, which surfaces immediately in the question of Oedipus' opening 
address39. 
Appearing before the suppliants at the doors of his palace, Oedipus asks them: 
My children, ancient Cadmus' newest care, 
why have you hurried to those seats, your boughs 
wound with the emblems of the suppliant? 
the city is weighed down with fragrant smoke, 
with hymns to the Healer and the cries of mourners. (Gould, 1-5) 
The very first line is loaded with complex oppositions and overtones. Its Greek original, 
`Ö tekna, Kädmou tou pälai flea trophe', allows for multiple ambiguity in attribution of 
what Gould translates as `newest care' (nea trophe) as compared to Jebb's somewhat 
less precise 'latest-born' and the overtly explicative 'latest to be reared' of Lloyd-Jones. 
The conjunction of `children' (tekna) here with 'flea trophe' can explicitly mean that 
Theban descendants of Cadmus are cared for presently by Oedipus and by the `ancient 
Cadmus'. Implicitly, this approximation between Oedipus and Cadmus here is certainly 
more than merely contingent. 
Trophe is interesting here because, as Jebb suggests in a somewhat puzzled way, 
it seems to mean, contrary to the reality, that 'Cadmus is still the tropheüs' (`foster- 
father', `one who brings up', Liddell and Scott4). Lewis Campbell in his 1879 
translation of the line -my latest-born care derived from ancient Cadmus' - as well as 
Lloyd-Jones understand that the tropheüs is Oedipus. The attempt at clear semantic and 
39 The fact that we rely on the Oedipus myth for amplification of the suggestions in the play's language is 
normal and indeed necessitated by the original design since tragedies were composed for and performed in 
front of those who knew the myths all along, despite the insistence of critics like Ahl and Goodhart on a 
sort of abstract, `new critical', approach to the play for the sake of questioning the truth of Oedipus' final 
discovery. However, the truth in the play is questioned only insofar as it is related to the myth, which is 
why we cannot and do not need such an abstraction for better appreciation. 40 From now on referred to as LS 
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relational distinctions and thus at separate attribution of `care' and `origin' of Thebans 
miss the inherent ambiguity of the Greek words tropheüs and trophe that refer both to 
'caringlupbringing' and `breeding' which allows Oedipus' desire to approximate himself 
as much as possible to the Theban royal line of `descent' by virtue of his `care'. - thus 
outlining the contours of his dominant fantasy. At the level of our interpreting 
consciousness and myth, this fantasy of `care' and `breeding' acquires a third, ironic, 
realisation since, unlike Oedipus, we are aware of his literal status as Cadmus' 
descendant and carer. 
Besides, trophe is not only used as an abstract substitute meaning `brood' for 
which the concrete equivalent in Greek is thremmata; it also means `nourishment, 
provision; that which provides nourishment' (LS). Thus at an even deeper unconscious 
level, Oedipus in his addressing the populace of Thebes as `my... newest care' figures 
them as, as it were, the most recent part of the generational provision which he (at this 
point) secretly lacks and longs to partake of, considering himself a Corinthian foreigner 
with doubtful origins, that is `uncared'-for. 
Based on this multiple ambiguity of `care', the larger impression one can get 
from Oedipus' opening lines is of a contradictory nature. Showing himself as a caring 
ruler in his address, Oedipus clearly does not want his people to have such a distressing 
occasion as `the city weighed down with fragrant smoke, /with hymns to the Healer and 
cries of mourners' (4-5, Gould) to appear at his palace in recognition of his power and 
proximity to the Cadmeians. The 'weight'/heaviness of the `ship' of the city here is not 
only a `daring' metaphor, as Gould says, because thumiamc ton, `fragrant smoke', does 
not only refer to incense but to that which is `[capable ofd giving off smoke' (LS) - that 
is, funeral pyres and thus the corpses of those dying in the plague. On the other hand, it 
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is in such conditions as these that Oedipus can really assume the desired degree of 
proximity to the role of the native caring king, which for him carries necessarily a much 
more sinister connotation. The point is that his first `0 tekna', reiterated five lines later, 
does not only put him in the position of an elder addressing his juniors in the persona of 
Cadmus, the Theban proto-father. In Attic tragedy - for example, in the plays based on 
the House of Atreus tradition - the word teknon for `child' was specifically associated 
with mother and begetting as opposed to pais related to father as well as instruction and 
domination (`Agamemnonos pai kai Klutaimestras teknon', Euripides, Iphigeneia 
Taurica, 298, qtd. in LS). Oedipus' repeated tekna (rendered by Gould as `I thought it 
wrong, my sons, to hear your words/ through emissaries' at 1.6) in conjunction with the 
ambiguity of the trophe comes, therefore, to suggest not only Oedipus' extreme concern 
and care towards the suppliants but, on the unconscious level, his reaching towards the 
maternal side of `care', as well as the paternal one embodied in Cadmus, as he would 
like to see himself both legitimized and engendered by the royal power in Thebes. Thus, 
unlike the ending of Eumenides where child-engendering (and teknon) is ostensibly 
pronounced to belong to and invoke the father's prerogative, the beginning of 
Sophocles' Oedipus in its overt invocation of the father and paternal relation, uncannily 
invokes the repressed maternal proximity which will play the decisive role in Oedipus' 
paradoxical realisation of his fate and patricide. 
However, at the given moment, Oedipus, moved, tantalized, dismayed, and 
implicated by the encounter with his yet unknown compatriots, asks a more obvious 
question: why have they come as suppliants to him when in the times of such deadly 
troubles as the current plague their normal destination should have been the Delphic 
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shrine of Apollo (as numerous interpreters and his own actions point out)? He makes a 
point of his wonder and care, coming out to them in person: 
I thought it wrong, my sons, to hear your words 
through emissaries, and have come out myself, 
I, Oedipus, a name that all men know. 
Old man - for it is fitting that you speak 
for all - what is your mood, as you entreat me, 
fear or trust? You may be confident 
that I'll do anything. How hard of heart 
if an appeal like this did not rouse my pity! (Gould, 11.6-13) 
We will certainly have to wait for the priest's words to understand the full import of the 
suppliants' appearance, for Oedipus, though his words are consciously directed at his 
subjects with self-abnegatory concern, keeps revolving within the uncertainty of his own 
ancestral fantasy, which acquires a new key element. In line with his previous wooing of 
the `foreign'-`foster' Theban paternity, Oedipus appeals to the old man, the priest, to 
`speak for the rest' (`prd tönde phönein') without hesitation as he, literally, `would be 
willing to give all aid' (`5s thelontos an emou prosarkein pan') even before he knows 
why they have actually come. To find it out he uses, as Gould notes, `slightly odd', but 
also, as it turns out, uncannily pertinent words, `delsantes e sterxantes', rendered by 
Gould as `fear or trust' (by Jebb as `dread or... desire' and by Lloyd-Jones as `fear 
or... longing'). 
The meaning of sterxantes here has been especially a matter of prolonged 
dispute, which, as is often the case in this play, does not preclude but promote the 
understanding of the play's complex reality in the uncovered polysemy. Jebb explains 
his choice of (literally) `having formed a desire' as the equivalent for the word out of the 
possible `having acquiesced' and `content' (which he cites as the version of Professor 
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Kennedy) as based on the subsequent reply of the priest as well as the general situation 
in which it seems highly unlikely that people have come to Oedipus to ask for something 
having already `acquiesced' or become `content' with their suffering or fear. `Desire' 
and `fear' seem much more natural, although not very clear, motives behind people's 
appearance in which view Gould's rendering of sterxantes as `trust' forms, indeed, even 
an odder alternative to `fear', as he himself admits in the comment to the line. His choice 
of `trust' as the English equivalent seems all the more strange as he also says in the same 
commentary that `having formed a desire' would be much more natural here, while 
Liddell and Scott give precisely such a translation of this passage in Sophocles' Oedipus 
while not mentioning `trust' at all in the whole article on stergö (-ein), the verb base of 
sterxantes. The closest the article gets to `trust', however, is its rendering of stergö as 
referring to `love, affection ... freq. of the mutual love between parents and children; 
subjects and rulers; believers and gods; city and her colonies; wheedling demagogues 
and people; dogs and masters; [finally] brothers, sisters, and friends'. Modified by this 
very specific and multifarious understanding, `trust' would be indeed very apposite in 
Oedipus' parental fantasy pervading the first part of the scene as he perceives the 
suppliants as frightened children who came out of loyal/familial or even abject 
loveldesire to be ruled into order again. 
Although such a reading of this phrase may seem too overdetermined, this is not 
all that can be said about the meaning of sterxantes and deisantes at this juncture. 
Another crucial level at which these two words work together in the context of Oedipus' 
parental uncertainty is their evocation of Oedipus many years before, himself as a 
suppliant at Delphi, with `desire' and then added `fear' to find out the truth about his 
parents. The beginning of the play, taking place many years after that incident, seems to 
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bring that moment back unconsciously into Oedipus' mind evoking the key element in 
his as well as suppliants' desire: Apollo. He seems to be the one who directs Oedipus to 
go out of the palace himself, `not through emissaries', in order to assume the role of the 
ruling father and child in Thebes (which he would fear to do in Corinth). Apollo is also 
the one who seems to have made the people of Thebes turn to Oedipus for help for the 
second time in their history. 
To sum up the ambiguity of his relations to the people, ancestry, and Apollo, 
Oedipus puts himself at the centre of all this intricate relationship by using what would 
elsewhere seem a harmless straightforward formula of designating one's status. Making 
a point of going out to the suppliants in person, Oedipus, as Gould translates it, says 
`I... have come out myself) I, Oedipus, a name that all men know'(8). The English 
variant tries hard here to approximate the peculiar sense of alienation between the `I' of 
Oedipus and his name, both internal and external. What Gould renders as `know' in 
English is actually comprised of a more complex two-word relation which would 
probably be too much for English to accommodate in one line. Literally, Oedipus says 
`I... / famous to all Oedipus-by-name' (`hagö... /ho päsi kleino's OidIpous kaloümenos'). 
The last word, kaloümenos, is the centre of meaning and ambiguation here since it does 
not simply mean `called/named/by name', but also is a participle from the verb kalein 
meaning `to summon before court' which is what Oedipus is going to do to himself in 
the course of the play and what the populace, unwittingly, has also come to do precisely 
because of his being `famous' (kleinbs). Anticipating in this way the final point of the 
play, kaloümenos/kalein relates to the beginning of Oedipus' quest and signifies the 
intervention of and turn to Apollo at the moment in his life when the drunk man `calls' 
(kalei, historic present) Oedipus `a false son of his father'. The verb also means, when 
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applied to designating interpersonal relations, `consider', `define' (LS), which makes 
Sophocles' phrase in question sound also like `I, whom all so famously consider 
Oedipus'. This last overtone, already reaching beyond the play into myth and subsequent 
interpretations, further emphasizes the ironic distanciation between knowledge/name and 
its object in the minds of Oedipus and his suppliants (with the former on a more 
conscious level because of his anxious doubts about his parentage). The distinctly 
Apollonian attribution of all this complex interplay on the themes of belonging, desired 
and unsuspected proximity, which will become more and more prominent in the play, is 
thus cryptically inscribed in these opening lines introducing the two daimonically 
opposite sides of the god - the Healer who has (as it were, homeopathically) sent a 
plague to the city in order to rid it of pollution which he, as the Oracle that stands behind 
Oedipus' `famous' name, is largely responsible for. 
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2.3 `There is a f... 1 creature upon earth... ' 
If Oedipus' opening speech is more dominated by the ironic fantasy of replacing 
the real but daimonically foreclosed Corinthian ancestry with the adoptive but much 
wanted Theban one, the explicit purpose of the suppliants in the second part of the same 
scene shows more conscious hesitation as to what exactly they want from Oedipus. 
Their leader, the priest, says that the people do not want anything from him only 
but rather his help as an intermediary between the city and the daimon (`daimondn 
sunallagais' (1.34)) which, as they believe, is the source and essence of the plague 
besetting their city. As Gould notes at 1.31, immediately before the above-quoted phrase, 
the priest's speech echoes Oedipus' expression of confusion in his opening 
question/invitation with a `rather tortured apology'. What he refers to is the 
extraordinary nature of the situation where the priest of Zeus comes as a suppliant to an 
earthly king for help in the daimonic matters, while the usual procedure would involve 
exactly the opposite order of supplication. 
This case, however, is certainly the famous (as Oedipus calls himself) exception 
explained by the priest's reference to his king's extraordinary saving of the city from the 
Sphinx years ago `without learning anything from us or without proper 
learning/schooling' (`huph' hemön ouden exeidös pleon/ oud' ekdidachtheus', 37-8) - `it 
is, however, with god's assistance, it is said and believed, that you raised/set right our 
life' (`allä prosthekg theoü/legei nomizei th' hemin orthösai blon-' 38-9). Later, 
quarreling with Teiresias over the same `famous' matter, Oedipus will insist that he did 
that by gnome, 'thought/intelligence', only. The belief expressed by the priest here does 
not in the least discount or contradict Oedipus' later assertion. The people admire and 
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honour Oedipus for proving lucky or more precisely `having a good daimon' which his 
brilliance, courage, and care for the city in the confrontation with the Sphinx were for 
them the obvious signs. The Sphinx and the plague, according to the contemporary 
views, belonged to the `daimonön sunallage', which stands both for the `dealings with 
the divine' and `visitations of the divine', and in both, of course, with more irony than is 
acknowledged at the present moment, Oedipus famously proved to be `andrön de 
pröton' (33), ` the foremost of men'. 
This explicit and major reason for the suppliants to appear before Oedipus' 
palace, of whose desperate strangeness they are aware, also develops the same ironic 
distortions of proximity and distance between the knowledge and its object which we 
saw working in Oedipus' opening speech. This development is working to show how 
deeply the Sphinx and the plague are the same matter and how deeply the same is the 
man and the daimon they relate to. The import of the priest's speech points with more 
suggestion to the three levels of daimonic influence commonly designated as a 
calamitous visitation (the Sphinx, the plague); as a name or characteristic of any divinity 
particularly when its identity, motives, and involvement in one's life are not well- 
understood; and, finally, as a guiding principle, an internalised divinity of a person, his 
other, immortal self. Gould's description of these levels in relation to Oedipus as a play 
about discovering `the real relation between Oedipus and his daimon' in all its three-fold 
capacity is very apposite here, except for the reservation which the term `real' acquires 
in its course. Because, despite the veering of the unconscious/daimon towards the 
surface, what remains to be re-examined is the actual content on both sides of the line 
between the two spheres, and in particular the elusive and shifting character of the line 
itself. 
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The three-fold presence of the daimon and the Sphinx as its particular sign 
develops the introductory interplay of hints in Oedipus' opening monologue into a major 
historical theme from the very first lines of the priest's speech. He hails Oedipus as `Ö 
kratunön [... ] choras emes' (14) rendered by Jebb as `ruler of my land' and by Gould as 
`[you Oedipus] who holds power here'. At the end of the speech, at 1.54, there appears a 
discreet but also prominent opposition between `kratein' (the verbal root for kratunön), 
meaning `hold in power by sway, might, excellence', and `archein' implying power 
through `primacy, belonging, tradition': literally, after calling Oedipus the 'ruler/holding 
power' at the beginning, the priest ends his appeal with something like `if you are to 
belstay (a real) ruler (arxeis) of this land, even as you hold power here now (`krateis')/, 
it is better to hold power ('kratein') [over this land] with men than over a waste' (54-55). 
The priest is hardly advancing some restrictive conditions or reproaches to Oedipus' 
power in Thebes; on the other hand, there is no secret or question about Oedipus' non- 
arche rule at the moment because everyone knows him as a foreigner. But trying as the 
priest is to inspire Oedipus to prove once again his reputation as the city-saviour with the 
apparently innocent archein-kratein combination, which on the syntactical surface of the 
line look more like synonyms than antonyms, the priest unconsciously strikes a very 
powerful chord with Oedipus' parentage and identity problem. Set thus as innocently 
factual and also seductive supplicatory terms, these key words in the priest's speech 
respond and present themselves in perfectly stimulating kind to Oedipus' opening 
ancestral fantasy of longing to find in Thebes the missing part of his excellency (krate-), 
that is, his primacy and belonging (arche-). 
The unconscious and the daimonic are never too far from each other here. The 
exact way in which the priest's speech offers Oedipus an opportunity to turn from 
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'krate' to `arche' is ominously filled with unsettling suggestions concerning the doing- 
away with the Sphinx through answering (literally, `unraveling') her riddle - which 
indeed, unknowingly, opened then for Oedipus the literally direct way towards his 
arche. Neither Jebb nor Gould draws enough attention to the krate-arche opposition and 
the desire/seduction relation in the priest's speech whose message resembles a maternal 
call: `be closer and dearer, as a true Theban-born would be (arched, putting your 
excellence/power (krate) to saving us once again' - which is what Oedipus exactly longs 
for himself. Jebb does not consider the opposition of the verbs in the speech meaningful, 
while Gould stresses the point of ambiguity of Oedipus' position as the one `holding' 
and `held by' the power, which is certainly extremely relevant but is not literal enough 
to reflect the meeting of maternal and filial desire in the verbal exchanges here. The 
problem of the identity of Oedipus' unconscious longing and relation to the particular 
Theban `chdros' (land as country, delimited space) as his chthonos (land as soil from 
which one springs) constitutes the untranslatable complex involving both Oedipus and 
the Theban people in their desire to return to the primal, pre-daimonic41, healthy, 
condition of arche. This desire, however, in both cases assumes also a strongly daimonic 
form, that of the riddle, thus tending towards its opposite - that is, an inevitable 
Sphinxian self-destruction on both sides. 
Although the riddle itself is never cited in the play and there is evidence for it to 
have more than one version, the language and symbolism of Sophocles' Oedipus seems 
to draw emphatically on the imagery of Asclepiades/Athenaeus version whose 
translation was quoted in the previous section and which is going to be quoted now in 
41 which proves to be, indeed, daimonic, or even, as it were, 'always already' post-daimonic at the end of 
the play 
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full together with its original Greek text so that we could have a closer look at its 
correspondences with Sophocles' text: 
Esti dlpoun epi ges kai teträpon, hou mia phöne, 
kai tripon" allässei de phuen mönon höss' epi gaian 
herpetä kineitai and t' aithera kai kata pönton. 
all' hopötan pleistoisin ereidömenon posi baine, 
entha tachos guioisin aphaurötaton pelei auton. (Jebb 6) 
(There is a two-footed upon the earth and four-footed creature, who has a single voice 
and is also three-footed. 
it changes shape alone of those on land or in the air or sea. 
And when it goes supported on its most number of feet, 
then the speed of its limbs is the weakest. ) 
Its central image of the adult (dipoun, two-footed) who is also a child (teträpon, four- 
footed), with `single voice' (mia phdne-), and also old man (trIpon, three-footed) 
immediately springs to mind when the priest in his introduction points out to Oedipus 
the ages of the suppliants he is speaking for in his `single voice' driven by the daimon of 
the plague: `those not yet strong enough to fly far' (`oi men oudepd makrän/ptesthai 
sthenontes', 16-17), `those heavy with old age' (`oi de sün gera bareis', 17), and `those 
of the chosen unmarried youth' (`oide t' etheön lektoi', 18-19). These, representing the 
land's regenerative cycle, its arche, implore and lure Oedipus into becoming their 
master-saviour once again almost exactly as the Sphinx did before - with the added 
irony that liberation of Thebes from her was the direct precursor of the current plague. 
The different syntax and metaphors in the supplication now emphasizing the young and 
old age as well as the inextricability of doom and escape (flying, heaviness of age, 
chosen-ness) is going to become the focus of the play's later revelations. In both cases 
Thebes is portrayed as bound, clenched in a grip, which is the meaning of the Greek 
`sphiggein', the generally disputed but here definitely relevant etymological verb root 
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for the word 'Sphinx'42. If in the former case, as the priest informs us and reminds 
Oedipus, it was tied by the `dasmos'(36), the 'tax/tribute' which Thebans were to 
`render' (`pareichomai', ibid. ) to the `harsh singer' (`skleras aoidou', ibid. ), at present 
Thebes is described as `tossing' (`saleuei', 23) as if in the grip of a deep (`buthdn', 24), 
deadly/bloodred (`phoiniou', ibid. ) swell ('salou', ibid. ), out of which it is unable to rise 
('anakouphisai', 23). 
The Athenian maritime connection of this extended metaphor has been 
considerably emphasized (e. g., by Bernard Knox) and is also apparently strengthened by 
the preceding mention of the 'twin shrines of Pallas' (`Pallädos diplois naois', 21) 
which, according to both Jebb and Gould, should together with the ship/sea-metaphor 
have immediately reminded the Athenian public of the Erechtheum and Parthenos, the 
-twin shrines of Athena overlooking the acropolis, ravaged by the plague and war during 
the time of the performance staged in the city priding'herself on its seapower (thalasson 
krate, Pericles). 
However, the three-fold Sphinxian structure of the passage's imagery proves no 
less strong an evocative pull, which with the mentioning of the third temple, the 
prophetic embers of Ismenos (`Ismenou manteia spodö', 21), transports the picture out 
of Athens back to Thebes where Apollo's shrine by the river Ismenus was also joined by 
the twin temples of Pallas, Pallas Ogka in West Thebes and Athene Kadmeia (or Athena 
Ismenia), mentioned by the scholiast to the play - to say nothing of the fact that the 
deadly swell gripping the Thebans can be perfectly embodied by the city walls. 
42 Hesiod calls it Phix and quite a largely shared opinion holds it that it is neither a Greek nor Indo- 
European word, from which sphiggein may even be an inspired back-formation. Even if this is not true, 
the events in Thebes described in Sophocles' Oedipus are certainly Sphinxian back-formations; 
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Developing this theme, the daimonic trinity in the priest's speech is substantially 
modified and complicated with a distinctly maternal implication evident in the 
description of the three-fold blight of Thebes that is `withering in the fruits of its land, 
withering in its flocks, and fruitless labours of the women' (`phthinousa men käluxin 
egkc rpois chthonösf,, phihinousa d'agelais bounomois tökoisi te/agonois gunaikdn', 25- 
27). At the same time, the overarching hypostasis of this blight is said to be the 
masculine `fire-bearing god' (`ho purphdros thebs'), the hateful plague (`loimbs 
echthistos' (27-8)) that has `swooped upon the city' (as with a staff or club-like weapon, 
LS) and 'harries/drives. . . the city', `skepsas elaunei... polin' (28 - as a daimon would 
until the victim `has had enough', LS). This is the first strong symbolic connection made 
in the play between the three-fold Sphinxian blight and the odd singularity of its 
daimonic staff-armed personification here. Like the tripartite creature under one voice of 
the riddle evoked by the priest's supplication for the three generations, the three-fold 
blight of Thebes is personified under a figure of a singular `fire-bearing' daimon 
`swooping' upon the city, as if with a staff. This heterogeneity, certainly, points to many 
later developments like the image of `discovered' self-blinded Oedipus, but also to 
Apollo as the daimon who flashes forth (profanein) in his traditional role of the one who 
swoops (skeptein) upon a victim from afar. Also, in an ironic twist, it may be seen 
pointing to Prometheus with his fire-brand - and all three (again, the daimonic number) 
come to be reflected under the name of the native Theban Ares, which generalizes the 
blight as an ambiguous, both internal and external, foreign and native, self-reflexive, 
haunting condition. The chief puzzlement at the level of symbolic development here is 
the merger of the distinctly masculine personification and attribution of the blight with 
its three-fold manifestation as the ravager of the maternal, engendering function. 
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If we attempt to look into this puzzle from the point of view of Theban daimonic 
typology, the present situation suggests a perfectly symmetrical transformation of sex 
and orientation in the evoked daimon. In the first visitation, it was the traditionally triune 
but overall female Sphinx who came after the city's male youths (if this indeed was the 
tribute whose substance is never clarified in the play, while towards the end there is a 
strong impression that the Sphinx was there solely to accommodate Oedipus on the 
Theban throne). Now, the present visitation in the priest's description, which uncannily 
evokes the riddle in the previous one, is a masculine daimon in the form of plague that is 
after women and Thebes collectively as the three-fold mother of its offspring (the Greek 
word for `Thebes', Thebai, is plural feminine, and it is probably also relevant here to 
remember the characteristic multiple gates of the city, not prominent in this but in other 
Theban-set contemporary plays). Just like the creature in the riddle, the daimon visiting 
the city over the years appears to have multiple, coexistingly heterogeneous, `phue' 
which in the riddle translation quoted above is rendered as `shape' but which can 
relevantly mean 'substance/nature' in the poetic language. The key riddling aspect of the 
daimon evoked in this scene (as well as of the creature in the riddle) is precisely the 
enigma of its heterogeneous coexistence with itself, the mode, reason, and condition of 
the changeability of its phue. The implicit question that the riddle is wondering at is 
what makes the creature change? how/why does it manage to do it `alone of those on 
land or in the air or sea'? This wonderment acquires a sinister side when it becomes 
involved in the evocation of the Theban daimon. As it was signified in the previous 
sentence, quite a simple (some might say even childish) riddle with apparently a definite 
and fairly straightforward answer (`man') turns into what Laplanche in his theory of the 
unconscious and repression emphatically prefers to call `enigma' (the Greek word for 
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`riddle') - the message `proposed to the subject by another subject' ('Time and Other' 
254) but which, unlike a riddle, exceeds and haunts conscious intellectual and psychic 
control of the parties involved. 
A crucial indication of the sinister, `enigmatic', link between the changeability of 
the riddle-creature/Theban persecutor-daimon and the act of engagement with and 
response to the riddle lies at the heart of the priest's supplication scene (and certainly 
looms increasingly large as the play progresses). The change in the shape/nature of the 
riddle creature becomes associated with the change and return of the daimon to Thebes 
in the priest's evocation of Oedipus' victory over the Sphinx. By way of explaining their 
extraordinary appeal, the priest reminds Oedipus of the time when he `came to Cadmus' 
city and unbound the tax' (35-36) that they had to render to the `harsh singer'. The 
Greek verb `exelusas' which Gould here renders as `unbound' is full of dramatic, 
indeed, daimonic connotations for the action it describes. Although the phrase does 
imply the solution of the riddle by Oedipus (referred to in different terms at 11.398 and 
1197-200), it essentially relates only to the (unwittingly ominous) result of the answer, 
that is, literally, to `loosening, unraveling' the dasmos ('tax', `tribute') that, as Jebb says 
in his note on the use of exelusas, `was as a knotted cord in which Thebes was bound' 
(n. 35,16). The act of 'loosening/unraveling' that in Greek is applicable both to riddles 
and literal knots has a crucial nuptial connotation referring to undressing, freeing the 
bride by the groom, which is what Oedipus certainly and crucially achieved. But in this 
particular situation and in relation to his particular bride what he also and simultaneously 
achieves is certainly an unconscious multiple daimonic reincarnation because by solving 
the riddle, by loosening the Sphinx's grip on Thebes, he unlocks the doors to Jocasta's 
bedchamber, both a royal consummation of his excellence (krate-), initiation into 
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procreative adulthood ('two-footedness') and, unwittingly, a daimonic return to his 
childhood (`four-footedness') and primacy (arche-). 
Daimonia, existence under/with/as a daimon, appears thus unavoidable in the 
context of the play, since facing the riddle does not really unravel it but makes those 
who attempt it assume its terms of existence. The enigma of the riddle (the uncanny 
mutual invasion of the daimon and human being) becomes a distinctive but also 
ambiguous attribute of the persona of the unraveler, Oedipus, making him `famous to 
all' but at the same time not altogether assimilable either to himself or to the people. For 
the priest, the Chorus, and increasingly in his own mind, Oedipus (as a name and 
persona) curiously stands out as a peculiar defender, daimonic intermediary and 
visitation, now benign but later a source of pollution, foreign and immanently Theban - 
something they already chose and will again try to choose not to look into, as though 
under permanent if ironic Sphinxian persuasion to heed `their feet', that is, something 
more real and urgent, as Creon will imply. This looking away is significantly set off by 
another indication of the arche-ambivalent symbolic merger of the Sphinx, Jocasta, and 
Thebes in relation to Oedipus and the daimon harrying them at 11.1197-200 where the 
Chorus, already after the revelations, refers to Oedipus' destruction of the Sphinx with 
the same word the priest uses now in his supplication to describe the plague `withering' 
(phthiein) Thebes in its mothers, flocks and crops. Thus by ridding the city of the 
daimon, on which Oedipus prides himself, he is actually said, again literally and 
unconsciously, to take its place, role, and, here symbolically, even form in the city's 
ongoing generation crisis. 
However, all these extremely suggestive verbal associations between Thebes, the 
Sphinx, the plague, Jocasta, Oedipus, and the daimon are completely unconscious at this 
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early stage. In fact, these connections are possible here as well as throughout the play 
only insofar as they are denied any conscious possibility and presence at all. Conversely, 
the drama is only made possible through reliance on their immense revealing and 
forbidding force that does not allow any conscious association between the protagonists 
and their daimonic counterparts. This force, which, as it were, oversees its own 
boundaries - simultaneously saving and killing, producing and reducing, loosening and 
binding, abandoning and leading, illuminating and blinding - is manifested, as we 
ventured to say at the beginning of this section, in a peculiarly dialectical character. It is 
peculiar because its mode of representative problematisation, albeit involving multiple 
oppositions, prefers a paradoxically non- and simultaneously pan-oppositional view of 
the opposites in which the presence of the latter is mutually inclusive rather than 
exclusive. Various heterogeneous features in the representation of the conflict are shown 
to coexist as components in a third, inclusive entity which pertains but is not equal or 
confined to their respective individual realities. Neither the symbolism nor the evoked 
reality in the play is absolute or originary; they are both made to bear witness to a third 
inclusive category of their uncanny, daimonic, relation. Unlike traditional dialectics, 
here we seem to be presented with a perpetual anxiety and deferral of synthesis not 
because of the irreconcilability of differences but precisely because of the anxiety over 
their distinctions. Thus, on the one hand, the play communicates a sense of anxious 
necessity to produce a definitive and conscious synthetic judgment about the order and 
relation of the opposites, and, on the other, it seems to be caught in an irresistible pull 
leading towards an ultimate, unconscious, hyper-synthesis, a collapse of all categories 
into, as it were, the terrifying one-ness of the daimonic real (which until the final 
moments remains at the level of unconscious wordplay). 
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2.4 The Killer(s) of Laius and Oedipus. 
The multiplicity and singularity of the daimon as well as parental and protection 
anxieties, observed in the opening scenes, significantly develop in the subsequent scenes 
of Creon's arrival from Delphi, the ensuing first Chorus and interview with Teiresias. 
From the inchoate stage of subtle and deeply unconscious wordplay, these issues gain 
dramatic prominence in the problem that is to be raised in connection with the present 
daimonic crisis in Thebes. The problem is certainly none other than the murder of 
Oedipus' predecessor Laius as well as the identity and, particularly, the number of the 
murderers. 
The conditions of introduction and the trajectory of development of this problem 
are critical for the direction of the conflict. For Oedipus and the rest of the dramatic 
personae, the oracular turn to Laius answers their deepest anxiety - the absence of the 
parental, or more exactly, paternal arche - and thus paves the way for its joint and also 
increasingly conflictual pursuit. For many interpreters, this moment is likewise the first 
major point of divergence. Some consider the emergence of Laius' murder in connection 
with the Theban plague as the unmistakable sign of the divine intervention, some 
consider it the beginning of Creon's coup d'etat. Some, compellingly, define it as an 
`imperative of initial situation' acting outside both personal and divine agencies (Knox 
10). 
Bernard Knox's is a compelling vindication of the latter point of view in relation, 
firstly, to the plague and with a lengthy emphasis on the importance of understanding 
Oedipus and Oedipus Tyrannus as the epitome of `self-sufficient' Periclean spirit based 
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on full responsibility and free wi1143 as opposed to (what Knox perceives as) the 
predestination approach of the Freudian-psychoanalytic inflection. 44 To refute the latter, 
Knox starts, quite paradoxically, with the first choral ode that follows the arrival of 
Creon and thus what can be considered the initial instance of divine intervention taking 
place within the action in the form of the divinely-announced cause and remedy for the 
plague - the polluting murder of Laius ('miasma... phonon' 11.97,100) and driving out or 
killing of his killer (`andrelatoüntas, e phön$ phönon palm/ lüontas', 11.100-1) 
respectively. 
Unlike Oedipus, the Chorus in the first ode does not make any particular sense of 
Creon's announcement. The only identifiable reference to it there is the opening appeal 
to the Delian Healer (i. e. Apollo): 
.. .I am on the rack, terror 
shakes my soul. 
Delian Healer, summoned by "ie! " 
I await in holy dread what obligation, something new 
Or something back once more with the revolving years, 
You'll bring about for me. 
Oh, tell me, child of golden Hope, 
deathless Response! (Gould, 155-159a, Gould, italics added) 
Apart from the internal ambiguity of the key words in the passage, `exanüseis' and 
`chreos', which Gould here renders, in a close compromise between the debating 
opinions, as `bring about' and `obligation' paired with 'something '45, the general tone of 
the appeal clearly expresses faith in and desperate dependence on the divine 
43 'I sum it all up by stating that the whole city is the school of Hellas, and that the individual Athenian 
citizen addresses himself to the most varied types of action as a self-sufficient personality with the utmost 
versatility and charm' (qtd. in Knox 73). 
44 Like Vernant, Knox did not consider the implications of Freud's peculiar assimilation of 'destiny' to 
'Nature' (discussed above in the Introduction) which, in the larger context of psychoanalytic theory, 
worked against, rather than in favour of, a straightforward predestination. 
as Compared to 'accomplish' and 'thing' in Lloyd-Jones, and 'work' and 'thing' in Jebb, who also refers 
to 'enact' and 'requirement' in Whitelaw (Jebb n. 155,33). 
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interference. This tone and references to Apollo as well as Athena and Artemis as the 
defenders against the disaster certainly do not openly identify the plague itself as divine- 
sent 46 However, the supplication for defence does imply a close relation between the 
affliction and invoked deities. Knox himself admits that Apollo could not only be 
depended upon for defence against plagues, but rather to the contrary, he 
... is, in fact, traditionally the god who sends pestilence; every spectator of the play 
would in the early scenes think of the opening of the Iliad, where Apollo's deadly 
arrows kill mules, dogs, and men, and "the pyres of the dead burned numerous. " The 
Athenian spectator would also be reminded of the plague at Athens in the early years of 
the Peloponnesian War, and the current attribution of it to Apollo, on the basis of the 
god's promise, made oracularly at Delphi at the beginning of the war, that he would 
collaborate with Spartans (Pericles should have been ousted due to an ancient pollution). 
(Knox 9, italics added) 
Nevertheless, on the grounds that the Chorus here, in contrast to poetic tradition, appeals 
to Apollo only as the saviour and invokes his deadly arrows as defence against the 
plague, identified with the god Ares, `tön apbtimon en theo? s thedn' ('the unhonoured 
god among gods', 1.215), Knox concludes - in a second paradoxical step - that the 
plague is not the effect of Apollo's interference, let alone that of Ares' (whom Knox 
prefers to consider only a figurative personification of the epidemic). This goes not only 
against what Knox identifies as the traditional role of Apollo in relation to plagues but 
also the contextually suggestive fact that Apollo, known as a deity especially presiding 
over the cases of pollution, has now declared, at least through Creon, his confident 
knowledge about the cause of the current plague in Thebes which just happens to be an 
uninvestigated polluting murder of the former king. With the correlative contingent 
appearance of the Corinthian messenger (who just happens to bring new pieces of news 
that intensify Oedipus' oracular anxiety), the conjunction of events in this play, starting 
46 As opposed to the above-discussed imagery of the 'fire-bearing god' swooping upon the city in the 
priest's appeal to Oedipus. 
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with Creon's announcement of the Delphic verdict, suggests the already noted much 
more intimate relationship between Oedipus and Apollo than `fate', `freedom', or 
`political plot' approaches can grasp. 
This is the direction in which Knox is himself moving after positing the plague 
as non-interference (with the caveat that it is such only so far as Oedipus and everyone 
else, possibly except Teiresias, can imagine). In his view, one should pay attention in the 
case of Oedipus Tyrannus to the crucial difference between prediction and 
predetermination: 
The external power might predetermine, with or without direct interference; it might 
also merely predict. This is, it is true, a form of intervention, for the human being to 
whom the prediction is imparted may be affected in his decisions by the prediction [... ] 
Yet this is an entirely different way of presenting the problem, for it leaves the 
individual concerned a large measure of free will; the prediction is not fully causal, as 
the predetermination, with or without incidental interference, is. (Knox 35) 
The exact distinction between predetermination `with or without interference' and 
prediction `as a form of intervention' that Knox is trying to draw in this context is 
difficult to grasp, given the complex interrelation of seemingly contingent `interference' 
events as well as neutrally intervening predictions which, in Knox's words, act both as 
objective imperatives and at the same time give an impression of directing Oedipus' 
powerful reactions towards a certain goal - namely, the discovery of the prophecy's 
fulfilment. These crucial events, which include the plague; Apollo's linking it with the 
murder of Laius; Teiresias' (and thus Apollo's) linking of this murder with Oedipus (and 
the initial parrincest prophecy); and, finally, the appearance of the Corinthian messenger 
which crucially alters the original design for the interrogation of the Old Shepherd - all 
these events occur in such a manner that, if not excludes, then, at least, renders their 
contingency deeply suspicious. 
76 
To illustrate the distinction between predetermination, `with or without 
interference', and a `mere' prediction, Knox contrasts Sophocles' use of Apollo in 
Oedipus with Euripides' use of Aphrodite in Hippolytus where the goddess 
`predetermines everything' from the start without informing the human characters of her 
will (34). The fact that Aphrodite conceals her determining influence makes it, for Knox, 
more decisive - whereas Apollo's will is less so and more neutral because it `ig 
represented by the prophecy in the play and by the prophecy alone' and because it relies 
on the `complement of Oedipus' character' for its fulfilment (38,41). 
At a closer look, this difference is incidental: both Aphrodite and Apollo 
substantially rely on human characters for the fulfilment of their respective daimonic 
wills, and the fact that a daimon announces his or her will in some form to the human 
characters does not necessarily imply any diminishment in predetermination. On the 
contrary, the essential point of Sophocles' perspective on Apollo - and Euripides' on 
Aphrodite - is to emphasise the infinity of difference between the human and daimonic 
power where it does not matter whether the human character perceives and/or believes in 
the daimonic intervention: the daimon works anyway. However, to consider this work in 
Oedipus an objective `mystery' where `the relation between the predicted destiny and 
the divine will' is intentionally `left undefined' would be too hasty (Knox 38). 
First of all - and specifically in Sophocles' Oedipus - there can be no separation 
between `prediction' and `divine will'. Oedipus is born into the world thoroughly 
permeated with oracular messages (Apollo, the Sphinx, Teiresias). Furthermore, these 
messages do not permeate the space and time of the play neutrally but appear to be 
specifically fashioned to each receiver's character at the given space-time point so that 
they can affect the receiver's self-identity in the deepest possible degree. This 
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impression is certainly due to what Knox calls the `complement' of the human character 
- and what Laplanche was later to designate as the drive to translate the enigmatic 
message. 
However, it is only one part of the picture, because it is the very presence of the 
daimon in the world of Sophocles' Oedipus that creates for the human character what 
Knox designates as the `large measure of free will' and is responsible thus for activating 
the character's relationship to the world. What Knox's conceptualisation carefully 
misses - and thus prepares the reader to appreciate better - is the fact that this `measure', 
far from being `large', has all the attributes of what Laplanche designates as the situation 
of primal seduction (discussed above in the Introduction) - and thus lies `beyond even 
the most general contingency' (New Foundations 89). 
If we look into the history of oracular interaction that Sophocles makes available 
in Oedipus (outlined above on pages 30-31), a distinct daimonic complement - as 
opposed to the human one emphasised by Knox - makes itself clearly visible. The 
contrast that Knox draws between Sophocles' Oedipus and Euripides' Hippolytus does 
not only help to appreciate the substantial reliance of the daimonic forces on the human 
characters for the fulfilment of their will, but also a deeply affective involvement of the 
daimon in the process47. In particular, the fact that Sophocles dispenses with any explicit 
motivation for Apollo to intervene (through his inspired `servants') into the life of Laius' 
47 Although Aphrodite's position in relation to Hippolytus' plot resembles that of Ghost of Andrea in The 
Spanish Tragedy in that she is outside the immediate action, the goddess is, nevertheless, deeply involved 
in it, just as the Ghost of Andrea ('But for his sins against me I will this very day take vengeance on 
Hippolytus; for long ago I cleared the ground of many obstacles, so it needs but trifling toil. '). 
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household48 seems to suggest that for him it is, indeed, interference (rather than non- 
interference) that is the essence of the daimonic. 
The original prophecy about Oedipus - the prime mover of the plot - is not 
mentioned by Jocasta in the context of any solicitation. Therefore, we are led to believe 
that it came unsolicited (11.711-12). Nothing substantially changes if solicitation of the 
prophecy is to be assumed49, because what matters for the plot is Apollo's extraordinary 
status as a god. Presumably, prior to reception of this prophecy, Laius and Jocasta did 
not care to distinguish between the god and his ministers (as Teiresias later implies50). It 
is the conjunction of the prophecy with god's authority that made them change their 
mind and thus laid the foundation of the play's conflict. The unconditional nature of 
Apollo's prophecies in Sophocles, often emphasised in traditional analyses of the play, 
is in reality only relative; its equation with non-interference and objectivity is 
fundamentally misleading. For this unconditionality essentially depends on the condition 
of the god's communicating that exact original prophecy to the mortals in question. If 
we are to understand that his prophecy was indeed the prime mover of the situation 
(responding only, as it were, to the fact of Oedipus' birth), then all he needed to do to 
make the story run a different course was not to communicate the prophecy. If we are to 
understand that a solicitation by the parents was made, all Apollo needed to do was to 
communicate the prophecy as a warning against exposure of the child unless the parents 
desired to rear a parrincest. 
4e Discussed above in relation to Rudnytsky's argument in Freud and Oedipus (Introduction). 
4' Gould notes here on the fact that in 'Sophocles' time, the world was full of oracles, and it was necessary 
to have some explanation for the fact that some were to be trusted whereas others were not' (n. 712,91). 
so 'Stupid I seem to you, yet to your parents /who gave you natural birth I seemed quite shrewd' (Gould, 
435-36). 
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In the second crucial encounter - when Oedipus himself came to Delphi - 
Apollo's task was even simpler. All he needed to do was to tell Oedipus the names and 
the city. Because he did not do it, the situation at the beginning of the play itself is 
already irremediable. The response that Creon brings from Delphi and the subsequent 
scene with Teiresias make it clear that Apollo either did not particularly want to or could 
not make the situation remediable. The ambiguity of `either/or' here may not matter 
greatly with regard to the final result, but what it allows us to perceive is the irreducible, 
intentional, and thus enigmatic element in the communication of the oracles (akin to the 
above mentioned Aphrodite's attitude to Hippolytus). 51 
In his discussion of religion in the context of psychoanalytic studies - and 
particularly with reference to the case of Judge Schreber52 - Laplanche confronts 
fundamentally the same problem: 
That God is enigmatic, that He compels one to translate, seems obvious in the 
entire Judaeo-Christian tradition of exegesis. Whether this enigma presupposes 
that the message is opaque to Himself is plainly a different question. Does God 
have an unconscious? ('Seduction, Persecution, Revelation' 190) 
The question of the Christian - or ancient Greek - god's unconscious seems naturally 
undecidable precisely because of the human element in the equation. Laplanche never 
quite answers it in the essay, but he does consistently object to Kant's conceptualisation 
of the relationship between the subject and object where the latter ` "conforms' to the 
"constitution of our faculty of intuition" and our "a priori concepts" ('Revolution' 57). 
Indeed, the place where Sophocles, Knox, and Laplanche meet with regard to this 
51 The comparison with Christ that Knox draws in support of his thesis that divine prescience is not 
logically incompatible with independence of the individual actions only highlights the peculiarity of 
Apollo who is much less compassionate and explanatory in his predictions (Knox 40). 
52 Freud, Psychoanalytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia 
Paranoides) 
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question is not just the irreducibility of the human element in perception but its 
fundamental failure. Oedipus' final realisation of the utter blindness of his life does not 
imply, however, that Apollo's influence on it was non-existent. On the contrary, it 
highlights the infinite depth of its presence which, in the characteristically extreme 
fashion, becomes for Oedipus the sole reality of life (symbolised in his self-blinding). 
Accordingly, Laplanche's question of whether the god has an unconscious should be 
answered in the affirmative with regard to Sophocles' representation of Apollo insofar 
as anyone who transmits enigmatic messages for Laplanche must needs have an 
unconscious. 
Now that we realise the compromised nature of the relation between the human 
character and the daimon in Oedipus' case, the problem emerging with the arrival of 
Creon from Delphi designated at the beginning of this section in terms of the 
`multiplicity and singularity of the daimon' can be meaningfully reformulated into the 
uncertainty of the daimon and, more specifically to the scene in question, the uncertainty 
of the killer(s) of Laius and Oedipus. Although Oedipus is certainly physically alive at 
this point, he represents a haunting and haunted survival under, as he is to declare after 
Creon's report, a long-time `obscure' threat of those `hands' that did away with the 
previous läng. This appropriation of the threat is going to build up significantly and 
include not only Laius' position in the arche but also, at the level of the unconscious, the 
very `murderous hands' (Creon's phrase `toils autoentas cheiri timöre? n Linas translating 
the Apollonian oracular injunction is ambiguous exactly to imply both 'punish those 
whoever did it with their hands' and 'punish with your own hands those whoever did it', 
1.107). 
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However, the multiplicity/singularity motifs mutation into uncertainty comes up 
in a still quite latent but no less telling image that Oedipus produces in his short response 
to the priest's supplication immediately preceding the arrival of Creon at the end of the 
previous scene (with the boundary between those quite uncertain itself). First, Oedipus, 
in a truly Apollonian fashion, acknowledges that `gndtä kouk agnötc moi/proseltheth' 
himeirontes' (11.58-9), rendered by Jebb as `well known to me are the desires wherewith 
ye have come' and by Gould as `oh I know, I know the yearnings that have brought you' 
which is much closer to the Greek. However, in both renderings the ironic ambiguity of 
the active and passive in knowing and desire which could literally be expressed by 
`known and not unknown to me are the desires that have brought you forth' (to which 
Loyd-Jones offers also a very close but somewhat too transparent `I know, I am not 
ignorant of the desires with which you have come') remains, at least, in part 
untranslated - especially, in relation to `Ö pa? des oiktroi' (`O pitiable children') here 
which unconsciously and most poignantly includes Oedipus himself when, in the next 
sentence, he deplores: `eü gär oid' höti/noseite päntes, kai nosoüntes, his egö/ ouk estin 
humön höstis ex isou nosei' (11.60-1) -'1 know well that you all are sick, yet, sick as you 
are, there is not one of you who is as sick as I'. The unconscious literal meaning of the 
`sickness' here is closely related to the inclusion and confusion between `the one and the 
many', developed in the image of triune `pain' ('algos') of Oedipus' soul which 
`mourns' ('stenei', the same verb used by Oedipus about the 'weighed-down city' at 1.5) 
`at once for the city, for me, and for you' (1.64). And this all-inclusive both conscious 
and unconscious `mourning', caused by the plague of equally dubious nature and 
attribution, has led Oedipus to Apollo with, as Laplanche says, `a force of the symptom' 
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when he is talking in Seduction, Persecution and Revelation about the Mosaic 
compulsive return of monotheism. As he confesses to the suppliants, 
you do not waken me as from a sleep, 
for I have wept, bitterly and long, (pollä men me dakrüsanta) 
tired many paths in the wandering of thought (phrontfdos plänois) 
and the single cure I found by careful search (eu skopön ehüriskon iasin 
mönen) 
I have acted on [. ] 
(11.65-9, Gould) 
We know that this cure is sending Creon to the Delphic `Pythian/ halls of Phoebus' 
('Puthika Phoibou dömath', 11.70-1) so that Oedipus, in Ahl's words trying hard to 
render the pun on `Puthika' ('Pythian') and `puthoith' ('to learn'), can `delve' into `what 
[he] must do [drän] or say [phönön] to save this city' (11.71-2, Gould). For Ahl, the pun 
between the Delphic name of Apollo and the verb `to learn' is symptomatic of Oedipus' 
obsession with Apollo and oracles that, he claims, in Sophocles' hands is a sign of 
critical inadequacy of Oedipus as a thinker and saviour who is ironically exposed by 
entertaining a seemingly serious conviction that something he can physically `do' or 
especially `say' will actually be able to stop the plague. Here Ahl cites the skeptical 
Thucydides who, writing about the plague at the time of composition and staging of 
Oedipus, maintained that the disease had nothing to, do with the divine and had a natural 
cause and was spread by contact. 
However, skepticism about both the human and the divine in the context of this 
play is a most precarious ground, as Oedipus and, this time, every remaining figure in 
his peculiar family constellation is about to find out. 
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2.5 The Oracular Logic and Return of the Father 
Jocasta comes on stage to stop a dangerous quarrel within her family. The 
Chorus justly welcomes her appearance as `timely' (`kairian', 631): had she come later, 
Creon may have paid dearly for advising Oedipus to turn to Teiresias to identify the 
killer(s) of Laius. After the blind seer points to none other than Oedipus as the polluting 
culprit of the cryptic prophecy that Creon so proudly brought from Apollo, Oedipus can 
indeed draw only one logical conclusion: Creon has decided to use this moment of 
extreme hardship in the city to seize the throne. Creon's evasive and blatantly 
implausible plea that he, as the king's brother-in-law, already enjoys all the privileges he 
may wish for without the burden of actual responsibility certainly does nothing to help 
his case in Oedipus' eyes. If anything, this defence only strengthens Oedipus' suspicions 
by reminding him that there is but a very fine line between Creon's current status and 
kingship. 
Indeed, only a miraculous intervention can help Creon at this moment, and 
Jocasta certainly provides it by her powerful entrance, instantly breaking up the 
altercation at its most critical, almost as if Oedipus and Creon were her children: 
Wretches, why have you struck up this foolish battle of abuse? 
Are you not ashamed to start up private troubles 
when the country is thus sick? 
(Lloyd-Jones, 634-36) 
Joining her voice with the Chorus, she adds the decisive imploring weight to Creon's 
desperate but also somewhat shifty oaths of innocence. As Ahl points out in his analysis, 
which illuminatingly compares Creon's self-defense with that of Euripides' Hippolytus 
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(from the eponymous tragedy composed at approximately the same time as Sophocles 
Oedipus), Jocasta is the one who, as it were, inserts `gods' (Ahl, 128) into Creon's oaths: 
Believe his words, for the god's sake, Oedipus 
In deference above all to his oath 
to the gods. Also for me, and for these men! 
(Gould, 646-48, italics added) 
Creon's oath that precedes this plea of Jocasta does not, in fact, include a direct 
reference to the gods but to his `perishing accursed' (`aralos... oloimen', 644-5): 
May my life fail, may I die cursed, if I 
did any of the things you said I did! 
(Gould, 644-45) 
In comparison, Euripides' Hippolytus swears by Zeus to Theseus, his father, that he is 
innocent of Phaedra's (alleged) rape and suicide and asks to be put to death and not sent 
into exile if Theseus is not convinced of his innocence: 
Hippolytus I am [... ] amazed at your blandness, 
Father - if you were my son, without one qualm 
I would have had you killed, not exiled, 
if you had raped my wife. (Bagg, 1615-18) 
This is, indeed, a telling contrast with Creon's earlier pleas which, for the most part of 
the previous scene, invoke neither gods nor an actual preference to death over exile (but 
precisely the opposite if Oedipus does not relent - while Oedipus does prefer to put 
Creon to death rather-than exile him)53. 
ss E. g., `... if you find I plotted with that portent/ reader, don't have me put to death by your vote / only- 
I'll vote myself for my conviction) Don't let unsupported thought convict me! ' (Gould, 605-08) - and, 
especially, 
Oedipus But when a swift and secret plotter moves 
against me, I must make swift counterplot. 
If I lie quiet and await his move, 
he'll have achieved his aims and I'll have missed. 
Creon You surely cannot mean you want me exiled! 
Oedipus Not exiled, no. Your death is what I want! 
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However, despite Ahl's reference to the qualification of oaths in Athenian 
courts in Sophocles' time which accepted them only if they were sworn in god's 
name, Creon's last desperate invocation of a curse on his life (ironic as it is in the 
context, where he, unlike Hippolytus, does not want to die) is, at least, as good as 
Oedipus' own curse pronounced in the circumstances (of ancient Thebes) against 
those who may be concealing knowledge about murderer(s) of Laius. More 
importantly, in the context of this comparison between Sophocles and Euripides, a 
much more telling contrast opens between Oedipus and Theseus, since the latter, 
unconvinced of Hippolytus' innocence (just as Oedipus is of Creon's), does not put 
his son to death, but only because he does not want to let him have his way in the 
punishment: 
Theseus A just remark! yet shalt thou not die by the sentence thine 
own lips pronounce upon thyself; for death, that cometh in 
a moment, is an easy end for wretchedness. Nay, thou shalt 
be exiled from thy fatherland, and wandering to a foreign shore 
drag out a life of misery, for such are the wages of sin. (11.1619-23) 
Whereas Oedipus, who is now not fully convinced of his innocence in the matter of 
Laius' murder either, does relent and lets Creon, his kinsman, go unharmed, 
substituting his `hate' (stügos) for punishment. Unlike Euripides' Theseus, Oedipus 
does yield to the Chorus' plea, moved both by the appeal to the lack of direct 
evidence for his conviction and invocation of the troubled `dying land': 
Oedipus Do you know what you are asking? 
Chorus Yes. 
Oedipus Tell me, then. 
Chorus Never to cast into dishonored guilt, with an unproved 
assumption, a kinsman who has bound himself by curse. 
Oedipus Now you must understand, when you ask this, 
you ask my death or banishment from the land. 
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Chorus No, by the god who is the foremost of all gods, 
the Sun! No! Godless, 
friendless, whatever death is worst of all, 
let that be my destruction, if this 
thought ever moved me! 
but my ill-fated soul 
this dying land 
wears out - the more if to these older troubles 
she adds new troubles from the two of you! 
Oedipus Then let him go, though it must mean my death, 
or else disgrace and exile from the land. 
my pity is moved by your words, not by his - 
he'll only have my hate, wherever he goes. 
(654-72, Gould) 
This exchange does prove that Oedipus is not the kind of tyrant Creon implied he was. 
However, the proof is not unambiguous. Why does Oedipus let Creon go against what 
he evidently thinks his better (and anxious) judgment? Creon's reaction to this is 
remarkable: just as earlier he does not show any surprise at the fact that Teiresias 
called Oedipus the killer of Laius ('if he said so, you are the one who knows (oistha)', 
574, Gould), so now he seems to be explaining the `unreasonableness' (`agnötos', 
677, Gould) of Oedipus' behaviour, the `sullenness' of his `yielding' (`stugnbs men 
eikön', 673), in terms of the latter's `excessively wrathful/passionate nature' (`barüs, 
d', hötan/ thumou perasgs', 673-4). Jebb's appreciation of the coordination between 
`sullenness' and `wrathfulness' (`thumou') here makes his translation articulate the 
sense with particular accuracy: 
Sullen in yielding art thou seen, even as vehement in 
the excesses of thy wrath; but such natures are justly sorest 
for themselves to bear. (Jebb, 673-5; and the note, pp. 94-5) 
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Consciously, Creon does not seem to appreciate the deeper contradiction in the 
excessive wrath and sullen yielding of Oedipus' `nature': apparently, again, so long as 
the latter wins. He does seem to explain the lack of reason in this `natural' behaviour as, 
indeed, natural in itself: first, Oedipus' reason is clouded because he gives in to wrath 
too much, then this same wrath heavily clouds his relenting and his reasoning in general, 
from beginning to end. This is what seems to be the one conscious observation that 
Creon makes on Oedipus' nature in his last verse in this scene - which Jebb's version 
closely renders as 
I have found thee undiscerning, 
but in the sight of these I am just. (676-7) 
However, Creon's word agnötos, which Jebb here renders as `undiscerning' (cf. Gould's 
`unreasonable' and Lloyd-Jones' `uncomprehending'), sums up Oedipus in a number of 
suggestive synchronic senses in the context of this and other momentous scenes 
throughout the play54. Gould in his note on this verse traces back the derivation of the 
word to gndme in the periphrasis `I discovered that you don't have true gnöme', a true 
insight (n. 677,89). Although syntactically and consciously Creon seems to mean that 
Oedipus' nature is to blame for this lack, the grammatical and semantic connotations of 
agnötos (agnös), used both in the active ('unknowing') and passive ('unknown') sense 
as well as in the modal meaning of `not to be known' (Liddell and Scott), tie in much 
better with Oedipus' particular sense of lack that permeates his nature, from without as 
well as from within: the uncertainty about his origins as well as certain past events in 
relation to the current situation. 
54 Most notably, `gnötä kouk agnötl', `known and not unknown [are to me the desires with which you 
come]', says Oedipus to the suppliants at the very beginning (58-59). 
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Although the lack of this particular insight is not mentioned either by Oedipus or 
Creon during their altercation, Oedipus' exacerbation throughout the scene and his sense 
of doom towards its end are certainly based on the disturbing link between his sense of 
uncertainty about his parents and the crimes against them which are predicted to him 
(without confirming/disclosing their identity), first of all, by Apollo. The predictidn, as 
we are about to learn from Oedipus himself, results in his particular moral and actual 
inability to know his parents (without the risk of breaking the taboos) and thus an 
inability to know himself fully in relation to others, probed open sharply by Teiresias. 
The oracular logic of the latter in conjunction with that of Oedipus' own solemn curse 
on those who conceal the murder(ers) of Laius reminds Oedipus now, much to his 
dismay, that his (grudging) acknowledgement of the lack of direct evidence against 
Creon makes the specific lack of conclusive evidence in his own favour, as non-killer of 
Laius and real son of Polybus, grow into its (potentially terrifying) significance. He has 
blamed Creon, with excessive anger, not on the basis of direct evidence of the latter's 
conniving with the seer, but, emphatically, to defend his own innocence and truth of his 
gnöme (`ekmänthan'- ou gär de phoneu's haldsomai' -'Ask on: I shall not be proved a 
murderer', 576), called into question by Teiresias. Thus the ambiguity of the sense of 
doom growing out of Oedipus' frustrated exasperation, evident but not elaborated in his 
last exchanges with Creon in this scene, seems to point, in consonance with 
confrontations in the previous scenes, not only to a deep-rooted impossibility of gnöme 
(insight) at the heart of Oedipus' `excessive' nature but also to a deep inevitability of this 
insight for him (which will resound, as we are about to see, in the specific word for 
`heart' at the very end of this scene). He certainly `hates' to let Creon go under pressure 
from the Thebans and Jocasta - Creon is the only one who can conceivably stand 
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directly between him and accusations of Teiresias. He `hates' to let him go because this 
effectively merges the search for the killer(s) of Laius with Oedipus' (older) search for 
his own innocence in relation to his parents and Apollo. But he also has to let Creon go 
because, as we are about to find out, the convergence of these two searches on the 
question of Oedipus' innocence cannot only be the work of Creon's, however plausible 
- or rather, as they both paradoxically admit, implausible - motives for coup d'etat 
together with Teiresias. The, apparently, freakish fit of political wrangling between 
Oedipus and Creon -'foolish strife of tongues' (`äboulon [... J stc sin glösses'), `private 
troubles' ('Idia kakel'), `petty grief (`meden älgos'), as Jocasta calls it at her entrance - 
does conceal, at least, one actual but yet unknown killer. Of whose identity Creon cannot 
(and, as we saw in the previous section, does not really want to) have a (conscious) clue. 
Nevertheless, Creon does represent, in his consistent silence and keeping silent over 
what he does not `know' or `understandi55, the Delphic oracle, the one that `according to 
Heraclitus, [... ] does not speak, does not dissimulate' but `signifies' (Ricoeur, 18). And 
it is through his negative acceptance of Creon's voice, to which he denies all truth and to 
which he is made to listen in the end by the Chorus and Jocasta, that Oedipus, however 
grudgingly, starts looking into himself and gradually agreeing with Teiresias (a more 
explicit and vehement Apollonian voice), when the latter says `Creon is not your pain; 
you are' (`Kreön de soi pem' ouden, all' autos su soi', 379). 
This reminds us (in response to Goux's argument about Oedipus' tyrannical 
nature) that Oedipus is not a tyrant and that he is also not a conscious (free-thinking) 
cold-blooded killer. He, certainly, is or rather was a very hot-blooded but also a 
55 ('ouk oid'" eh ' hois gär mJ phronö sigän philö. ' -'I do not know and when I do not understand I prefer 
to keep silent' (574). 
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singularly accidental killer, and also a self-defending one. The extraordinary fantasmatic 
dimension of Oedipus' speeches that brim with the reenactment of his unwitting crimes, 
in combination with his behaviour towards Creon, reveals itself substantially at a meta- 
or trans-personal level, the level of the daimon's voice and message. He proves from the 
very beginning that his innocence for him, especially in the murder of Laius (but also in 
the matter of 'knowing' his parents), is not a personal but rather a public, ethical matter, 
specifically in the sense in which Heidegger applies ethos as `accomplished dwelling' to 
Sophocles' tragedy, where `human beings become manifest in their relation to being, 
which is to say, in the manner in which they dwell in the midst of beings as a whole' 
(McNeill in Philosophy and Tragedy, 171). It is a matter of public well-being, revealed 
both in the synecdochical and metaphorical relation between the part and whole, and 
thus a daimonic matter, which he vowed to restore, respectively, both to the people and 
Apollo (the daimon), from the very start. As much as one in his position might prefer to 
displace or let this matter `remain where it has stopped' (`enth' eleksen, autoü menein', 
686), as the Chorus suggest he do, he feels obliged to pursue it, because there is no 
difference between the personal and public in this daimonic domain. Oedipus' 
distinctive feature thus, already prominent in the previous scenes, is not only a 
remarkable fidelity to the city (to which Creon may, in part, owe his life) but also a no 
less remarkable, meta-personal fidelity to the oracular/daimonic message. 
Despite the appearance (and lengthy critical arguments) to the contrary, Oedipus' 
and then Jocasta's relation to the oracular voice will prove to be of paramount 
importance. Both may argue against or rather try hard to disprove the truth of the 
oracular messages, but they never effectively disengage themselves from the impact of 
the message itself. Its murkiness or even utter meaninglessness does not really dissolve 
91 
the link between them and the oracle altogether. On the contrary, both Oedipus and 
Jocasta need the oracles to be meaningless in a very particular way, so that their own 
jives and the truth of their insight may have the meaningfulness they have (and 
unwittingly lack). Just as the innocence of Creon in the context of Teiresias' accusations 
against Oedipus makes his eyes open at a certain possible culpability on his part, so a 
coagulation of a certain reality in the meaning of oracular messages threatens to upset 
the order in Oedipus' and Jocasta's lives. This is true in both cases because, however 
obscure may the particular message be, they all do have a link to reality, not only as 
facts but also as wished-for facts. 
In Oedipus' case, as we will see, Apollo's prophecy to Oedipus ambiguously 
relates to a `wondrous' (`thaumäsai men axia', 777), impossible rumour that suddenly 
`attacked' (`epeste', 777) Oedipus' certainty about his identity as a son. In Jocasta's, it is 
a certain disturbing impossibility about Laius' murder in relation to his predicted fate as 
a father. Teiresias is the first one who, within the play, attempts resolving these 
impossibilities by relating them to each other, but his attempt has to be necessarily 
riddling, and is unsuccessful with the addressee since for the latter the seer, too, suffers 
from a lack of full factual insight; or perhaps, Teiresias simply does not need to go into 
the details of the Laius' death at the cross-roads, since, as he says, Oedipus' downfall is 
Apollo's job, not his. However this maybe judged by the end of the tragedy, Jocasta is 
certainly another character who should take a significant, if, admittedly, unintended 
credit for bringing the two impossibilities in a much closer, spatially revealing relation. 
And Oedipus should, certainly, take another part of the credit for not turning away from 
the dark hint at this relation that has just dawned upon him. 
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At the moment of her entrance, Jocasta does not yet understand all this 
complexity of the situation between Oedipus, Creon, Teiresias, the oracles, and their 
unsuspected links to real events. But, after a safe dismissal of Creon, she does demand 
explanation (from Oedipus, not Creon, which is the first, barely perceptible tip towards 
the particular route of her argument leading to the major reversal). Oedipus is eager to 
oblige as he sees in her the only compassionate arbiter and adviser left. The Chorus, 
echoing Creon, want her to make the matter `remain where it has stopped' (`enth' 
eleksen, autoü menein', 686), which is why they find nothing better to say than that 
Oedipus and Creon were both to blame, of `blind suspicion' (`dökesis agnds') and the, 
`injustice wounds' (`dc ptei... tb me'ndikon', 681), respectively (indeed, again as if they 
were children). Such a division and thus concealment of blame by the Chorus is taken by 
Oedipus as afresh insult against his (and the city's) cause and innocence. He turns on 
the Chorus with resentment asking if they really understand the meaning of this division 
of guilt and request to hush the matter up: 
See what you've come to in your honest thought, 
In seeking to relax and blunt my heart? (687-8, Gould) 
Did you really mean by your requests throughout the scene, Oedipus seems to ask, that I, 
as your king, am not able to face the accusers and apparent plotters with clear mind and 
clean conscience? That the city should, perhaps, better perish of plague because of my 
inaction? Or (as we have just seen) that I, rather than Creon, am to abide by my own 
curse and go into exile or die? While none of this is mentioned directly in the question, 
there is also another significant overtone at the very end of Oedipus' verse in the word 
Mar, which adds a sinister, reversing counterpoint to the seemingly obvious suggestion. 
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Gould renders this word as `heart' (while Jebb opts for `zeal' and Lloyd-Jones for 
`passion'). Its metaphorical relation to kearnon, `the carpenter's axe', is emphasized by 
the verb `blunt' (katambh nön). But, as Liddell and Scott note, in Homer this word is 
contracted to ker, which makes it sound even closer (although Mar is already close 
enough) to Ker, `the goddess of death or doom', or `doom, death, esp. violent [... ]', or 
`plague, disease'. This overtone harks back to the Chorus' invocation of Zeus' son 
(Apollo) as the hunter for the hidden/hiding killer of Laius, right after Teiresias' 
departure, who is bringing with him the `deinai Keres anapläketoi', `the dreaded 
goddesses/ of Death, who never miss' (472-3, Gould). In Aeschylus' Seven against 
Thebes, Ker is also the word for the Sphinx (`harpaxändra Ker', `man-snatching bane'). 
Thus in the sense of doom and foreboding that started to emerge with the Chorus' 
invocation after the departure of Teiresias and to coalesce inside and around Oedipus, 
especially with his letting Creon go, the poetic connotations that seem to spring for a 
moment out of this specific word for `heart' figure Oedipus' desire as his `doom' and 
identify it with the voice of the oracular (daimonic) message, both in its sinister and 
enigmatic quality and also in its uncannily close relation to the situation at hand. 56 
However subtle this poetic imagery may be for the Chorus, they do, in a sense, 
provide for Oedipus' doom by making him turn to Jocasta, after they try to present the 
guilt as divided between the two men. But they certainly see Oedipus' frustration with it 
and try to make up by responding to his anxious question with an oath that, for them, 
their king is still `the lucky helmsman' (`eripompos genoio', 696), who `in the time of 
56 As Gould informs us in the note on the Chorus' use of Ke'r at 473, The original scribe of the great 
manuscript in Florence wrote, not "goddesses of death", keres, but "hands, " cheires [so that the Chorus' 
line read]: "and along with the son of Zeus there came the terrible hands that never fail of their victim". 
(Gould 70, the last italics added). 
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troubles set the restless city on a true course' (`hds... en pönoisin alüousan kat' orthbn 
oürisas', 694-5). But at this particular moment, after Creon is let go under their pressure, 
this praise is an exact mirror image of his painfully incomplete denunciation of Teiresias 
and Creon, condemning the truth of their statements57 but not being able either to fully 
counter them or bring the apparent plotters to answer. He would have appreciated it 
much more if the citizens proclaimed him the same `lucky helmsman' not in spite of 
what has been said against him by the `slanderers' but because they would have fully 
upheld him and flatly denounced the latter (better still if he could have done it fully by 
himself- that is, if he knew for sure the accusations against him are completely absurd). 
However, Oedipus can only express his disappointment at finding the Chorus short of 
this kind of boldness and fidelity of judgment (his characteristic gnome-), which he hopes 
to find in his wife and thus reaffirm his confidence and kingship. 
Yet, as we have seen already, this reaffirmation for Oedipus, because of the 
deeper root of his lack of self-confidence, is not a straightforward power measure, in 
which he would devise with his queen some method to neutralise and/or execute those 
who are a nuisance or a threat. Even before Jocasta transfixes Oedipus' mind by 
mentioning the `place where three roads meet' (less than a hundred lines later), Oedipus 
has already demonstrated that he does not want his kingship at any cost, specifically that 
of the Chorus' and Jocasta's pity for Creon. We saw that his own apparent lack of pity 
for Creon conceals a certain, much stronger lack'of pity for himself, sown, to the best of 
Oedipus' memory in Corinth and sealed, as we are about to find out, in Delphi and even 
57 E. g., Teiresias -'... from this day / say no word to either these or me, / for you are the vile polluter of 
this land.. . You live, unknowing, with those nearest to you / in the greatest shame ... A mother's and father's double lashing / terrible-footed curse will soon drive you out' (Gould 351-53,366-67,417-18) - 
and Creon, in response to Oedipus"Authority must be maintained. ' -'Not if the ruler's evil. ' (Gould 628- 
29). 
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more on the road from Delphi to Thebes. To this oracularly inspired lack of self-pity and 
what can be construed, at least, in part as pity towards his (supposed) parents and the 
people of Thebes Oedipus largely owes his present reputation as the conqueror of the 
Sphinx, the king of Thebes, the husband and father of a (still) happy family. This 
success is a product of painstaking struggle with the oracle, of (literally) keeping the 
distance between him and the parrincestuous criminal in the prophecy - but which, 
paradoxically, seals his image for him as such a parrincest through a negative 
association. This paradox shares it nature with the one described by the psychoanalytic 
German term for `negation' (Verneinung), where `keeping the distance' from the 
unwanted implies both `never approaching to' and `never losing sight of, reflected in 
Oedipus' case by the `stars' by which he measured and still measures his distance from 
Corinth and which, in the sense of their reference to the daimon, gave him the point of 
the absolute negative self-reference. The need to keep this delicate paradoxical balance 
of negative self-identification, the need to exercise the lack of self-pity (in order to be 
able to accept one's self at all), the sense of battling and following his daimon, is more 
important for Oedipus than control over others. And it is, again, not only because of, as 
Creon has already suggested (and Jocasta will do very soon), a certain passionate 
imbalance in his nature, a peculiar proclivity towards wrath and fear which makes 
Oedipus' `heart' (kear) and mind (gnome) seize upon a threatening, disturbingly 
impossible idea and react to it with a vehement repression (that is, appropriating it under 
the stress of negation), as if it were a hard-proven, real fact. Oedipus will, indeed, 
himself acknowledge very shortly this peculiarity of his nature when he tells us and 
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Jocasta in what is considered by AM as a strangely displaced prologueSB (17-18) that he 
left his (other) family in Corinth many years ago because, initially, he could not live 
with the taunt of a drunk man who called him `not his father's son' ('plastbs hös eien 
path", 780). Now, we know, he cannot live with himself because of, apparently, no less 
absurd allegation of Teiresias that he killed Laius and, again, that he does not know his 
parents! - which endows the former with its own negative reality, despite the odds. And 
although no one yet believes in the truth of either of the accusations (Oedipus has not 
told his story yet), it is already clear that a troubled relation towards (the murder of) the 
king-father has been a common repressed problem both for Oedipus and the Theban. 
But if before the scene with Teiresias and Creon there was a clear distinction 
(particularly, in Oedipus' mind) between his earlier, negative relation to the almost 
fantasmatic murder of the father and the `ancient', almost forgotten, but actual murder of 
the previous Theban king, now, because Teiresias' allegations could not have been 
effectively refuted on the basis of Croon's political involvement in them, there will be no 
obstacle to the deepening of the commonality between these two cases. On the contrary, 
their conjunction provides a deeper, disturbingly real object to substantiate the 
oracular/fantasmatic dimension in both, which, when the cases were not associated, was 
checked by its apparent lack of connection to the 'objective' circumstances. But to make 
51 Ahl's inquisitiveness about the status of Oedipus' phrase 'My father was Polybus of Corinth' ('emoi 
patlr min Polwbos In KorWhfos'. 1.774) is derived, partly, from Aristotle's confusing reference to this 
same phrase as an example of a typical tragic prologue (Rhetoric 2.1415A) that is normally supposed to be 
found at the beginning of the play (which it is certainly not in this case, at least, in the available 
manuscripts). The other and more substantial question about this phrase raised by Ahl is, nevertheless, 
why the father was and not is. Oedipus, indeed, cannot know about Polybus' death at the moment of 
utterance. Gould's note on the same phrase helps to resolve the difficulty of this introduction being placed 
halfway into the play. in it, he points out that'Polybus was (mown as an ancient king in several legends, 
though not usually of Corinth' which would warrant a seemingly awkward middle prologue (Gould, 
n. 775,98). However, the question of'was' versus 'is' here certainly remains to be dealt with. 
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this object emerge in sufficient, fantasmatic and real, detail from Oedipus' dark 
forebodings we certainly need Jocasta and her reasons for dismissing the scandal around 
Oedipus' relation to the murder of Laius as well as the meaning of this murder as such. 
To change Oedipus' luck (tyche, a very important notion in the context) with the 
previous interlocutors, who tended to pose a continuous challenge to Oedipus on this 
subject, Jocasta comes wanting to reassure and understand; her apparent purpose, unlike 
that of Teiresias and in a different sense that of Creon, is to allay Oedipus' anger and 
anxiety altogether (that is, not to channel it against Oedipus himself). Also, unlike the 
Chorus, Jocasta does not want, at least initially, to hush the whole matter up by simply 
taking Oedipus inside and making him subdue his anger; rather, she seems eager to 
make an informed judgment (perhaps, even a denunciation) of the matter, provided 
Oedipus tells her (again, for the god's sake) exactly what happened: 
Please, for the god's sake, Lord, explain to me [also] 
the reason why you have conceived this wrath? (698-9, Gould) 
Having found the Chorus a disappointing ally, Oedipus prefaces his account of the 
events in a (ironically) Creonian fashion: he says that he `honours' (`sebö', which, 
primarily, means `revere'/`worship' gods) Jocasta more than `these', i. e. the Chorus 
(`tönde', 700, which echoes Creon's exact word at 1.91), and that he will tell her 
everything. His `everything' is that Creon has conspired against him ('moi bebouleukös', 
701) with the help of the `wicked prophet' (`mäntin[... Jkakoürgon', 705), literally, to 
`say that I became the murderer of Laius' (`phonea me phesi Laiou kathestänai', 703). 
Here Oedipus' desperate conviction of his innocence is at one of its peaks: even the verb 
he uses to refer to his relation to Laius' murder in view of the conspirators is not `be' but 
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rather `become', `come into a certain state' (`kathestänai' - the same verb Oedipus uses 
about the suppliants, who have come to sit on the steps of his palace in a certain 
state/mood). That is, in his view, they want to make him the murderer or that they 
devised something to make him such. And he needs someone - now, only Jocasta - to 
share his contrary conviction and unmake theirs. 
The eager queen, however, in whom Oedipus hopes to find a fellow thinker, 
turns out to be - as Hamlet would say -'too much in the son', that is, too much like 
Oedipus both in the manner but also in the object of her thinking, the son. This, at first, 
seems to align her (in a peculiarly unwitting way) more with Teiresias, Creon, and the 
Chorus rather than with her king. Instead of pursuing Oedipus' line of thought and, at 
least, considering, if not condemning, the conspiratorial link between Teiresias and 
Creon behind the surprising oracular accusations, Jocasta, on hearing that Creon used 
the seer's `mouth' ('stoma') for uttering the accusation to keep his (mouth) `completely 
innocent' (`pan eleutherol', 704-5), exclaims `you, then, [Oedipus] should absolve 
yourself (`sü nun aphels seautbn') of `what you are talking about' (`hön legeis peri', 
707). Both Jebb and Gould note that Jocasta's `absolve' (`apheis') here has a most 
appropriate (all the more so as it is unconscious) legal reference to the specific situation 
`when the natural avenger of a slain man voluntarily released the slayer from the 
penalties' (Jebb, n. 707,98). Thus, instead of joining the prosecution on Oedipus' side, 
Jocasta sounds more like her truelunwitting position, that of Laius' plaintiff and 
Oedipus' advocate. 
Furthermore, Jocasta's reason why Oedipus should absolve himself - while he 
has not even begun to accuse himself of anything except inaction towards what looks 
like a blatant treason - is not her conviction that he is innocent while his accusers are 
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not, but that they, as mortals (`broteion'), in the person of Teiresias, simply lack 
evidence to support their oracular accusations: `no mortal', she claims, `possesses the art 
of divination' (`bröteion ouden mantikes echon technes. ', 709). Here, apart from 
approaching the issue with a 180 degree-difference from Oedipus, Jocasta unwittingly 
exposes the peculiar falsity and also a peculiarly oracular bend of her own reasoning: if 
no human can possess the art of divination and thus know'truly the meaning of the past, 
present, and future, then there should be no way of telling who is right and who is wrong 
in the oracular matters - which point she surely makes, only forgetting to include herself 
among the mortals - although later she will not forget to include even Apollo in that 
group. In his observation of Jocasta's phenomenon, Ahl concludes that `she herself 
[thus] usurps the oracle's mysticism' (133). But, given the extraordinary control of the 
oracular truth and logic over her thinking in these scenes as well as the deep and active 
involvement of the oracular word (`manteia', both as voice and meaning) in the events 
of this tragedy, it is no less appropriate to say that it is the oracle's mysticism that usurps 
Jocasta - as well as Laius, and then Oedipus - at a certain point in their lives, but it does 
so precisely as a negated truth of transgressive, alienated desire, thus turning the 
characters involved into interpretative subjects. Jocasta's insistence on the absence of 
certainty with regard to the oracular truth in general rather than on the incredibility of 
Oedipus' particular case at hand should alert Oedipus to the peculiarity of her approach 
in comparison to his own negative association with the oracle - which, on the contrary, 
acknowledges the general truth of Apollo, contesting it only on a particular point. In 
other words, from the beginning Jocasta's and Oedipus' attitude towards the truth, 
although similar in method and the end result, are opposed in the aims. 
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However, Oedipus, of course, has neither the time nor the mood for a detached 
analytical observation because Jocasta goes straight for her reason for the suspension of 
certainty in the oracular matters. Unexpectedly for her, this reason has a diametrically 
opposite effect on Oedipus: it rivets him almost with a full certainty about Teiresias' 
pronouncement and upsets his whole sense of innocence and distance from the daimon 
even further. Jocasta reveals to him that her belief in the impossibility of human 
divination turns out to be based on the fact that Laius was killed, `according to the 
rumour' (`hösper g' he phätis ), `at a place where three roads meet' ('en triplals 
hamaksitoIs') by `some foreign robbers' (`ksenoi pote lgstai phoneüous', 715-6). 
According to the original oracle brought to Laius by Apollo's servants, the killer should 
have been Laius' own child (`phonea genesthai patrös', 721), who, because of the 
oracle, was `exposed with yoked feet on a trackless mountain' (`drthra ke? nos enzeüksas 
podoin erripsen [... J eis c batos horos. ', 719), `not three days after his birth' (`paidbs de 
blästc s ou dieschon hemerai', 717). 
One of the first murky points in Jocasta's argument here is her distinction 
between `Phoebus himself and his 'servants/ministers' (`Phoibou autoü' versus `tön 
huperetön', 712). She says that, in `her opinion' (`erö'), the prophecy that came to Laius 
was definitely not from Apollo himself but from his inadequate human servants because 
it, apparently, was never fulfilled: `Apollo in this case', she concludes, `never brought 
about' (`kantaüth' Apöllön oüt' [... J enusen', 720) what his ministers predicted in his 
name -and that `the things the god must track/ he will painlessly reveal himself (Gould, 
`hön gär an thebs/chreian ereund hrgdiös autos phanel', 724-5). But, at the same time, 
she says that she bases her assurance on the `rumour' (`phc tis', 715), that is, again, on 
human mediation - which in this case is not even that of the prophets but that of Laius' 
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attendant who, though having witnessed the murder at the cross-roads, could say nothing 
about the whole incident, except for the famous `one thing', which we already heard 
from Creon and to which Jocasta firmly clings (as we will see, in a very symptomatic 
way). It is obvious that Jocasta' dismissal of the oracular truth in principle on the basis 
of a particular oracular version of Laius' murder is an inverted synecdoche: it is not 
really the part that is used to disavow the whole but rather the whole that is used to 
disavow the peculiar part. On the one hand, Jocasta negates the oracular truth in 
principle since, indeed, both Laius and his child seem to have perished at different 
places, different times, and contrary to the oracle. On the other, she also has to make use 
of the negated oracular truth to deny (disavow) the fact and meaning of Laius' murder 
itself - the murder which seems to affect the certainty of her general negation and put 
the two, supposedly disconnected deaths, that of the son and of the father, in an 
enigmatically converging relation. Thus Jocasta's general suspension of the oracular 
truth, while being based upon her affirmation of the non-existence of her son and thus 
Laius as a father, paradoxically works for the peculiar return of both father and son in 
the negative: oracles are not true because Laius was not killed by his son because he did 
not really have one - and even if he did, the son cannot have done it, to the best of my 
knowledge. It is a mirror image of Oedipus' reaction to the conjunction of the drunk 
man's rumour and Apollo's prophecy: the oracle cannot be true because I cannot 
transgress against my father and mother, that is to the best of my knowledge. These 
negating responses to the oracles in both cases actually give life to oracles and the 
transgressive desire in them - precisely because what they negate is the human 
knowledge and not the oracular message as such, which, indeed, persists through this 
negation. It is extremely remarkable to see, in this context, that Jocasta starts her 
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demonstration of the falsity of the oracles with `[Oedipus], absolve yourself, instead of, 
for example, `Creon could not have done that! ' - the extraordinary suggestion behind 
the focus in Jocasta's opening points to the unexpected fact that, not only does Oedipus 
have reasons to believe that he may be involved with Laius' murder closer than anyone 
would think, but so does Jocasta, in her own way. 
Another moment of interest (if not alarm) here is that Jocasta does not identify 
Apollo's `servants' who brought them the original oracle, which led to her son's 
exposure. Both Jebb and Gould understand her word for `attendants' as referring to the 
`Delphic priests' or `divinely possessed' (Jebb, n. 708,98; Gould, n. 712,91). But 
Teiresias did earlier mention, as a point in his favour, that, although Oedipus does not 
have respect for the truth of his insight, Oedipus' `real parents' did (`goneusi d', hoi s' 
ephusan, emphrones', 436). Oedipus, certainly, never gets to ask what the seer exactly 
means by this, because he wants (and fails) to learn first who the seer means when he 
mentions Oedipus' parents. It is beyond doubt that Teiresias means Jocasta and Laius, 
and he may as well be that `servant of Apollo' who is aware of the exposure of the baby 
as the measure of the parents' appreciation of the truth behind the Apollonian insight he 
may have delivered. 
However, Oedipus, again, seems too distracted or rather too riveted to relate all 
the details of his previous dialogue with the seer to the larger meaning of Jocasta's story 
. and reasoning. He fails to notice the fact that Jocasta turned him effectively into a 
defendant and has completely circumvented the matter of Creon's possible role in the 
events. Moreover, he does not seem to react even to the extremely suggestive `yoking' 
of the child's feet in Jocasta's story (let alone the terrible story itself). Gould's 
interpretation of this remarkable fact, in the immediacy of its dramatic moment, gives 
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the meaning of Jocasta's verb `enzeüxas' (enzeügnumi), `yoked', as a plausible 
explanation, since `it says nothing about the mutilation' and thus `allows Oedipus to 
continue his preoccupation with "the place where three roads meet" ' (n. 718,93). In 
comparison, Jebb reads the verb as `fastened together by driving a pin through them, so 
as to maim the child and thus lessen the chance of its being reared if it survived 
exposure', thus rendering Oedipus' reaction to it even less explicable (n. 718,100, italics 
added). Given the extraordinary suggestiveness of Sophocles" poetic language in this 
tragedy, especially in the development of the key imagery, both commentators, in a 
sense, completely miss (or do not develop enough) an important point: Jocasta's verb 
enzeüxas is derived from zeugma, which is, indeed, the Greek word for `yoke' but also 
for that peculiar figure of speech, zeugma, `wherein two subjects are used jointly with 
the same predicate, which strictly belongs only to one' (Liddell and Scott, italics added). 
Zeugma is literally a `place where three roads', and also how the exposed baby's feet, 
peculiarly `meet': a joining of the two in one, which, although formally possible, is not 
strictly regular (or permissible) -a vital link to the imagery of relations between 
Oedipus, Laius, and Jocasta's desire in the context of the oracles. From this point of 
view, Oedipus' extraordinarily sensitive fixation on the image of the triple-road without, 
apparently, taking into account the `yoked' feet themselves may not look like a 
contradiction (especially, if we remember that the most troubling aspect of the 
`shameful' marks for Oedipus is not only their physicality but their meaning, their 
relation to the mystery of his parents). 
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The expression itself (`triplals hamaksito? s', `triple wagon-way') 59 in Jocasta's 
narrative causes him to lapse into a sort of momentary loss of consciousness: 
hoiön m'akorisant' arti6s echei, gzlnai, 
psuches plänema kanakinesis phrendn 
What a wandering of the spirit and a stirring of the mind is upon me, 
Lady, since I heard your words just now! 
(726-7, Lloyd-Jones) 
The compelling force of the expression, rendered closely by Lloyd-Jones, shows not 
only Oedipus' spirit lapsing, for a moment, into a restless `wandering' (`plänema', 
which also means `unsettled-ness', `going astray') but also his mind violently roused 
(`kanakinesis phrenön') as if by a nightmare. In his interpretation of Oedipus' 
explanation of his reaction 
I thought you said that Laius was attacked 
and butchered at a place where three roads meet. (729-30, Gould) 
Jebb points out `edox' (rendered here by Gould as `I thought' but which is closer to 
Jebb's archaic `Methought' because of the implied dislocation in the `I' into an 
intermediary position between active and passive) as `the word of one who has been in a 
troubled dream' (Jebb, n. 727,101). In the same note Jebb links plänema with this 
sensation as referring to `the fearful "wandering" of his thought back to other days and 
scenes' (italics added), which no one else is yet aware of. It is compelling to read and 
imagine Oedipus' reaction at this point in terms of his primary oracular nightmare, 
suddenly hitting the core of his many years' negation of the oracle. It is especially now 
that Oedipus' earlier words, addressed to the suppliants, in which he assures them that 
s' At the unconscious and, one may say, even esoteric level, his extraordinarily sensitive reaction to the 
expression seems also extremely pertinent to the place and season of his exposure as a baby, since it is 
related to the progress of Arcturus, the brightest star in the constellation Bootes (sharing its name with the 
Theban land), that lies near Ursa Major, which is also called the Wagon (hamaksa), and means literally the 
`guardian of the bear' (arldos, ourus). 
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they `do not wake [him] from untroubled sleep' (`ouch' hzipn( g' heüdontä m' 
eksegetrete', 65) because he `had followed many ways of wandering thought' 
('phrontidos plänois', 68) about how to save Thebes seem to acquire a supra-literal 
sense: the roads that Oedipus had followed to avoid Apollo's prophecy are now 
revealing their terribly misleading route, which, after all, was not that untroubled for 
Oedipus, as he is about to reveal. 
But, still, the dream that flashed through Oedipus' mind just now is not his worst 
one yet: at the moment he fears that he may just have been Laius' unwitting killer, not 
his son. Soon, however, he will testify to the fact that the terms in this opposition'are not 
only compatible for him, but that they have an ineluctable metaphorical relation. The 
irony now is that Oedipus acts and desires as if he were Laius' son. Between his first 
scene with Creon and encounter with Teiresias he makes a remarkable proclamation of 
himself as the avenger of Laius, to parts of which we should turn to re-involve Jocasta in 
a wider context of Oedipus' anxiety at the moment. 
Formally, murder in 5th century Athens could be prosecuted only by the next of 
kin. In this case (of ancient Thebes recreated for and by Athenians), because the family 
as well as the `loyal' subjects of the victim have proved impeded and not so keen on 
revenge, it is Oedipus who takes up the task as a `stranger', both `to the report' and `to 
the deed' (`ksenos men toü lögou [... J/ksenos de toü prachthentos', 219-20). 
Despite this formal inconvenience, he, certainly, does have links to the family 
and, apparently, a certain clue in order to reopen the process of justice. In his somewhat 
baffling sentence `I would be unable to follow the track far by myself, without having a 
clue' ('ou gär an makrän/ichneuon autos, me ouk echön ti sümbolon', 220-1), he seems 
106 
to imply that he does have one, while he is not supposed to have any, precisely because 
of his `late' (`hüsteros') arrival at Thebes. 
This time-lag will be extremely interesting to relate to Jocasta's version of the 
events. The commentators, however, try to elucidate it in its immediate context. Jebb in 
his note on the passage cites Professor Goodwin, together with whom he reasonably 
points out `by myself as the real, albeit very succinct, protasis in the sentence (`autos', 
which he renders as `alone' - Jebb, n. 220,41). For Jebb and Goodwin, this `by myself 
is an unreal condition, since Oedipus is not actually alone in tracing the murderer(s). 
This is exactly his `clue' (`sümbolon'): it is in his `link' (which word Lloyd-Jones uses 
as translation of sümbolon) with the Theban and the family of the victim, who, he 
hopes, may know or help him find the culprit. 
Gould, on the other hand, aligns himself with those who treat the passage as 
`strictly illogical' (n. 221,42), because they seem to understand `without having a clue' 
not as an elaboration of `by myself but as a separate protasis, thus implying that 
Oedipus believes that he does have one. Such an interpretation of the sentence seems, 
indeed, illogical in conscious terms, since in the same note Gould informs us, in an 
attempt to save the meaningfulness of the passage, that 
The word translated as `key' ['clue' in our version] is symbolon, 
which is a fragment of some small object (such as dice or knuckle bone), 
the rest of which was kept by a xenos (stranger-friend). A messenger could 
present the missing symbolon; if the two fitted, it was accepted as proof 
of the man's identity and good faith [... ]There may be a sense here, therefore, 
that Oedipus has a token by which he will discover his true family. It may be 
that we are supposed to think of the crippling or disfiguring marks on his feet. 
(221,42-3, Gould) 
We are, indeed, supposed to think at several significant moments about those marks on 
Oedipus' feet, but the particular moment of Oedipus' proclamation does not seem to be 
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one of them (unlike that of Jocasta's mention of the crossroads and exposure of the 
baby, which we have already looked at). The image of the one-time pierced ball joints of 
Oedipus (`arthra') may indeed come to the mind of an informed, searching audience - 
but in the context of Oedipus' own vision of the situation at that very moment the link is 
associated with another (unconsciously connected) image of his relation to the city, the 
central one through which Oedipus passes in a kind of symbolic rebirth in his 
proclamation. Because the ambiguity of this link (or rather a whole network of them) 
does not yet reach his consciousness, the unconscious implications here achieve an 
extraordinary level of fantasmatic resonance (much stronger than that of the 
unmentioned pierced ankles alone), comparable but also exceeding that of the line where 
he says that he heard all about Laius but never met him in person. This link is, of course, 
Jocasta - not only the one whom he did meet in person but also the one whom he, as in 
the case with Laius, did not. The ambivalence of her image as a link to the city is 
compounded by its function in Oedipus' mind, that of his symbolic rebirth as Laius' 
absent son. 
But, to start with, Jocasta is the sümbolon, or rather a part of it, the `fragment' of 
the city and Laius' power that makes Oedipus a complete Theban. The multiple 
connotations of his identification with Laius through Jocasta in this passage are hard to 
render adequately into English. Oedipus feels obliged to search for the murderers of 
Jocasta's previous husband not only because the god `had driven' him now to this `deed' 
(`tb prägma theelaton', 255 - which is a first, highly daimonic, verbal expression here), 
but also because the city should have done it long before (thus the god is driving him, as 
it were, simultaneously back in time towards the event and forward to Oedipus' final 
revelations - which is another key daimonic motif in the speech): `it was not proper of 
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you to leave the murder of your noble king [basileös] unpurified'! (`akc tharton humäs 
eik3s hen hozitds eän, /andrds g' aristou basileös t'olölötos', 256). And as he now 
possesses the most significant and the only remaining token of that murdered king's 
power, to the best of his (and everyone's, except Teiresias') knowledge - that is, his 
`bed' and `his wife sharing our seed' (`lektra kai gunaIch' homösporon', 260) - he feels 
a special duty to undertake the neglected task. It is remarkable that at this point there is 
no question for him of connection between this neglect and his acceding to Laius' 
position. That is, not at the conscious level, since his elaboration of the materiality 
binding him to act as avenger does not stop here. He moves into what Gould calls `an 
extraordinarily compact example of unintentional double meaning' (n. 261,46), to which 
Jebb also pays attention, adding a laconic `ghastly' (n. 261,46). 
The Greek word homösporon means literally 'of the same seed' and thus is 
primarily used in reference to siblings. Oedipus, however, is using it, consciously, to 
suggest a common bond between him and Laius specifically through children, and not 
just Jocasta, which they both could have had by Jocasta, had Laius and his hope of 
offspring, as he puts it, not met with bad luck: 
it's I who have the power that he had once, 
and have his bed, and a wife who shares our seed, 
and common bond had we had common children 
(had not his hope of offspring had bad luck - 
but as it happens, luck lunged at his head): 
because of this, as if for my own father, 
I'll fight for him (259-65, Gould) 
The unconscious truth here is over-entwined. Jocasta is, certainly, a homösporos of both 
Oedipus and Laius, but the final position of that word makes Oedipus' verse sound as if 
his wife, Jocasta, was only his homosporos, that is, apparently, `descended' from `the 
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same seed' with him (which, to a degree, she certainly is since they all go back to 
Cadmus). But the main issue here is the fact of the peculiar absence-presence of Laius' 
seed in the equation. The proximity between himself, Laius and Thebes, is created for 
Oedipus by his children (paiddn) with Jocasta and Laius' ones by her, had he had any - 
at which point, as Gould notes, we are reminded of the gap between Oedipus' 
knowledge and, at least, Jocasta's knowledge. But besides this apparent factual gap in 
Oedipus' knowledge about Laius' status as a father, Oedipus' Greek here, as Jebb points 
out, is `carefully framed so as to bear a second [a different and more linking] meaning' 
(n. 261,46). In Gould's translation Oedipus says `it's I who have his power... the 
bed... and a wife' and `common bond had we had common children', whereas in the 
original the reduplication of commonality in `common bond' and `common children' 
(`koinbn to paidön koina', 261) comes before the implication of Laius as a `father' in 
this `offspring' bond (`keinO genos', 261). Thus, before that moment, the Greek verses 
sound like `it's I now who have his power, his bed and a wife who shares our seed and 
common bond with [my] children' (`ego /men archäs has ekeinos eiche prin, / echön... 
lektra kai gunaich' homosporon, /koindn to paiddn koin' an', 258-61) - which, even if 
impossible, according to Oedipus' conscious knowledge and wish, is exactly what he 
was trying to negate through his abandonment of Corinth. 
Oedipus is, certainly, aware of this absence/presence of the father, which is, 
indeed, the point of his declaration. But how is he dealing with it? The verb in the first 
person singular present, `kurö' (kureö), through which Oedipus describes his accession 
to Laius' power, bed, and wife, and which Gould renders in the impersonal `as it 
happens [it's I who have' etc]', has a distinct connotation of hitting, hitting the mark 
right (Liddell and Scott). This stands in a direct and, of course, unconscious relation to 
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Oedipus' description of Laius' frustration as a father - in which case, again, `as it 
happened, luck lunged at his head' (263, Gould - `nun des t6 keinou krät' enelath' he 
tüche'). Here is where we get the relation to Oedipus' later description of the encounter 
at the triple-road with `the old man' who `brought his goad with two teeth down full 
upon my head' (807-9, Jebb, `[... J m' ho presbus [... J meson! kära diplois kentroisi mou 
kathiketo') - as well as the metaphoricalreference to the pierced ankles of the exposed 
baby. And though the reduplication of `as it happens/ed' in Gould's translation does not 
correspond to an analogous verbal repetition in Greek (except for the adverb `nün', 
now), nevertheless, together with a lengthy note on the suggestive use of verbs with the 
connotation of hitting/lunging/swooping/(sexually)penetrating (p. 46-8), it alerts the 
reader to what Gould presents as a violent merging of the father, mother, son, and. 
Apollo in one daimonic lunge, a violent zeugma, where each of the three members plays 
the role of the same predicate for the other two (Jocasta being the most conspicuous one 
at the moment), which is developed as the central metaphorical motif of the tragedy. The 
impersonality of the English `it' in `as it happens' refers to what looks in Greek like a 
trans-personal mingling of the human agency through/with the daimonic `luck' (tüche-). 
Echoing the passage analysed earlier where Jocasta tells Oedipus to absolve 
himself from Teiresias' accusations of killing Laius, thus coming very close to (a 
negative) identification of him with her (reportedly) dead son, Oedipus, in his 
proclamation to avenge Laius, indeed, absolves himself from `hitting' (kurein 258) at 
Laius' power, place, and wife by displacing the fatal `lunge' at his head (`enelatha', 
263) onto `luck' (`tüche', 263). But, as we saw, he also unconsciously identifies with it. 
The image of lunging at one's head, notably, suggests Oedipus' later recall of his 
encounter at the cross-roads in which, he will consciously fear, he may have become that 
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`luck', after he was himself lunged at by the man in the chariot. He will certainly need to 
defend himself against this fear, and the defence will again be based on the link to 
Jocasta. But there is a remarkable difference between the two cases: in the proclamation, 
Oedipus absolves himself from `hitting' at Laius' position, not only vowing to be an 
avenger for him on the basis of a would-be bond but actually offering himself as a 
substitution for its `unfortunate' (dustüchen) absence: 
because of this, as if for my own father, 
I'll fight for him (264-5, Gould) 
and all the rest of Laius' predecessors on Theban throne. Thus, Oedipus sees himself as 
the missing common bond between Laius, Laius' ancestors and... himself. In other 
words, he vows to restore Laius as a father. It is also only the delay of `luck' that stands 
between them, which Oedipus (paradoxically) is eager to reduce to an absolute 
minimum by taking up the position of the avenger (having already `hit upon' the wife 
and place of the victim). This `luck' is key to his self-identification (now and till the last 
scenes in the play) as Laius' son-substitute, which, through the mental distance between 
him and Laius' real son, allows him to mirror the unthinkable, predicted to him by the 
oracle. Thus `luck' and negation appear in the context of this tragedy as the two 
hypostases of the same daimonic phenomenon. 
When Jocasta comes on stage, in her very first scene - to which we can now 
come for a more informed comparison - the distinction between the circumstances of the 
`luck' and Laius' son is immediately thrown into a sharper and more paradoxical focus. 
If Oedipus, in posing himself as the avenger of Laius, identifies with Laius' ('never- 
born') offspring and opposes himself to the fatal `lunge' of `luck', Jocasta's speeches, 
effectively (and ominously), reverse Oedipus' identification in this opposition. 
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As we saw already, Jocasta's mentioning of the crossroads shakes Oedipus 
profoundly. By asking questions about the exact place and time of murder, as well as 
about Laius' appearance and manner in which he traveled, Oedipus is shaken even more 
because now he is forced to realise that not only his insight may be wrong in general but 
that Teiresias could have been right in a very particular sense, because Oedipus did kill a 
man and a retinue who seem to match Jocasta's description of Laius. Therefore, he may 
become the murderer he has been looking for. But there is still a small but, nevertheless, 
a significant hope for Oedipus: the question of the number of killers. He knows that he 
was the only killer and that he killed all of the men in that encounter. Jocasta (and earlier 
Creon) says that Laius was murdered by many, not one, which was reported by a sole 
survivor - whom Oedipus wishes to see immediately. Jocasta promises that his wish will 
be promptly fulfilled but is, again, behind her husband on the unexpected details of his 
ever-growing misgivings and desperate hopes. This is why he needs to tell her the story 
of his leaving Corinth and coming to Thebes - presumably, with the earlier undisclosed 
detail of his encounter at the crossroads. Or is it simply to refresh Jocasta's memory of 
something he told her long ago but which has now been long forgotten or altered in her 
mind? 
Her memory of those events seems, indeed, curiously muddled - if only in 
relation to Creon's recollection of them. When Oedipus, before starting the story of his 
Delphi visit, asks if the sole survivor of Laius' encounter with the murderers is still `by 
chance... in the palace' (757), Jocasta answers with an emphatic negative ('ou det', 
758), and she appears to remember vividly the reason for his absence: 
When he returned and saw 
you had the power of the murdered Laius, 
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he touched my hand and begged me formally 
to send him to the fields and to the pastures, 
so he be out of sight, far from the city. 
I did. Although a slave, he well deserved 
to win this favor, and indeed far more. 
(Gould, 758-64) 
The recollection is certainly `vivid', as Gould notes on the passage, although `not of the 
whole sequence of events, but solely of the surviving servant's departure' (n. 758,98). 
Indeed, what is omitted - or rather confused - here is the chronology of Laius' murder, 
the servant's return, and Oedipus' arrival, not to mention the arrival of the Sphinx 
somewhere in between, for whose ravaging of the city, as Gould notes at another point, 
Sophocles could not have allowed more than a day or two (! ) (n. 567,78). As we have 
observed earlier, according to Creon, Laius went `to see a sacred rite' (to be a `theorös', 
which must mean Delphi), then the servant returned and told everyone that Laius was 
killed by many (robbers), not one, and the city tried to look into the murder - at which 
point the Sphinx arrived and `made them look to what lay at their feet' (`tb prbs posi 
skope? n', 130-1), that is herself rather than Laius' death abroad. 'Then Oedipus came 
along and solved the Sphinx' riddle. However, this did not result in resuming the search 
for Laius' killers, bnt in his being married to Jocasta, since which time no one has, 
apparently, given the murdered king another thought - until the plague and Creon's visit 
to Delphi. If we look at this (Creon's/official) version of the chronology of the events, 
nothing in it, except for the apparent brevity of the Sphinx's ravaging Thebes and the 
unexplained but palpable disregard for the perished Laius, seems implausible at all. 
However, according to what Jocasta has just told Oedipus, it looks like the 
servant-survivor, who informed everyone about the king's death, returned to Thebes 
after Oedipus. This has to mean that Creon lied about the investigation and that the 
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Sphinx's role in ravaging Thebes was even more expressly to lure Oedipus into the trap 
of marrying Jocasta and in burying the investigation into Laius' death as deep as 
possible, instead of reviving it. However, both Gould and Jebb agree that Jocasta's short 
recount of those events should not be taken at face value. While admitting that the 
passage reflects Jocasta's peculiar focus on the servant and the link between Oedipus' 
arrival to Thebes and Laius' death in her mind, Gould does not have much use for the 
question of chronology here: `If the way that Jocasta recounts the story is a little vague, 
that is just what we should expect, considering her ignorance of the connection between 
the two main events' (n. 758,97). In comparison, Jebb does not think Jocasta is to blame 
for this lack of consistency: it is Sophocles who `has neglected clearness on a minor 
point', because he `was here thinking of the man [servant] as coming back to find 
Oedipus already on the throne, and had overlooked the inconsistency' (n. 758,104,105). 
But can there be a meaningful relation between Jocasta's `minor' distortion of 
chronology and her focus on the servant's reaction to Oedipus taking Laius' throne in 
the context of such swift forgetting of the late king? Gould assumes Jocasta's point of 
view to interpret the meaning of this relation: `She remembers that he asked to be sent 
out as a shepherd and that he wanted to be out of sight of the city. (She supposed, we 
may imagine, that he was grieving for Laius, nothing else)' (Gould, n. 758,97). We, 
indeed, may - but even Jocasta implies by the end of her narrative that there is more to 
servant's request than may meet the eye of our straightforward imagination. `Although a 
slave, he well deserved/ to win this favor [to be sent away], and indeed far more' - this 
is how she explains the servant's current absence from the house (at the end of the 
passage quoted above). Oedipus cannot know what desert on the servant's part Jocasta is 
exactly referring to - indeed, he, again, thinks (and now even hopes) he has never met 
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the man. This time he is behind Jocasta on the details of her secret story: the servant was, 
the man to whom Laius and she specifically (as will follow from the servant's later 
account) entrusted the exposure and killing of their mutilated baby, who was `predicted 
to kill his father' (`ktenein nfn toils teköntas in logos', 1176 - or rather his `parents', as 
teköntas-teköntes is plural). This, indeed, must be his big service to them - the servant 
was the guarantor of Laius' (and Jocasta's) life, his talis-man - that is the one who 
`completes the ritual' (telesma - telos). The word by which the servant is designated as 
the dramatis persona, therapön, develops the ambivalence of this meaning in the 
specificity of the context. While therapön does mean `the one who serves; the one who 
attends', even a `courtier', it also has a second, ironically related, and thus, reverse 
meaning. In this case, it is the association of therapön with `surgical treatment' 
(therapeia - therapön, the one who performs it), which may be seen as referring to his 
complicity in the exposure of the mutilated baby, the excision of a threatening tumour, 
as it were, and thus the `completion of the [cleansing] ritual' that does away with the 
threat and helps the parents to avoid pollution. But it also and more relevantly refers (as 
we will see) to his giving the baby away for his feet to be unpinned by another 
(Corinthian shepherd), who becomes Oedipus' own therapön and thus completes the 
reversal of Laius' ritual. Here the connotation of `serving' in this word does not only 
refer to attending to the will of the human master, but, significantly (and this is the 
primary meaning in Liddell and Scott), to doing service to the gods ('theos', `dafmona', 
Liddell and Scott) - which is what he, indeed, ends up substantially performing through 
his therapeutic service both to the father and to the son. 
In Jocasta's recounting of his departure after Oedipus' accession to power,. the 
servant must be associated, certainly, with the first type of service - that is, the one to 
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the father against the son (and Apollo's oracle). But the discrepancy between the value 
of this service and the final reward which the servant is asking for - the voluntary exile 
from the city - cannot escape Jocasta's notice. She almost notes, too, in this passage that 
it is hardly a reward at all - rather, it is a self-punishment (whose specificity, `to be as 
far as possible from the sight of the city' of Thebes (`hös pleIston eie toad' äpoptos 
ästeös', 762), will resonate strongly with Oedipus' own self-punishment at the end). And 
her acceptance of the servant's plea and report without any questioning points to her 
unconscious appreciation - and repression - of the ambivalent sense of completion and 
failure of the ritual by the therapön. On the one hand, after Laius is murdered, the 
therapön comes to insist that it was done by many, not one - his insistence on this 
particular feature to the exclusion of the rest cannot be particularly meaningful or 
helpful, unless it suggests a reference to the `one' he was supposed to do away with long 
ago on his secret mission, which can only be understood by Jocasta. It is for her that he 
must be insisting on this many versus one killer, trying to imply that he has fulfilled his 
mission faithfully. However, it is exactly in Jocasta's peculiar chronological placing of 
the event that this insistence acquires a specific sense of failure, because it is after the 
servant sees the one who took Laius' place that he asks to be sent far away from the city, 
never to see or be seen in it again. Whether or not the servant has actually lied about the 
number of assailants in his account of Laius' murder is thus not important at all - 
indeed, in this dramatization of the myth the servant is never made to retell the story of 
the murder. Instead, what is important at the moment is Jocasta's tacit/unconscious 
recognition (and, in a sense, reward) of the therapön's failure in his service to Laius. 
Even if this, consciously, is a recognition of his failure only in a general, symbolic sense 
(with Gould's `grieving and nothing else' as Jocasta's appreciation of the servant's 
117 
motive), the other part of his service - unknown to Jocasta but also repressed by her as a 
wish - the one rendered to the daimon (in which the baby was saved and Laius' ritual 
was undone) is also very palpable in her recount. The condensed chronology of the 
servant's gesture of withdrawal by touching her hand (which evidently fuses the moment 
of servant's arrival and departure which took place, respectively, before and after the 
arrival of Oedipus) helps Jocasta fulfil her (unconscious) desire through the hand(s) of 
the other. 
This desire will resound more strongly when Oedipus finishes his own agitated 
account of his encounter at the cross-roads with the old stranger and his arrogant retinue 
on his way from Delphi to Thebes. We have referred a lot to this central episode of the 
tragedy throughout our analysis and we will return to it once again later. Now the 
important aspect which needs to be emphasized in the context is, again, Jocästa's 
reaction to it. What Oedipus relates in his encounter at the crossroads is, indeed, 
dangerously close to the murder of Laius. It is difficult to believe that Jocasta does not 
appreciate it. On the contrary, the paradox of her reaction to the new light in which this 
incident appears at this moment in time, after all the preceding scenes and especially her 
account of Laius' murder, is that she seems very prepared to accept Teiresias' alleged 
truth behind it, i. e. that it was, indeed, Laius whom Oedipus killed at the triple-road at 
Phocis. Oedipus himself is, of course, very much dismayed by the possibility of not 
being just a prophesied father-killer (without knowing clearly who his father is) but also 
an unwitting victim of his own curse on the killer of Laius. So, he reminds Jocasta, after 
he finishes his story, to send for the servant and confirm the account of many robbers 
against one. But she tells him not to worry because 
He [the servant] told it as I told you. Be certain. 
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He can't reject that and reverse himself. 
The city heard these things, not I alone. 
But even if he swerves from what he said, 
he'll never show that Laius' murder, Lord, 
occurred just as predicted. For Loxias 
expressly said my son was doomed to kill him 
The boy - poor boy - he never had a chance 
to cut him down, for he was cut down first. 
Never again, just for some oracle 
Will I shoot frightened glances right and left. 
Oedipus That's full of sense. Nonetheless, send a man 
to bring that farmhand here. 
(848-60, Gould) 
Jocasta's reassurance here is, indeed, in Gould's figurative translation of `kalös 
nomizeis' `full of sense', which Oedipus, nevertheless, does not seem to fathom at the 
moment. The expression actually refers to `custom' or `habit' (nomizeis-nomos), in other 
words, it should draw attention at this crucial point to the pattern in Jocasta's thinldng 
which we have been tracing since the beginning of this section. The extraordinary result 
of this pattern here is that, in its conclusion, her demonstration that Oedipus could not 
have killed Laius actually includes and even, to some extent, depends on the very 
possibility of this fact, because, even if the servant does `swerve' (`ektrepö', 851) in his 
account of the number of killers (which tips the balance of evidence towards Oedipus), it 
will make it even harder, as Jocasta (reasonably) thinks at the moment, for the oracles 
Oct alone for the servant's report) to make sense. Hence the oracular Teiresias should 
not be trusted, and Oedipus did not kill Laius? 
While this should, presumably, be the thrust of her argument, Jocasta's real focus 
is on her own son and the fact that he, in Gould's ingenious translation, `never had a 
chance' to do that ('ou keinos g' ho diistenös pote [katektan 7', 855-6, which literally 
refers to the `unfortunate', `wretched' one [who was killed first]). Jocasta's phrasing is 
telling of her regret for this fact (it is the child, not Laius, whom she calls `unfortunate' 
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here), and also, significantly, of her distinct, yet never uttered, acceptance of Oedipus as 
a son-substitute - only this time not as the avenger of the father (as he proclaimed 
himself), but the avenger of the son, Laius' not absent but expelled, `unfortunate' seed 
which Oedipus vowed to substitute for. This desire for the son-avenger, while reversing 
Oedipus' identification in comparison to his proclamation, certainly, depends for Jocasta 
on the possibility of corporeal differentiation (which allows the fantasmatic fusion) 
between the substitute and the original son. This is where her and Oedipus' desires meet 
and, enhanced by the mutual reflection, become, indeed, `full of sense', or `habit' 
(nomos) - the habit of negation. What Oedipus cannot appreciate in his cursory (as Jebb 
says, `almost mechanical', n. 859,116) praise of Jocasta's reasoning now, because of his 
preoccupation with the number of killers and the danger of having to abide by his own 
curse, is that after the exchange of their oracle-negating narratives, Jocasta has just made 
a conclusion that not only reflects the intersection of their desires for avengers- 
substitutes but reveals their approaching the point of collision and no return due to their 
contrariety. 
By insisting on sending for the servant, Oedipus shows that he does not really 
comprehend (and accept) Jocasta's point about the immateriality of the number of 
assailants. He does not seem to understand now that the number itself is purely 
incidental to the fundamental issue which both he and Jocasta have been negating in the 
oracularly predicted crimes all along, that is their identificatory nature. To remind 
ourselves, Jocasta has just, effectively, claimed not only that the matter of the number is 
unimportant but that Oedipus' innocence in the murder of Laius does not really depend 
on whether he actually committed it or not. On the contrary, the better if he did, because 
what they should be clinging to is the distinction in it between the regicide and patricide 
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- the two crimes which the original prophecy specifically unites in relation to Laius. So 
what Oedipus should be concentrating on, according to Jocasta, is not the number but 
the difference in his identity from Laius' `dead' son, which, to the best of Jocasta's 
conscious knowledge, is as sure as it can be (as opposed to the possible `swerves' in the 
now old servant's memory). 
But, however reassuring she is trying to be, she has to insist, increasingly, on 
Oedipus' keeping to the oracle-negation with the same composure. Because, as we have 
just, found out, together with Jocasta in their exchange of the narratives, it is not just an 
excessive fastidiousness that makes Oedipus cling to the place and number in her 
account. Although he cannot yet envisage the possibility that he may actually be Laius' 
son, we already know that he was once very uncertain about whose son he actually is. 
That uncertainty, as we remember, has led him to Delphi which, instead of clarifying the 
matter, predicted that he would commit parrincest. So now that Oedipus has already 
confessed that he did commit a murder of an unknown older man after that, Jocasta is 
trying to warn him that he should be worried about maintaining the difference between 
this murder (and his marriage) and the knowledge of predicted parrincest - and not 
necessarily about the truth, which they have been denied by the oracle in their respective 
circumstances. Or rather that they were, virtually, forced by the oracles to exchange their 
knowledge of truth for its negation, which now is their truth and should be maintained in 
order to keep at bay the intrusion of the oracular blame which is threatening to upset the 
balance of their lives. 
Taking such an overtly consistent anti-oracular stance, Jocasta alerts us (if not 
Oedipus at this moment) to the deep identificatory meaning of the oracles and the 
particular figurative aspect of her and Oedipus' attitude to them. As will become much 
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clearer at the moments of their respective self-punishments with which Jocasta and 
Oedipus react to the discovery of the full truth, they have been battling Apollo's oracles 
not only like humans but, significantly, like the Sphinx (curiously absent from the plot) 
- that is, with the riddle of their desire (the desire that is a riddle to them as well), which 
is seeking to drive a wedge of negation, in Jocasta's case, between Laius' killer and her 
own son, and in Oedipus' between him and the parrincest. It was, certainly, Apollo who 
originally challenged them with the riddle in his oracles which they dared to defy, thus 
assuming the Sphinxian status. Oedipus, at this moment, after he told Jocasta the story of 
his encounter at the crossroads, becomes her main asset in this agon, her ultimate 
weapon-riddle against both Laius and Apollo as the baby-expelling agents. And as we 
saw earlier, Oedipus presents Jocasta in his proclamation as the vital link to and locus of 
his alternative family, where he can allow himself, in a fantasy negating the oracle, to be 
both husband and (substitute) son to the murdered sonless king. 
However, the conjunction of their narratives now also reveals the specific 
vulnerability of the Sphinxian stance which, while apparently challenging the god's 
insight and acumen, has, in fact, submitted to and been transformed by his transgressive 
vision. Jocasta's effective insistence, after she hears Oedipus' story, on keeping the 
distance between him and her `dead' son is both right and fatal because the patricidal 
identity of the son is the point of convergence between her and Oedipus' oracles - the 
point to which Oedipus has now come dangerously close, even if he does not yet fully 
realise this. The particular danger of his case is that the identificatory nature of the 
crimes in his oracle is wider and includes not only the patricidal but also the fully 
incestuous, maternal (and as we will see later, matricidal) identification of the same son. 
This is why Jocasta's insistence on keeping the distance between her son and Oedipus' 
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involvement in the murder of Laius is of paramount importance for the success of her 
counter-oracular struggle: for as she dismisses all the oracles on the basis of one, then if 
that one proves true and Oedipus is her surviving son, all other oracles must then be true 
as well. 
Furthermore, according to the same synecdoche of her dismissal, we can see that 
the negating divide penetrates the key oracles themselves: not only is the murder of 
Laius real and correlative to the murder of the old man by Oedipus but both these 
murders have an undiscoveredunwitting quality about them (with regards to the killer(s) 
and the victim(s) respectively). This latter quality pertains exactly to the nature of 
inevitability of the identification in the oracles because they never name the victim(s) 
and killer(s) but define them through their unnamed participation in the transgressive 
act. This is why oracles are only partially untrue and why Jocasta will keep advising 
Oedipus to stop searching for truth as such, because the truth in their case remains 
fundamentally oracular and knowing it cannot mean anything but recognition of 
parrincest. Ironically, by bringing the story of the exposed baby to corroborate this view, 
she has gone already half way towards the encounter with this truth, where she will be 
met by the well-meaning Corinthian messenger (Oedipus' other therapön), who appears, 
significantly, right after another of her ironic steps - the supplication to Apollo to allay 
Oedipus' anxiety. The messenger has come to announce the death of the father and to 
relate it to the birth of the son - precisely the link which Jocasta has been striving to 
repress so strongly, and which could only be convincingly revealed to her through the 
other's unwitting knowledge. 
The consistency of Jocasta's peculiarly divided agnosticism towards the oracles 
is emphasized in a broader structural sense by the fact that she and Laius' servant (the 
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original therapön), the former giving Oedipus life and then giving him away and the 
latter saving him also to give him as far away as possible, are played by the second actor 
(deuteragönistes). This actor also plays the palace Messenger (exaggelos) reporting 
Oedipus' self-blinding at the sight of Jocasta's suicide (which provides another link 
between Oedipus' self-blinding and the therapön's self-exile as the acts reflecting their 
proximity to the unbearable). This is also the actor that appears at, the palace's steps in 
the very beginning as the Priest of Zeus (hiereus), the one who gives voice to the land's 
affliction and death and who is also prepared to overlook a certain unusualness of quasi- 
religious supplication to a human ruler, provided that he secures the much-needed 
alleviation of the suffering. The significant common line between all these four 
characters is a distinct sympathetic link to Oedipus (especially as a son) and in the 
readiness to disregard, disavow the daimonic/oracular insight in his favour, `to endure in 
silence' (`pherein [... ] sigg', as the Chorus refers to Jocasta living with Oedipus all those 
years at 1211-12), even to accept the fulfilment of the oracles and turn a blind eye, 
especially to the patricidal part in them, so long as the truth never breaks out, stays dark, 
its segments in the various oracular messages unconnected, `unyoked', by means of the 
compromise figure of the substitute-son (instead of the transgressive father). All the 
three major characters played by this actor - Jocasta, Laius' servant, and the palace 
Messenger - will try to stop Oedipus from learning the truth, already evident to them. 
But this agnosticism, uneasily divided between sympathy towards Oedipus and 
lack of it towards the oracle, most notably in Jocasta (but also in the servant), certainly 
prepares its own as well as Oedipus' downfall in its preference for the substitute-son in 
and by whom the violated father and the oracle are repressed. The dark sense of the 
oracular, daimonic messages, involved in this version of the myth, is, indeed, to drive 
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home the condition of the violated and displaced father which causes the plague and 
barrenness in Thebes while also causing the blinding of the son's (Oedipus') mind, first 
figuratively, then literally, in their unconscious traumatic clash. And even darker is the 
realisation that this violation and repression of the father through the son (substitute) in 
Thebes has been part of both maternal and paternal characters and desires all along. We 
have just seen that, however different may Oedipus' and Jocasta's implications be in 
relation to the murder of Laius, they both seem to converge on'the desire to rehabilitate 
the son, at least, no less, if not more, than the murdered king as a father. While the 
heavier preference for the son-substitute has just become evident in the case of Jocasta, 
it is also true about Oedipus, who, by avoiding Apollo's parrincestuous oracle, has not 
only been trying to save them but also himself as a good son. But the crucial dramatic 
difference in his case will be to reveal to Jocasta and to us that the rehabilitation of the 
son is impossible without the rehabilitation of the (violated) father, and that it is, indeed, 
only an accident, luck - in other words, a certain impossibility and inability/un- 
willingness of the mind to perceive, a lack of insight - that has kept the two lines of 
desire separate in consciousness. 
Thus, what both Oedipus and Jocasta are about to discover, in a deeply symbolic 
way, is the mystery of the conjunction between a mutual love/relation (expressed by the 
same word philos) and mutual transgression/betrayal (kakos), especially to and against 
the father and son, who get displaced from thereality of existence, seemingly, 
altogether. In Jocasta's case the revelation can be characterised as somewhat less 
symbolic because she does get an empirical, unequivocal proof that her second husband 
is actually her own son from the first one. But the mystery is still there because this 
revelation throws light upon her participation in the act of the baby's exposure - that is, 
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her defiance of the oracle, as already an indication of the unconscious desire to displace 
the father, both in the figure of Laius and Apollo (whose oracle provoked it) and to have 
the son return from the exposed/dead in his father's stead. In a broader context of our 
inquiry into the oracular logic of desire in this section, it is evident that neither Laius nor 
Jocasta realises that their exposure of the baby with yoked feet as an attempt to thwart 
the oracle is already a physical metaphor, or more precisely, a metaphorically zeugmatic 
consummation of the predicted transgression against both of them as `parents' 
('tekontes', to whom Laius' servant will refer in his recount of the oracle at 1176). Their 
piercing and yoking of the ball joints (arthra) on the baby's feet is thus, unconsciously, 
not so much a transgression against the son and the oracle but, in and through his body, 
it is, inseparably and inevitably, a transgression against themselves as the father and 
mother - which the oracle indeed predicted in its own negated form. 
In the son's case, this mystery is no less dark and convoluted, especially in 
relation to his alleged patricide, since it comes across for Oedipus, primarily, at a 
figurative (that is, synecdochically oracular) level: it is his discovery of himself as an 
incestuous husband-son, who `should never have been born' (`[... jphus t' aph' hön ou 
chren', 1184), that precipitates the recognition of his father in the one whom he 
unknowingly murdered and unwittingly replaced in Jocasta's bedroom, and the one who 
almost murdered him twice. The crucial question `who killed Laius? ' is, indeed, never 
posed to the single (other) surviving witness of all the crimes, Laius' therapön. If we 
accept the role of negation in the oracular logic of the human and daimonic interaction in 
this tragedy, then, it is clear that Laius, just as Oedipus, could not blame anyone but 
himself - his unconscious - for his reaction to Apollo's message. But one can, 
presumably, argue here, too, that Sophocles and Oedipus have `neglected clearness on a 
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minor point', or, indeed, that the absence of this crucial question in the play is a sign of 
the radical reversal of the oracular synecdoche in Sophocles' treatment of the myth, 
which, through this omission, may be saying that Oedipus may have never killed Laius 
and, perhaps, may have never been the exposed infant, because of the general 
unreliability of knowledge and witnesses in this tragedy and the peculiarly oracular logic 
of convictions. Ahl's and Goodhart's arguments, which propose to read Sophocles' 
intentions here along this general line, suggest that this tragedy is meant to question the 
audience's receptivity towards Oedipus' myth, the oracular character of its truth, and, 
effectively, convict the audience, instead of Oedipus. 
These scholarly refutations of Oedipus' self-conviction may be convincing in 
their attention to the problematic moments in Sophocles' dramatic appropriation of this 
myth and its reception but, nevertheless, they have to rely on the myth's own framework 
in order to refute or question it. They may be extending and radicalising their critique of 
it, but their own position reflects that of Jocasta in relation to Oedipus in the central 
episodes we have been discussing in this section. Therefore, fundamentally, the violent 
mystery of the negating relations within the family triangle - or rather quadrangle, to 
include Apollo's crucial influence - the fusion of the impossibility and inevitability of 
the transgressive insight into one's origins, the penetration of the daimonic word into 
and its mingling with the human body, in literally mutilating, sexual, and 
metapsychological sense, remain untouched. And it is this self-violent but not self- 
enclosed and hence enigmatic, unsolvable mystery that Oedipus (and the audience) is 
drawn more and more strongly to identify with at the end of the play. It exists, indeed, 
only as negative fragmentation - that is, the fragmentation which negates itself, 
simultaneously scattered in `fragments', `clues' (sümbolon) and coagulating its own 
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irretrievability into the elusive, tantalizing presence. This results in both the deeply 
sexualized and annihilating connection between spatially, temporally, psychologically 
(as in psuche, which here stands both for `life' and `soul'), and morally distinct relations 
- the humanly embodied daimonic link which turns the familial, cross-generational 
triangle into the uncertainly polygonal, contagious, zeugma. 
Despite the profound involvement of all the three main familial parties in the 
conflict of the truth and desire in relation to the oracular intervention, Sophocles' 
Oedipus is specifically centred on the problem of the father - it is in relation to the father 
that the oracle first manifests itself, and, although Laius' reaction to the oracle (let alone 
that of Jocasta, the servant, and, later, that of Oedipus) seems to be centred on and 
against the son, in reality (as we have already suggested) he reacts no less against 
himself as a father by exposing the baby, thereby substantiating the message of the 
oracle. Just as Jocasta may present herself now as wishing for the return of her exposed 
son from the dead (and, thus, displacement of the father), Laius, in his turn, by 
permanently disfiguring the baby but not killing it himself, seems to be wishing for his 
return as well, that is, for his own death, which, thus, aligns itself with Jocasta's 
unconscious by displacing his pollution onto his servant and inscribing it into his son. 
This negative survival of the father as the ghost of his pollution within and through the 
son and mother appears to be the key oracular and tragic motif in the play (which 
culminates in the twin self-punishment of Oedipus and Jocasta in the parental bedroom). 
Apollo's central oracle, the one given to Oedipus, which he recounts in the 
spatial and temporal centre of the tragedy, concerns not only (and not so much) the fact 
that he would be his `mother's lover' and be the `murderer of the one whose seed' he is 
(in Gould's rendering of `hös metri men chreie me michthenai, phoneüs d' esoimen toü 
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phuteüsantos patrös') but, as we have emphasized in the previous section, that he `will 
show offspring to mankind they could not look at' (`genos d' ätleton anthrdpoisi 
delösoim' horän', 791-3). It focuses not only on Oedipus' fathering children but also on 
the ambivalence of recognition and shunning in horror from the peculiar impossibility of 
the father in this offspring, his violated and negated, fragmented presence in the blood, 
which will transpire in the lack of distance between Oedipus and his children, Oedipus 
and Laius, within `great harbour' (`hd megas limen', 1208) into which this lack of 
distance turns Jocasta. This focus is echoed and developed by the Chorus, who, right 
after Jocasta and Oedipus have finished the first round of their anxious revelations and 
oracular dismissals, appeal to the `one and only' immortal `father', Olympus (868-9), 
whose presence and essence seem to them to be called into question by Oedipus' and 
Jocasta's reasoning; and to Zeus, the all-mighty father of Apollo, whose oracles no 
longer seem to the mortals to fit the events and thus again point towards the father's 
`dying' together with the `dying oracles' (`phthinonta gär[... J/ thesphatai', 906-7). The 
cause of this dying, as many have noted, is related by the Chorus to Oedipus' and 
Jocasta's behaviour and revelations. The arguments pro et contra identification of 
Oedipus as the `tyrant' whom his `hubris breeds' (`hubris phuteüei türannon', 873) in 
this famous choral ode often obscure an interesting paradox of the Chorus' relation of 
this `hubris' to `pälaisma', `struggle', `rivalry'. The Chorus is asking the gods not to 
`abolish' the `rivalries' of men `which are good for the city' (`to kalös d' echon/pölei 
pälaisma mepote lüsai thebn aitoümai', 879-80), but, more precisely, they imply that 
these rivalries will turn into `hubris' if the god, the father, does not point out his eternal 
presence by somehow making up for the truth of the `dying' old prophecies about Laius 
- in other words, by manifesting himself as the absence of certain sense, insight, in the 
129 
men `struggling' with each other and against the oracles. That is, at this stage the 
revelation of the eternal father must involve and ensue from the revelation of hubris of 
Oedipus and Jocasta and Laius. And if we remember Apollo's oracles, the father in the 
oracular message there, represented by the `immortal father' of the `eternal' laws, has 
already and must now reveal himself through a transgression, a violation, against 
himself that links the three together but which cannot be restricted to their own human 
scope, simply because the initial arrival of the oracles and the eventual commitment of 
transgressions elude the conscious human grasp until the very end. The self- 
manifestation and incrimination of the father, for which the Chorus seem to be appealing 
at this crucial moment is, thus, grimly appropriate to the case because the ignorance of 
the humans concerns the immediate physicality of their only half-unwitting 
transgression against themselves (all the three knowingly defy the oracles), while it is 
clear that the daimon could have pointed out the real connections between the people 
involved without setting them on the transgressive path. 
Quite in line with this unconscious plea of the Chorus for the father to reveal 
himself in his own punishment, Jocasta reappears right after their stasimon and in an 
ironic counterpoint appeals to Apollo, who is `the nearest' (`c gchistos', 919) to them, 
`for a cleansing that will not pollute him' (`höp(5s lüsin tin' hemin euage', 920-21, 
Gould) - that is Oedipus, who, despite Jocasta's reasoning, has been `exciting his soul 
too much with alarms of all kinds' (914-15, Gould), while the Chorus was appealing to 
Olympus and Zeus. As an immediate response to this counterpoint of appeals to the 
father, there arrives the Corinthian messenger, who wishes the family and the house 
well. Apart from the unwitting connotations of the impossibility of such wish 
(concentrated in his unconscious punning on Oedipus' name (Oidipou in the dative) and 
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the interrogative `where' (hopou), rejoined by the Choral punning on Jocasta's marital 
and maternal relation to Oedipus (`guns de meter hide tön keinou tekn(5n', `this is his 
wife and mother of his children', 928, Gould), the messenger has consciously come to 
bring what he. thinks is both a `good' and `bad' news - the passing away of the father, 
that is Polybus, whom Oedipus, despite his old uncertainty about his origins, still 
considers his progenitor. The Corinthian throne is now waiting for Oedipus and the 
messenger is hoping for a reward for his service. But, to his amazement, he learns that 
his news is thoroughly `good' for Oedipus since it means a painless death of the father, 
`by his own destiny' (`pros tes tüches', 949) and not by Oedipus' hand, as Jocasta puts it 
in her elated abandon. Oedipus joins in her elation, although we all know now that he is 
not at all sure that his father was Polybus. It is the painlessness of Polybus' death that 
convinces him here, and it is the first very close indication of the mode in which 
Oedipus later recognises his real father. 
However, the paradoxes do not stop for the messenger at Oedipus' joy at 
Polybus' death, whom Oedipus can now safely consider his father. To his amazement, 
he learns that the Corinthian throne as well as the return to Corinth is out of the question 
for Oedipus - that is, until Merope, Polybus' queen is still alive, for Oedipus still fears 
the predicted incest. This gives the Corinthian an opportunity to restore the favourability 
of his report of the painless death of Oedipus' father. He is told that it is the link to his 
parents that has been bothering Oedipus since the oracle, so, he complements the report 
of the father's painless death by dissolving this link, both to the father and mother, who, 
he says, are not Oedipus' real, but adoptive parents. It is profoundly remarkable that at 
this crucial moment Oedipus, after he is presented with the Corinthian throne as an 
assuredly safe haven, does not even consider going there. Instead, he succumbs to the 
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search and retrieval of the murky clues about his origin, the path, which must now lead 
him away from that haven, to an almost assured disaster. 
At this sudden turn of events, this last twist in Oedipus' journey towards the truth 
starts again with the mother sliding out of the focus for a while because, in response to 
his bewildered queries, the Corinthian puts himself next to Polybus in relation to 
Oedipus and reopens the line of paternal succession: he says that Polybus was no more 
father to Oedipus than he, the messenger, was: 
Oedipus Do you mean Polybus was not my father? 
Messenger No more than I. We're both the same to you. 
Oedipus Same? One who begot me and one who didn't? 
Messenger He didn't beget you any more than I did. 
(1017-20, Gould) 
Thus very quickly, with the help of Oedipus' oracular anxiety and paradoxical joy of 
reacquiring his uncertain father through the news of his painless death, the messenger 
returns Oedipus to the basic equation describing his father as a strange `nobody'. In his 
question, Oedipus asks, literally, `how can the one who begot me be equal to nothing' or 
the one `who is nothing to me'? ('kai pös ho phüsas ex Isou to medeni; ', 1119) - and is 
enlightened by the messenger that this was made perfectly possible due to the 
withdrawal of Oedipus' real father, who must have disavowed and abandoned Oedipus 
to the care of three successive substitute fathers, the last and most real of whom was, of 
course, Polybus. The Corinthian explains that Polybus was taught by `his own 
childlessness' to `love' Oedipus as if his own begotten son ('autbn apaidia' `esterxen 
mega', 1024,1023). It is a puzzle for Oedipus that a man could love a child received 
from someone else's hands (`ap' alles cheirös', 1023). This puzzle, however, bears 
witness not to his cynicism but to the puzzle of the `ancient trouble' (`archaios kakon', 
1033), the marks on the `ankles of his feet' (`poddn ärthra', 1032), `the tokens of 
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dreadful shame' (`deinon g' öneidos spargämdn', 1035), which his real parents left him 
with. And as the Corinthian proves to him now, Polybus was, indeed, not privy to the 
secret of those marks. Neither is the Corinthian himself. However, what the Corinthian 
credits himself for over Polybus is the unpinning of Oedipus' feet, when, as he first says, 
he found him on the Cithaeron mountain (1026). After Jocasta's mentioning of the 
crossroads at Phocis, this is another crucial toponymic reference in the tragedy. This 
time it does not transfix Oedipus but Jocasta, who, when she reenters the dialogue thirty 
lines later, will already be devastatingly certain about the identity of Oedipus' 
progenitor. 
There is a further symmetry in her and Oedipus' reaction to the Cithaeron 
toponym at this moment in that while Oedipus missed completely the yoked feet of the 
exposed baby in Jocasta's story which was obscured by the crossing of the roads, he 
now seems to be missing again the crucial and sinister movement in the Corinthian's 
story towards Thebes, in whose vicinity Cithaeron mountain lies. Instead, he is now 
concentrated on the meaning of the yoked feet, because he now recognises himself as the 
baby in the story - while Jocasta has already made the terrifying connection between the 
two stories. But Oedipus still lacks insight, so he asks the Corinthian, who is now forced 
to admit to the similar problem and curiously correct himself by saying that he was 
actually not the first to `fmd' Oedipus on Cithaeron but only received him from another 
shepherd, `one of Laius' men' (`tön Laiou depou', 1042). This, even more alarming 
signal of proximity to Oedipus' present situation, while certainly removing Jocasta's last 
doubts, spurs Oedipus on in his search - he asks about the shepherd and is told by the 
Chorus that the shepherd the Corinthian is talking about must be the one Oedipus has 
already sent for, the survivor of Laius' murder and the confidential exposer of Laius' 
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baby. Oedipus does not seem to make and ponder over this ominously involved 
connection but rushes onwards and is impatient to see the man and ask him the question 
about the identity of his father. For Jocasta, the father has already returned, in Oedipus' 
guise, now terribly transformed in her mind's eye, the `great eye' which is `the father's 
tomb' ('megas g' ophthalmös hoi patrbs tc phoi', 987) - the words she used about 
Polybus in the moment of her short-lived joy which are now revealing their other, 
terribly true sense, engulfing both her and Oedipus. 
Characteristically, Oedipus misses the depth and vehemence of Jocasta's sudden 
`wild grief at the Corinthian's revelations - `agrias Jupes', literally, `the grief of 
someone who lives in the fields', thus `savage, wild', which will, indeed, prepare the 
reentrance of deuteragonistes as Laius' servant, who returns from wilderness, after 
Jocasta rushes in to hang herself. Despite the fact that his search for his ancestry has now 
virtually come to Thebes, rather than Corinth, Oedipus still counts himself fortunate 
enough - the son of Fortune (`palda tes Tuches, 1080) - to hope, with the new `clues' 
(`semeia', 1059), for a discovery of a miraculous ancestry at the end of the chain of 
substitute fathers. In other words, Jocasta's `sickness' ('nosos') and her calling him the 
`un-fortunate one' (`dýstene', 1071) is not enough for him to stop looking for the tomb 
of his real father, `break forth what will! ' ('hopola chrezei hregnütö', 1076). The 
nearness of this tomb, as we have already noted, does not deter him but, to the contrary, 
exerts an irresistible, inevitable pull. 
This is why he rushes through the interrogation of the Laius' old servant, who 
arrives after Oedipus' desperately defiant and Chorus' absurdly hopeful speeches about 
Oedipus' new ancestry. He cannot wait to get to the truth, he is so impatient as to 
threaten and most certainly apply torture to the old man, who is very anxious and 
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reluctant to talk - especially, after he understands the reason for his being summoned 
and has the full truth of the situation in front of his eyes well before his interrogator gets 
near it. This truth still blind to itself is, of course, Oedipus himself, desperate to learn the 
secret of his lame name. On the pain of death, the servant-shepherd finally concedes that 
Laius and Jocasta (specifically) entrusted him once with a baby (whose ankles he does 
not mention) whom he was supposed to `do away with' (`analösaimi', ' 1174) - but 
whom he, out of pity, gave away to the Corinthian to raise as his foster-son far away 
from Thebes - and 
If you are the one 
he speaks of - know your evil birth! 
(1180-81, Gould) 
(ei gär hoütos ei/ hon phesin hoütos, 
isthi düspotmos geg(5s. ) 
These are the last words of Laius' servant-shepherd, a response to the extraordinary last 
question of Oedipus in this episode, when he, already knowing the truth of his birth, still 
asks for the reason why the servant gave the baby away instead of killing it. Finally, 
Oedipus finds his father and, virtually, his tomb, the `great eye', in his mother's 
embrace, at the sight/site of his own conception, of his curse by the oracle, and exposure 
to its element. Together with the son, the dead father is re-exposed at the very centre of 
the son, mother, the children bom from unwitting incest, and his `dead' self as well as 
the oracle - which announced it from the very beginning in the ambivalent form of the 
nameless/naming act of his murder. The consummation of this act now is carried by 
Oedipus even further back in time, prior to the exposure of the baby - right to the time 
and place of his conception, Jocasta's bedroom, where, according to the palace 
messenger, Oedipus rushes crying for a sword and where he, having broken through the 
135 
now revealingly forbidden double-doors of the bedroom, sees the sight of Jocasta 
hanging from the ceiling and blinds himself with two brooches that kept her dress 
together. The self-blinding and hanging, the arthra, ball joints of Oedipus eyes, and the 
noose of twisted ropes for Jocasta's neck, are correlative in the re-exposition of the self- 
violating `dead' father as the dark murdering lack circumscribed by the circumferences, 
which are filled, respectively, by Jocasta's surrendered life and Oedipus' surrendered 
sight. This conjunction of self-blinding and suicide presents the father's self-violation as 
constituted by these two acts involved with the mother's and son's bodies - that is, it 
finally shows that Laius' becoming a father in Jocasta's bedroom has both sealed and 
blinded him towards his destiny, to `the place where three roads meet'. This scene also 
remakes the point of the fundamental zeugmatic and trans-personal character of this 
triple (rather than double) curse - that is, of the impossibility to ascribe it essentially 
either to the father, or mother, or the son, or even to the daimon, whose intervention can 
be counted as the alternative beginning of its transmission. The already negated 
character of the truth in the oracle shows that the oracular word itself is essentially 
incomplete and decentred with regards to its message. Sophocles' treatment of the myth 
thus depends vitally on negation for the revelation of truth, found both in the oracular 
messages and their human appropriation. And the key figure for the representation of 
this uncertainty is the father, the father as a specific condition of a missing, self-negating 
message. This mystery of the tormented and tormenting father, the great, terrifying, and 
un-closed `eye' (ophthalmos) of his tomb, which opens for Oedipus and Jocasta within 
and without themselves, and which happens to have an apposite phonetic coincidence in 
English with the I (ego) of an individual - something that both Oedipus and Jocasta see 
engulfed by this tomb - seems to us the key phenomenon which substantially 
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corroborates Freud's well-known and disputed association between Sophocles' Oedipus 
and Shakespeare's Hamlet. It is with renewed attention to the suggestiveness of this 
association in the context of the theme of the father that we are going to turn to 
Shakespeare's tragedy in the next section. 
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3.1 Hamlet: Introduction 
[The Ghost] Spreads his Arms 
`One can but wonder at the number of critics producing `new' readings of Hamlet. 
One feels they must believe that their readings are somehow exceptional. ' 
(Wagner, `Losing the Name of Action' 135). 
The recently prevalent tendency in approaching the Ghost in Hamlet has been to 
reduce its dramatic status to a manifestation of a certain external order of reference - in 
other words, to a complex epigraph60. Doing the double justice to the complexity of the 
object in question and the requirements of the modem genre of critical theory, this order 
is usually not homogenous but a mixture of various uses of psychology, historicism, and 
modem approaches to text. It is necessary to acknowledge from the start that the 
following analysis of Hamlet will certainly not stray from this state of being `to double 
business bound' in any `exceptional' sense - except that it will confine explicit 
interrogation of various critical approaches to the play mainly to this introduction, so 
that, following the pattern of the previous section, the maximum of analytic attention is 
focused on the play itself. 
A primarily textual emphasis of this analysis is warranted particularly in relation 
to Hamlet by the already mentioned reductive peculiarity of the recent studies, although, 
to be fair, it is hardly possible to qualify them as unambiguously reductive. On the 
contrary, it is a combination of suggestiveness and circumspection that characterises this 
60 Helpfully laid out in the OED as `[ad. Or. E7TtYPa0 inscription, f. 
E7fYp6,4e1vto 
write upon, f. £7, Tc 
upon + YP4E"%'to write. In Fr. epigraphe] an inscription; esp. one placed upon a building, tomb, statue, 
etc., to indicate its name or destination; a legend on a coin'; `the superscription of a letter, book, etc.; also, 
the imprint on a title-page. Obs. '; `a short quotation or pithy sentence placed at the commencement of a 
work, a chapter, etc. to indicate the leading idea or sentiment; a motto. ' 
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tendency to leave the play, and particularly the protagonist and the Ghost, `veiled', to 
use Garber's appropriation of Lacan's `phallus' for her Ghost-centred reading of 
Hamlet. 
A paradigmatic example of disquisition on the matter, Hamlet in Purgatory 
published by Stephen Greenblatt in 2001, squarely refuses to confront the Ghost while 
accumulating an array of fascinating material on the `afterlife of Purgatory'. The 
mystery of the Ghost is all but exposed, at long last, in the penultimate chapter 
`Remember Me'. In the section of that chapter entitled `Uncertainty and Interrogation', 
Greenblatt dwells on the revulsion with which Hamlet views the corruption of the spirit 
`mired in the flesh that will not melt away, that cannot free itself from longings for 
mother and lover, that stubbornly persists and resists and blocks the realization of the 
father's wishes'. The task of setting right the time that is `out of joint', with which the 
father charges the son, `is further complicated by the father's own entanglements in the 
flesh' (243). This is a characteristic example of psychological reduction of the problem 
in which the discussion assumes the identity between the author's and Hamlet's points 
of view - and thus it assumes the identity of the Ghost and the father, as if this were 
indeed the indisputable reality of the play. 
This problematic assumption leads Greenblatt to finish this section with the 
Reformers' justification for the extensive dwelling on corruption which seems to tally 
well with the dramatic emphasis of the plot: `The spirit can be healed only by refusing 
all compromise and by plunging the imagination unflinchingly into the rank corruption 
of the ulcerous place' (243-44). The `primary and elemental nausea', the `revulsion' that 
this plunging would provoke are here, according to Greenblatt, `not an end in itself, it is 
the spiritual precondition of a liberated spirit that fords a special providence in the fall of 
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a sparrow, sacrificially fulfils the father's design, and declares that the readiness is all' 
(244). Having already assumed `the father's design', Greenblatt immediately follows up 
with the anticlimactic moment of liberation where he summons the very spirit only to let 
it go without questioning: 
But the problem is that the father's [i. e. the Ghost's] design is vengeance; vengeance, 
moreover, demanded by a spirit that seems to come from the place that was for 
Protestants a supreme emblem of the corruption of the Catholic Church. What can be 
made of this? The point surely is not to settle issues that Shakespeare has clearly gone 
out of his way to unsettle or render ambiguous. I am concerned, rather, with the 
particular uses that the playwright made of the struggle between Simon Fish and 
Thomas More and its aftermath. 
(Hamlet in Purgatory, 244) 
How can one be sure of the intent ('design') if the issues are unsettled and ambiguous? 
The only logical way is assumption of authorial intent because design cannot both reveal 
itself as such and remain ambiguous. 
Thus it is understandable how one could argue that the point of Hamlet is to 
forget about Hamlet as a play and turn to the historical issues of the day. After all, this is 
what the play itself seems to be demanding throughout, from Hamlet's proliferating self- 
accusations of `thinking too precisely on the event' to the arrival of Fortinbras at the 
end. One could attempt to construe the crux of the Ghost's design and Hamlet's 
behaviour in this context as a means for the author to capitalise on the `momentous 
public debate', the great `ontological argument about spectrality and remembrance' 
(249) as such, well played out by the rhetorical joust between Fish and More. For, 
according to Greenblatt's vision of Shakespeare, which received its fullest elaboration to 
date in Will in the World (2004), 
At a deep level there is something magnificently opportunistic, appropriative, 
absorptive, even cannibalistic about Shakespeare's art, as if poor, envious Robert 
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Greene, had sensed something more important than he knew when he attacked the 
"upstart crow, beautified with our feathers. " In the case of Purgatory, important forces 
had been busily struggling for decades to prepare the playwright's feast. And the 
struggle did not end with the performance of the play or the playwright's death. 
(Hamlet in Purgatory 254) 
The paradoxical conclusion that should be drawn from this passage is that Hamlet is 
really not about Hamlet at all; that the `playwright's feast' is `not where. he eats, but 
where he is eaten' by the `struggling' of the `important forces'; and that, because 
Shakespeare, according to Greenblatt, only developed to the logical, secularising 
conclusion the theological and political tensions that had been rife in the 16`h century 
England, the audience does not need to get involved with the issue of the Ghost's design 
and Hamlet's tragedy in the play as such.. 
To underscore those features of the Ghost that would conform to this vision, 
Greenblatt aligns it with 'More's poor souls' who `cry out to be remembered, fear the 
dull forgetfulness of the living, disrupt the corrupt ease of the world with horrifying tales 
of their sufferings, lament the remarriage of their wives'. (249) This description is meant 
as a contrasting complement to John Foxe's satirical attack against More whom he 
presents as making `the dead men's souls [... ] by a Rhetorical Prosopopoeia, to speak 
out of Purgatory pinfold, sometimes lamentably complaining, sometimes pleasantly 
dallying and scoffing [... ], sometimes scolding and railing at him, calling him fool, 
witless, frantic, an ass, a goose, a mad dog, an heretic, and all that naught is' (250). 
Despite the apparent intention, the contrast here is virtually non-existent because 
both descriptions - as well as much of the fascinating pro et contra Purgatory material in 
the previous chapters of the study - have nothing to do with the fundamental sticking 
point of the Ghost in Hamlet which Greenblatt leaves consciously aside: the Ghost does 
not so much `lament' the remarriage but reviles it and demands vengeance. This is the 
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very dramatic catalyst that combines murder and sexuality into the `revulsion' that fills 
the ear of Denmark and, by the time of the last scene, the eye of Denmark and the 
audience, without any clear promise of the `liberated spirit'. 
In Revenge Tragedy: Aeschylus to Armageddon (1996), John Kerrigan qualifies 
revenge as the perfect generator of the `natural dramatic situation.. . of re-action' (4) 
which presents the author with the problem of `prevent[ing] the material ramifying 
endlessly (as in an Icelandic saga)' rather than `creat[ing] the events ex nihilo': 
There is a sense in which theatrical doing gravitates, quite naturally, towards 
revenge ... The most cerebral and perplexed revenge plays cannot escape 
from action as a 
principle' (5). 
Although it is hard to miss the relevance of these observations to Hamlet, it is also hard 
to miss the reversed relation between revenge and the problem of dramatic proliferation 
there: the cerebrality and violence proliferate in a seeming contradiction to revenge. It is 
a commonly agreed fact that Hamlet manages to obliterate unnecessarily all but one 
major character, including himself, before he, literally, gets a chance to confront the 
perpetrator. Thus the deictic/creative quality of revenge that Kerrigan singles out as 
intrinsically germane to the mimetic nature of drama (17) is problematised together with 
that very nature: instead of `creation ex nihilo' the revenge motif in Hamlet rather 
provides for a creation ad nihilum, tending towards but never reaching the point of 
vanishing. 
Indeed, Denmark is not saved but implosively destroyed, and, although 
Fortinbras is there to `claim the rights of memory' and man the empty throne, there is no 
suggestion of any difference - except, perhaps, in terms of heraldry - that he might 
bring. Even the obvious change in the power balance at the end of the final scene, which 
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recalls the final scene of Oedipus, is rapidly reversed: Fortinbras' first act as the bona 
fide ruler of Denmark, after giving the burial orders, is to sit down and listen to 
Horatio's Hamlet. And if we are meant to judge the impact of this story on Fortinbras by 
the subsequent destiny of the play, then it is difficult to imagine him making an easy 
appropriation of and a clean break from the memory that he has come to claim. 
Essentially, unlike Creon, he must still be sitting and listening to the story, wondering, 
perhaps, if he should `settle issues that' Horatio as the bona fide Shakespeare `has 
clearly gone out of his way to unsettle or render ambiguous'. That is, unless he has left 
the privilege to the audience and has gone off again `with divine ambition puffd' to 
fight for some new `egg-shell'. 
Valeria Wagner's sarcasm, evident in the epigraph, can be read not only with 
reference to the sheer quantity of scholarship on Hamlet. In another sense, it must be 
hiding the embarrassing admission that this virtual infinity of critical discourse trying to 
figure the play out, to rid Hamlet and the Ghost of their `mystery' in more and more 
ingenious ways, is that `rest' to which the angels have sung the young prince. 
Greenblatt, apparently, comes to a very similar conclusion about Hamlet's state 
at the end of the play and his present situation. He finishes the chapter `Remember Me' 
with a section entitled `The Old Snare' in which he attempts to produce a seemingly 
chilling effect, not unlike that of `The Living Hand' of John Keats: 
With the doctrine of Purgatory and the elaborate practices that grew up around it, the 
church had provided a powerful method of negotiating with the dead, or, rather, with 
those who were at once dead and yet, since they could still speak, appeal, and appall, not 
completely dead. The Protestant attack on the "middle state of souls" and the middle 
place those souls inhabited destroyed this method for most people in England, but it did 
not destroy the longings and fears that Catholic doctrine had focused and exploited. 
Instead [... ], the space of Purgatory becomes the space of the stage where old Hamlet's 
ghost is doomed for a certain term to walk the night. That term has now lasted some four 
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hundred years, and it has brought with it a cult of the dead that I and the readers of this 
book have been serving. 
(Hamlet in Purgatory 256-57) 
In one sense, the chilling effect fails. It is because, unlike Keats, Greenblatt's exposition 
founders on the vagueness of `the dead' that are `not completely dead'. This is hardly his 
fault in view of the, presumably, never-ending legacy of `exploitation' that he is dealing 
with; besides, even such eminent scholars as More, Foxe, and others up till the present 
day have always been in dispute over the matter. However, the effect fails more 
precisely because in the context of Greenblatt's study, which accepts this legacy as 
Shakespeare's field of origin, the fact that the dead somehow retain the ability to move 
on stage, `speak, appeal, and appall' is taken to suggest the possibility of negotiation - in 
other words, the liberating design, presented at length in the chapter on The Gast of Gy, 
and symbolized on the cover by the angels singing the souls of `the dead/not completely 
dead' out of the painted darkness, through the funnel of light, into paradise. The Catholic 
exploitation of the `longings and fears' is in this way given a tacit credit by presenting 
the Shakespearean and modem theatre, as well as literary criticism, as its bona fide 
secularised reincarnations. Thus, on the one hand, Greenblatt wants to scare the reader 
by revealing, at the end of his book, that we all must be living in and with Purgatory at 
least (because, as he himself notes, the issue of its boundaries with Hell is notoriously 
unsettled); on the other, he tempts us with the promise of bliss because theatre and 
literary criticism, embodied in his book, are presented as the rightful heirs of the 
Catholic `cult of the ['not completely'] dead', who have been sobered up by the 
scholarly polemics but, nevertheless, managed to retain the precious key to salvation. 
Accordingly, in the Epilogue to his study, Greenblatt, in effect, corrects our 
initial association between his closing metaphor in `Remember Me' and Keats' 
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uncompromising demand to grasp `this hand' while it is still `warm and capable' by 
providing one of his own which reveals Shakespeare's Prospero as the inspiration 
behind the image: 
My ending is despair 
Unless I be relieved by prayer, 
Which pierces so, that it assaults 
Mercy itself, and frees all faults. 
As you from crimes would pardoned be, 
Let your indulgence set me free. 
(The Tempest, Epilogue, 11.13-20) 
Paradoxically, such a closing for a book on Hamlet revives, by the obvious repression, 
the very Keatsian image of us having to confront the dying, extremely unsettling prince 
and earlier the Ghost, neither of whom mentions or is concerned with `prayers' or 
`relief as such. Rather than leaving them the ability to `appall' and/in order to `appeal' 
for intercession, their death is absolute and cannot be relieved. However, far from being 
the absolute end of existence, death takes them over and endows them with the power of 
absolute demand that, similarly to Apollo's oracles in Sophocles, is not open to 
negotiation or intercession. As in Keats, relief here is totally hypothetical. However, 
according to Greenblatt, instead of this disturbing image, we should imagine an actor (an 
audience-friendly equivalent for `dead'/`not completely dead') who `is not, of course, 
crying out from Purgatory; he is speaking from the stage. And in place of prayers, we 
offer the actor's ticket to bliss: applause' (Hamlet in Purgatory, `Epilogue', 261). The 
life of this actor is `little', `such stuff/As dreams are made on', and is easily `rounded' 
not with death but `with a sleep' (The Tempest, 4.1.151-58). Greenblatt certainly tries to 
maintain the necessary pathos here by quoting Hamlet's famous lines 
For in that sleep of death what dreams may come 
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When we have shuffled off this mortal coil 
Must give us pause. 
(3.1.68-70) 
(Hamlet in Purgatory, 260) 
But the connection is tenuous precisely because Prospero does not (have to) die at the 
end and we are not demanded to tell his story again. His misfortune, although certainly 
resonant of the central collision in Hamlet, never really breaks out of his narrative 
control and does not involve any of the crimes committed at Elsinore. It is a `fable', 
avowedly much less real in dramatic terms precisely because of this lack of mortality. 
The only reality here is Prospero's awareness that the `vision' he is part of is a `baseless' 
and `insubstantial pageant', capable of equally easy dissolution and recreation; instead 
of earnest prayers, all it needs is another round of applause -a fairly reflexive (that is, 
physically self-centred) gesture; it is as insubstantial as the pageant itself and, as 
Claudius' example amply demonstrates, the audience should be happy to provide it in 
return for being spared a real need to pray. 
It is hardly possible to reconcile this kind of exchange between the audience and 
actors at the end of Hamlet, where applause seems incongruous at the very least because, 
as Horatio sums it up, the play has been a sequence 
Of carnal, bloody, and unnatural acts, 
Of accidental judgments, casual slaughters, 
Of deaths put on by cunning and forced cause, 
And, in this upshot, purposes mistook 
Fall'n on the inventors' heads[... ] 
(5.2.363-67) 
But, most importantly, it is incongruous because, as has been noted already in this and 
numerous other analyses, this is not the end but rather the beginning of Hamlet's plot. 
This moment of 
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I am dead, Horatio. Wretched queen, adieu! 
You that look pale and tremble at this chance, 
That are but mutes or audience to this act, 
Had I but time - 
(5.2.316-18) 
is the root - or the `navel [... ] spot', as Freud could have called it61- into which the 
`dream' of the plot and author's intent disappears without vanishing. And as if in a 
dream, we, and the play, find ourselves `mute' and incapable of extricating ourselves 
from the obligation that the prince is passing onto us, as he himself was earlier incapable 
of resisting the Ghost's beckoning. It seems pointless to argue that this is a figment of 
secularised imagination in order to insist that it promises purgatorial salvation, both for 
Hamlet and ourselves, if we somehow pay enough attention to certain fragments of its 
design. 
Without wishing to belittle Greenblatt's study which certainly succeeds in being 
highly fascinating and incisive in the context of its peculiar scope, it is necessary to 
admit that its conscious evasion of confrontation with Hamlet's disturbing root recalls 
the classic paradox impugning the existence of Purgatory to which Greenblatt turns at 
the beginning of the book: if the Catholic church and the Pope have as great a `power to 
remit punishment due to sin' (261) as they claim, why should there be a Purgatory? 
Hamlet has become by far the most popular play in the world in the last `four hundred 
years', and if we are to follow Greenblatt's closing metaphor that aligns theatre and 
literary criticism with the abolished intercessory rites to its logical conclusion, there 
61 `There is often a passage in even the most thoroughly interpreted dream which has to be left obscure; 
this is because we become aware during the work of interpretation that at that point there is a tangle of 
dream-thoughts which cannot be unravelled... This is the dream's navel, the spot where it reaches down 
into the unknown' (Interpretation, 671). 
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should be little justification for the word `Purgatory' in his title: the book should have 
been called With Hamlet in Heaven. 
Instead, for Greenblatt Hamlet partly thrives on and partly accounts for the 
covert persistence of Purgatory, because it `immeasurably intensifies a sense of the 
weirdness of the theater, its proximity to certain experiences that had been organized and 
exploited by religious institutions and rituals' (253). However, because the purgatorial 
aspect, even in Greenblatt's own opinion, accounts only for apart of this `weirdness', 
the current title could still be adjusted into Purgatory in Hamlet to reflect this reversed 
balance between the two notions. Greenblatt leaves aside the problem of their 
association, identifying it with the seemingly suggestive but not interrogated authorial 
intent despite its avowed ambiguity, and chooses to seek comfort by translating it into 
the `insubstantial pageant' of the secularised, symbolic, anodyne, and thus essentially 
non-tragic purgatory of The Tempest. For this reason, the question that Greenblatt asks 
here as part of this large assumption - whether Shakespeare `was participating in a 
secularisation process, one in which the theater offers a disenchanted version of what the 
cult of Purgatory once offered', and which he answers with a non-committing `perhaps' 
- is necessarily off the mark. The question that rather suggests itself here, in a 
Pirandellian fashion, is whether such appraisal of Shakespeare's authority in Hamlet is 
not in conflict with the dramatic reality of the text - which has itself been the subject of 
epochal debate that is far from over. 
Thus the second question that suggests itself here is whether we should follow 
the author - Greenblatt's `Shakespeare' - who, apparently, wants to keep Hamlet and all 
the subsequent generations of his audience in Purgatory, despite the discrepancies, or 
whether we should try, as it were, to reverse the decline of the diocese by attempting to 
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free the main characters and ourselves from this destiny. If we also acknowledge the 
distinction and, indeed, fierce opposition between the church and theatre on the one hand 
and Catholics and Protestants on the other in the 16th century England, neither 
conversion nor atheism is an option in the case of interpreting Hamlet's mystery (that is, 
if we do acknowledge it as such). What Greenblatt calls `secularization' corresponds, 
even in his own account, to the reverse process in which strife overwhelms the 
boundaries of the saeculum, the `time', and, just like this play in general and the Ghost 
in particular, wrenches it out of scholastic joint, leaving neither Hamlet nor the audience 
any meaningful choice except to confront it. 
Covering approximately the same ground almost forty years prior to Greenblatt, 
Eleanor Prosser's attempt in Hamlet and Revenge to engage as fully as possible with this 
very vision of the play's conflict received quite a dressing-down from Frank Kermode in 
The New York Review of Books. Modern treatments of Hamlet (including Greenblatt's) 
must still be mindful of his scathing and unflinching certainty: 
The one obvious thing about Hamlet is that nobody could possibly say what it 
means; but people who think they have stumbled on something in it that everybody else 
has overlooked do not notice this. Although the graduate schools now go in for all 
manner of metacritical precautions, it is still a common enough ambition to find and 
follow the clue which will show that quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus, that 
trinity of squares, have been wrong all the time. For instance, it can be argued that we 
shall be nearer a true understanding of Hamlet if we get close to what an Elizabethan 
audience might have thought it said, and the result of the research is almost certain to be 
a conviction that everybody since then, everywhere and practically always, has been 
getting it wrong; which is the conviction that prompted the inquiry in the first place. 
('Reading Shakespeare's Mind', 15) 
The fact that this view has not lost all its relevance in the later, theoretically informed 
age of Hamlet criticism, is supported, for example, by Terry Eagleton's evaluation of the 
play in his William Shakespeare (1986) which, in the chapter, correspondingly entitled 
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` "Nothing": Othello, Hamlet, Coriolanus', states, in a similar tone, that 
[Hamlet] will be scandalized that Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, slow-witted 
lackeys of the state, should presume to penetrate his inward essence, pluck out the heart 
of his mystery. But the irony of this, as in Othello, is that there is no heart of the mystery 
to be plucked out. Hamlet has no `essence' of being whatsoever, no inner sanctum to be 
safeguarded: he is pure deferral and diffusion, a hollow void which offers nothing 
determinate to be known. His `self consists simply in the range of gestures with which 
he resists available definitions, not in a radical alternative beyond their reach. 
(William Shakespeare 72) 
Contrary to the impression that it may have produced by now, the purpose of the current 
analysis is not specifically to counter Eagleton or Kermode by providing an equally 
unflinching defense of Prosser's approach (which has, inclusive of Greenblatt, become a 
recognized example of excellence) especially by means of coming up with a new 
solution for Hamlet. 
Instead, as it was stated in the beginning, the purpose is to insist on confronting 
the undisputed central problem of Hamlet (following the related example of Oedipus in 
the previous section), which both requires and defies our powers of observation, as a 
problem. The elusive shape of this contradiction has already been noted in the discussion 
of Greenblatt's argument. By contrast, Kermode's and Eagleton's texts, which were 
meant to rely neither on historical nor on detailed textual analysis of the play, are 
instrumental in helping this shape appear without much of its usual armour - as it were, 
in the transparent form of the `trinity of squares'. And `the irony' here certainly turns on 
Kermode and Eagleton, for, despite the rising influence of, for example, deconstruction, 
they managed to overlook the simple obverse of their categoric pronouncements: if 
nobody, neither Shakespeare nor Hamlet, knows what this play really `means', how can 
one be sure that it does not mean anything? How can one be a hollow void and resist a 
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`radical alternative' beyond one's reach? Where does the certainty, the `trinity of the 
squares', come from? 
The presence of something underlying this certainty is indeed very palpable, as 
has already been noted in relation to Greenblatt's argument which acknowledges but 
consciously evades the problem of Hamlet's meaning. In a further ironic twist, an 
important point of thematic convergence between Prosser's and Greenblatt's arguments 
helps to discern the shifting outline of this object of resistance in the very structure of 
Kermode's Latin shield. The tripartite parallel construction (quod semper, quod ubique, 
quod ab omnibus), with ubique at its centre, recalls the moment of oath taking at the end 
of Act 1, a major point of attention for many (Ghost) studies of this play. It is the Ghost, 
the `old mole' and `worthy pioner' (1.5.162,163), who thrice reveals itself to be `hic et 
ubique' underground and thus makes Hamlet, Horatio, and the soldiers thrice shift their 
ground for each repetition of the oath. 
0 day and night, but this is wondrous strange! (1.5.164) 
says Horatio the `scholar' immediately after the oath taking., When Hamlet, 
characteristically, does not oblige with anything more than a cryptic aphorism in 
response, the critics (and the audience more generally) take up the challenge to satisfy or 
dismiss the anxiety of this crucial moment at which the Ghost, literally, enters the stage, 
the plot, the mind of the protagonist, and thus the ear and ground of the whole Denmark. 
Hamlet's qualification of it as simply a `stranger' (1.5.165) may be a sufficient warrant 
for a prince to give to the sentries on duty on behalf of his `truepenny' confidante, but it 
does nothing to dissolve the suspicious impression of this shifting entry. None of them, 
including Hamlet, seems to realise who it is exactly that they have just let through into 
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the kingdom; and there is no hope of finding it out precisely because the Ghost secures 
Hamlet, literally, as its passport62. Because of its appearance, `it' can count on virtually 
absolute power of influence over Hamlet and thus over anyone in the kingdom without 
having to reveal itself and prove its identity with/as the late king. Hamlet's later use of 
the `father's signet' to get rid of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern is an exact Lacanian 
parallel to this moment: the father's image and name are not the father, `the king is not 
with the body'. Nevertheless, as this analysis will attempt to demonstrate, this does not 
mean that `the king is a thing of nothing' either in Kermode's, Eagleton's or even 
Lacan's sense (that of the `phallus', of course), because in dramatic terms, there 
definitely is a `body' that is `with the king'. 
Greenblatt promotes the reading of `hic et ubique' in this scene as the `Latin tag' 
that presumably refers to the prayer for the dead in the `traditional Catholic ritual in 
England' for where `God's mercy and forgiveness of sin are begged on behalf of all of 
those souls here and everywhere (hic et ubique) who rest in Christ' (235). 63 The 
relevance here is only superficial and is valuable again precisely by virtue of outlining 
that which it misses. That is, in the language of Sophocles' Oedipus, what this reading 
makes clear is the difference between `one' and `many': Hamlet may be punning on the 
Latin phrase from the Catholic service, but he is not referring to `all of those 
souls.. . who rest in Christ'; it is not a different soul that answers him every time he shifts 
62 One of the extended uses of the word includes 'means or guarantee of salvation, as baptism, an 
indulgence, deathbed absolution, the administration of the last rites, etc. In some faith traditions, esp. 
Orthodox Church: (originally) a document proving this or (now more usually) containing prayers for the 
deceased, placed in the grave to guarantee safe passage to heaven. Esp. in phrase passport to heaven. ' 
(OED). 
63 `Deus, in cujus miseratione animae fidelium requiescunt; animabus famulorum famularumque tuarum 
omnium, hic et ubique in Christo quiescentium [... ]' (Hamlet in Purgatory, Notes to Chapter Five, n. 38, 
301) 
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the ground; hence, as in the case of Oedipus' equation, there needs to be an 
extraordinary explanation for the equality between `one' and `many'. 
Such an explanation is, indeed, unavoidably present in Greenblatt's argument on 
the immediately preceding page, marking the convergence with Prosser. As both these 
authors note, another important reference for `hic et ubique' in the context of the time 
was the debate about the divine ubiquity. Greenblatt produces a compromise between 
this and the purgatorial reading by designating the debate as a `dispute over the Lutheran 
doctrine of Christ's ubiquity' (234, italics added). However, as Prosser emphasises in 
her treatment of this moment, such a compromise is not tenable in the context of the 
scene. First, ' "hic et ubique" cannot refer to an "honest ghost" ', because, according to 
the terms of the dispute, `only God and the Devil can be both here and everywhere at the 
same time' (Hamlet and Revenge, 140). Greenblatt himself comes up very helpfully with 
quotes from Shakespeare to support this assertion: 
The words [hic et ubique] refer to restless movement, a certain placelessness, 
comparable in Othello to Roderigo's description of Othello as "an extravagant 
and wheeling stranger/ Of here and everywhere" (1.1.137-38)... In Twelfth 
Night, a play of the same year [as Hamlet], Sebastian, baffled by the appearance 
of his double, declares that there cannot be "that deity in my nature/ Of here and 
everywhere" (5.1.220-21)... If this resonance is present in Hamlet, as it well may 
be, the prince's jest [while shifting the ground] is deepened by a disquieting 
association of his father's ghost with the omnipresence of God. 
(Hamlet in Purgatory, 234) 
The disquieting nature of this association is only emphasised by the fact that Greenblatt, 
virtually like Horatio, Barnardo, and Marcellus here, swears secrecy to Hamlet regarding 
the `stranger' and obliges by producing `further theological resonance to these words 
[hic et ubique], specifically relevant to Purgatory' (234). Not only does the `stranger' not 
appear to be an ordinary `ghost', but it also cannot appear to be Luther's ubiquitous 
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Christ to Hamlet (and the audience of either persuasion) for, at least, the obvious reason 
of demanding vengeance which should have belonged to Him in the first place. TM These 
considerations leave Prosser and, as she claims with some force, the audience no choice 
but to align the apparition with the Devil. `Old mole' and `worthy pioner' are additional 
pieces of evidence in her argument as they refer to the contemporary popular belief that 
"demons ... frequent[ed] mines', indirectly supported again by a quote from Tweflth Night 
where `we find Toby Belch referring to the Devil as a "foul collier" (III. iv. 130)'. This 
is coupled with the fact that cellarage `beneath the stage' `in Elizabethan drama' was 
`the familiar abode.. . of demons, furies, and damned souls' (140). 
However, to be precise, Prosser never simply equates the Ghost with the Devil. 
Instead, she underscores the fact that `throughout the cellarage scene, the Ghost is acting 
like a devil' (140, italics added). Similarity instead of identification maybe just a formal 
distinction here based on the same appeal to the authority of Shakespeare's design that 
we saw in Greenblatt. But the more intriguing development to it comes from Prosser's 
own recourse to the Biblical tradition in the contemporary theatre. Unlike Greenblatt's 
purgatorial gloss of hic et ubique which negates shifting by relating it to the multiplicity 
of the dead souls in the funeral prayer, Prosser comes up with a reference to Joseph 
Quincy Adams' article `Some Notes on Hamlet' which suggests `that a clue [to the hic et 
64 'To me [belongeth] vengeance, and recompence; their foot shall slide in [due] time: for the day of their 
calamity [is] at hand, and the things that shall come upon them make haste' (Deuteronomy 32: 35). 
`Dearly beloved, avenge not yourselves, but [rather] give place unto wrath [of God]: for it is written, 
Vengeance [is] mine; I will repay, saith the Lord. ' (Romans 12: 19 1-5) Luther starts his Preface to the 
Letter of St. Paul to the Romans unambiguously by saying that `this letter is truly the most important piece 
in the New Testament' ('Vorrede auf die Epistel S. Paul: an die Romer' in D. Martin Luther: Die gantze 
Heilige Schrift Deudsch 1545 aufs new zurericht, ed. Hans Volz and Heinz Blanke. Munich: Roger & 
Bernhard. 1972, vol. 2, pp. 2254-2268; trans. Bro. Andrew Thornton, OSB). 
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ubique] may be found in the Chester cycle Processus Prophetarum' (Hamlet and 
Revenge, note 39,139): 
Hamlet's attempt to make the friends swear, in which he shifts to four several 
places on the stage ... is apt to be taken as grotesque. Yet perhaps there was something 
conventional in this, as Professor Bradley suggests (Shakespearean Tragedy, p. 412). I 
am reminded of the attempt of Balaam to curse the Children of Israel (Numbers xxiii- 
xxiv). Each time Balaam found himself unable to utter the curse, and each time Balaak 
suggested a removal of ground.. . This scene had already appeared on the stage of the 
mystery plays. (Adams 40) 
Although both clues (mystery plays and traditional Catholic service) could be considered 
outdated by the time of Hamlet, the Biblical link in the mystery plays sheds at least some 
light on the possible meaning of the dramatic moment itself as well as on its larger 
significance. Certainly, Hamlet does not appear to be trying to disobey the Ghost; on the 
contrary, he is covering the ground with the oath endorsed by the spirit every single 
time. Superficially unlike Balaam's curse, this oath binds the witnesses to double 
secrecy: to keep secret Hamlet's secret hic et ubique. What is not particularly noted is 
that the Ghost itself, unlike the God in Numbers, takes part in the oath and thus binds 
itself to secrecy. A seeming, although quite spectacular, proof of this can be the closet 
scene where, apparently moved by pity towards Gertrude, the Ghost appears to Hamlet 
only. Together, these two facts produce a more important suggestion that the Ghost's 
participation in and endorsement of the oath means that the truth about his identity, 
provenance, and thus about Claudius' deed should remain a secret even to the oath- 
takers. The astonishing fact of the play is that, as was most recently emphasised by 
Steve Roth in his article `Who Knows Who Knows Who's There? An Epistemology of 
Hamlet (Or, What Happens in the Mousetrap) '6S, the question of the king's murder is 
6s Early Modern Literary Studies 10-2 (September, 2004) 3.1-27 
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never brought to the surface; not only no one asks the question `who killed the old 
king? ', which is the case with Laius' murder in Sophocles, but no one publicly 
associates the death of the previous king with murder (either during the Mousetrap scene 
or afterwards). This omission can hardly seem as incidental as it does in Oedipus: the 
whole play is shaped by the game of hide-and-seek that makes King Hamlet's murder a 
common secret of Hamlet and Claudius. Thus the Ghost's endorsement of Hamlet's 
secrecy is, effectively, a secret endorsement of Claudius, and the main challenge of the 
play is therefore for Hamlet (and us) to recognise this most hidden aspect of the Ghost, 
its affinity not so much with the father as with the father's muder(er). 
The Latinised wisdom, and more specifically its Greek connection, is certainly 
obvious in this light: the ambiguous duty to the dead father, rendered both absolute and 
impenetrable precisely because of this specific relation, which will all but obliterate the 
son's existence both in this and the next world - semper, ubique, et ab omnibus - aligns 
Hamlet not only with Oedipus but certainly also with Orestes. While at the level of plot 
Hamlet is certainly much closer to Oresteia (quite possibly influenced by its truncated 
two-play English version produced by the Admirals' Men in 159966), the issue of 
knowledge and meaning of one's actions aligns its no less significantly, if unwittingly 
and thus more fittingly, with Oedipus. 
It is necessary to emphasise the problematic nature of this unwitting, structural 
correspondence, which neither presents itself as a given nor allows itself to be easily 
dismissed or translated into contiguous terms, especially in view of another strain within 
Hamlet's scholarship stemming from Freud's famous insight. In the straightforward 
66 as it is painstakingly argued by Louise Schleiner in her `Latinised Greek Drama in Shakespeare's 
Writing of Hamlet', Shakespeare Quarterly, 41,1 (Spring, 1990), 29-48. 
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appropriation of that insight, `Oedipus' (conceived as the familiar structure of the 
complex) tends to take the place of the author, Devil, God, or the lost purgatorial soul. 
Recent psychoanalytically informed studies of Hamlet have been more attentive 
to the problematic nature of this link and have tried to accommodate it to what is 
considered to be one of the fundamental discoveries of psychoanalysis. Already 
discussed in the Introduction After Oedipus by Lupton and Reinhard approaches the 
relationship between Oedipus and Hamlet from the `retroactive' point of view: 
If Hamlet is the "translation" of Oedipus, it is also a translation in the sense of 
metaphor. That is, Hamlet, in its very figurative distortion, points back to a structure 
only retroactively "prior, " rather than being the secondary text that merely confirms the 
authoritative meaning of its archetype... Hamlet's scenes of imperfect mourning, which 
prevent Aristotelian closure and preclude reductive Oedipal readings, are precisely what 
render it a "problem play" demanding interpretation: Hamlet's excessive mourning both 
resists and enables the Oedipal reading as such. 
(14-15) 
A much more recent and, characteristically, more ambitious (and categorical) 
restatement of this argument can be found in 2i2ek's `Death's Merciless Love' 
(published by lacan. com in 2004), which relies on `Hamlet's Mill ... the notorious New 
Age classic of Giorgio de Santillana and Hertha von Dechend' and, of course, Lacan and 
Hegel to declare that 
One thing is nonetheless clear here: temporally and logically, the Hamlet 
narrative IS earlier than the Oedipal myth. We are dealing here with the mechanism of 
the unconscious displacement well known to Freud: something that is logically earlier is 
perceptible ... only as a later secondary distortion of some allegedly "original" 
narrative... So, in the case of Oedipus and Hamlet, instead of the linear/historicist 
reading of Hamlet as a secondary distortion of the Oedipal text, the Oedipus myth is (as 
Hegel already claimed) the grounding myth of the Western Greek civilization (the 
suicidal jump of the Sphynx representing the disintegration of the old pre-Greek 
universe); and it is in Hamlet's "distortion" of the Oedipus that its repressed content 
articulates itself - the proof of it being the fact that the Hamlet matrix is found 
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everywhere in pre-Classic mythology, up to the [sic] Ancient Egypt itself whose 
spiritual defeat is signalled by the suicidal jump of the Sphynx. 67 
These appropriations of Hamlet's (and Oedipus') hic et ubique character seem to 
appreciate and benefit from the complexity of the plays at the level of theory which they 
claim to render less `linear' or `naive'. On the other, the very appropriation of the 
problematic relationship between the two plays as a given proof for the phenomenon of 
`retroactive distortion' serves to perpetuate the paradox of the `trinity of squares' - or 
that which Vernant terms `vicious circle' (discussed above in the Introduction). 
This impasse is quite real for the studies in question which, like Lupton and 
Reinhard's After Oedipus and Garber's Shakespeare's Ghost Writers, choose to level the 
traditional divide between literary text and theory in favour of paying at least just as 
much, if not more, attention to theories of Hamlet and Oedipus as they do to what they 
call theory in Hamlet and Oedipus themselves. Similarly to Hamlet's role as an 
ambiguously `veiled' purgatorial spirit lost after/in the tumult of Reformation, these 
studies transform Hamlet and Oedipus into `veiled' figures of Freud's (self-)analysis. 
The following passage, introducing the chapter on `Shapes of Grief in `Hamlet, Freud, 
and Mourning', is (meant to be) representative of the strategy in question: 
In this chapter we map Hamlet's "forms, moods, shapes of grief' as they 
conjoin Shakespeare, mourning, and autobiography in Freud's letters to Fliess, The 
Interpretation of Dreams, "Mourning and Melancholia, " and Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle. In these texts, the processes of "projection" and "introjection" - aligned by 
Lacan with the dialectic of the imaginary and symbolic orders - simultaneously 
articulate and interfold inside and outside, subject and object, and presence and absence 
in the faulty act of accommodating loss. In Freud's writing, Hamlet marks the 
convergence of mourning, allegory, and the Oedipus complex; as both histrionic avenger 
and melancholy introvert, Hamlet defines the subject as mourner for literature and 
psychoanalysis. 
(After Oedipus 12) 
67 htty: //www. lacan. com/zizek-love. htm 
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While this certainly reflects (albeit very selectively) the peculiarity of critical tradition in 
the field, the perspective of After Oedipus becomes inevitably reductive, even while it 
attempts to critique this very tendency, in both theory and drama. The opening paragraph 
of this introduction (which immediately precedes the above-quoted passage) can be read 
as an acknowledgement of this situation: 
Consistently paired in Freud's early writing, together Oedipus and Hamlet have 
come to stand for the vicissitudes of the Oedipal in psychoanalytic literary criticism, 
whether as a master key to meaning, a reductive allegoresis, or a weathered milestone on 
the royal roads to post-Freudian truth. (11) 
However, what may look like an acknowledgement here should later be construed as 
simply a statement of interest: the two token plays in question are, in fact, considered 
mostly as tokens of theory where meaning as such is always already retroactive; Hamlet 
is an Oedipal `histrionic avenger and melancholy introvert' and Oedipus is a vehicle for 
displaying Hamlet's chief repressed fantasy - whereas the Ghost is a `a memory trace' 
of both, `the sign of something missing, something omitted, something undone' (Garber 
129), projection of an introjection and introjection of a projection (Lupton and Reinhard 
25). While the analytical elaborations of psychoanalysis regarding the principles of 
mental functioning in general and the conflicts in these two particular plays have proved 
most influential for the appreciation of the real ambiguity in both, it is necessary to 
resist the temptation to reduce the ambiguity in the plays to the structural principle and 
message itself, to inject the unconscious with linguistic or historicist structure and vice 
versa, to equate ambiguity with knowledge, diagnosis with cure, drama with therapy, 
stage and the world - precisely because such an equation is possible only because of the 
intrinsic difference between them. As tempting as these `uncanny' correspondences and 
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inter-penetrations may be according to Garber's argument, it is necessary to remain 
attentive to Freud's own caveat regarding this relationship: 
The distinction between what has been repressed and what has been surmounted cannot 
be transposed onto the uncanny in fiction without profound modification; for the realm 
of phantasy depends for its very existence on the fact that its content is not submitted to 
the reality-testingfaculty. 
('The Uncanny', 372-3, italics added) 
Garber uses this passage to relate the Murder of Gonzago, `the story of Old Hamlet's 
death', and 'Ophelia's disturbingly knowledgeable ballads' (128), which she conceives 
as `encapsulated artifacts', to the notion of `phantasy' in the context of Freud's 
abandonment of seduction theory. This is supposed to underscore their revelatory 
uncanny character. However, the matter of the dramatic facts is that, if we stick to 
Freud's understanding of the phenomenon, there can be no such revelatory 
encapsulation here precisely because of the lack of reality-testing in fiction. According 
to Schelling, whom Freud respectfully quotes on the notion, ` "Unheimlich " is the name 
for everything that ought to have remained ... secret and hidden but has come to light' 
(345). The status of the above mentioned episodes - as virtually every other episode in 
Hamlet - is precisely the reverse: they do come to light but their `secret' remains 
`hidden' within the confines of the `fiction'. And if fiction is then appropriated as a 
principle of analysis and reality-testing itself, the meaning of the `uncanny' as a term 
loses all significance. This would certainly be very congruent with Lacan's vision of the 
conflict in Hamlet - the central source of references for Lupton and Reinhard, Garber, 
and Lizek - which it identifies with and schematizes as 
a level in the subject on which it can be said that his fate is expressed in terms of 
a pure signifier, a level at which he is merely the reverse side of a message that 
is not even his own. (`Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet', 12) 
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Revelation of this message here becomes a function of a transcendent order of the Other, 
which, according to Lacan, normally remains hidden (14). But how and why do we 
become aware of the two sides of the signifier in this case? We should not, unless, as 
Lacan puts it at the start of his exposition, he 'open[s]' our `eyes' to this structural 
problem in the play (25). He seems to break the vicious circle by insisting here that the 
straightforward notion of `interhuman relationships' cannot help us to elucidate the 
`tragedy of [human] desire as it appears in Hamlet' because of the subject's `certain 
position of dependence upon the signifier', and it is only by reference to a certain 
`topological system' representing this phenomenon that the tragedy could be appreciated 
(11). 
However, to put it in Lacan's style, such an appreciation of the play would not be 
critical but purely diacritical - that is, replacing the chief protagonists with algebraic 
symbols and reducing their roles to a limited number of arrows, locked into a complex 
labyrinth of his famous' diagram-triptych of desire68. Just as Greenblatt's use of Bosch 
(and a number of other Purgatory-related artworks), this move only serves to create the 
impression that the play itself provides neither a demand nor a structure for liberation, 
salvation, explication, but only for repetition. Appropriating such a concept as structure 
for theory certainly increases the chances to appreciate the complexity of the play, but it 
does so also at the expense of the play's own complexity by suggesting that by some 
form of structural appropriation of the play's incomprehensibility it can somehow be 
comprehended. As in the case of Purgatory, this cannot happen unless the whole 
structure of explanation is dissolved with the object of analysis. 
68 `The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious', Ecrits: a 
selection, 323-36 1, reproduced in `Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet' on page 14. 
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To address this impasse that stems not so much from the psychoanalytic 
approaches to the plays but from the nature of the dramatic conflict in them, the present 
analysis will follow a psychoanalytic line of inquiry precisely because of its potential to 
confront and overcome resistance without appropriative reduction. This is what the 
present analysis understands to be the chief motive of Freud's method. For while Hamlet 
can be qualified by Terry Eagleton as `pure deferral and diffusion' only with a limited 
measure of fairness, Freud's task organises itself (at least, in part) precisely around 
undoing the reductionism of purity in resistance, isolating its fantasmatic and 
transferential core, and translating it enough to restore the psychic balance of the 
individual. Analysis in this case equals neither total unraveling nor repression of the 
symptom altogether. On the contrary, it addresses the undisputed need to make sense of 
the destruction that we witness in the play. Those who have accused psychoanalysis (and 
psychoanalytic literary criticism) of reductionism could certainly have legitimate and 
compelling reasons69 as it is next to impossible for any critic to preserve the fine balance 
of appreciation where, as in the psychoanalytic cure, the nature and extent of analysis 
should respect the individuality of all the involved parties (namely, those of critic vs. 
text). 
In the case of a psychoanalytic literary critic (informed by the specific opposition 
of the ego vs. unconscious in all its permutations), it is especially difficult since the text, 
as Avi Erlich notes in the introduction to his own problematic psycho-analysis of 
Hamlet, is not an actual analysand, capable of taking initiative in their own defense. This 
is precisely why it can be, paradoxically, all the more advisable to combine the so-called 
69 For example, the fairly recent and extensive Why Freud Was Wrong: Sin, Science and Psychoanalysis 
by Richard Webster (1996), and the earlier and engaging, Out of My System: psychoanalysis, ideology, 
and critical method by Frederick Crews (1975). 
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traditional psychoanalysis and traditional literary criticism under a challenge of never 
forgetting about the old-fashioned divide between them. For, as Oedipus and Hamlet 
abundantly demonstrate in their respective plots, it is incredibly easy to make the 
mistake of identifying a human being - especially, a fictional one - with a piece of text, 
an object, manipulable and ominous, while, in the inevitable chiasmus, reducing 
(literary) text to an idiosyncrasy of a symptom with no sovereignty rights. 0 With this in 
mind, the ensuing analysis of Hamlet, instead of eliminating or rendering absolute the 
human factor of tragedy, will strive to adopt what can be termed the principle of 
`bounty', or non-equivalence, advocated by Hamlet himself with the above-mentioned 
self-irony: `use every man/after his desert, and who should 'scape whipping? 971 That is, 
unlike Hamlet, and following Freud's suggestive reading of this very line in `Mourning 
and Melancholia', the characters and the text of the play will be afforded as much 
`evenly suspended' attention as possible, which will submit the engagement with the 
mass of criticism and theory to the primary focus on the text of the play72. This 
balancing in the focus will help to ensure the recognition not only of the ideational limits 
of the texts under consideration but also of the temporal limits of the current analysis 
itself. Hence, of necessity, it will constitute a compromise, but, unlike Lupton and 
Reinhard's and, similarly, Garber's approach to the intertextuality between Shakespeare, 
theory, and other literary examples, it will insist on avoiding excessive counter- 
70 As is decried by Timothy Dean in his recent article `Art as Symptom: Zizek and the Ethics of 
Psychoanalytic Criticism' (2002). 
71 Demonstrated also by Oedipus in his own respect with no less amplitude. 
72 Chiefly on the basis of The Norton Shakespeare based on the Oxford Edition (1997) which strives to 
reproduce the text of the play as fully and continuously as possible while also reflecting, through the use 
of indentation and overlapping numbering, the complex and contradictory state of the text. To evaluate the 
editorial judgment in the cases of dispute which are directly relevant to the present analysis the 1994 Case 
Studies in Contemporary Criticism edition of Hamlet, and several others, will be consulted. 
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transference, that is, on keeping an eye on the specific contours of the case in hand, 
however ghostly they may seem. For if we grant (particularly Freud in his Papers on 
Technique) that it is medically unethical, counterproductive, and unhealthy to let the 
melancholic lead the analyst with no restriction, this is particularly pertinent to the 
approach to Hamlet, which should be at once more reverent and more penetrating, if we 
genuinely want to acknowledge the full extent of its `uncanny' power. 
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3.2 Stay, Illusion. 
They say miracles are past; and we have our philosophical persons to make 
modem and familiar, things supernatural and causeless. Hence it is that we make 
trifles of terrors, ensconcing ourselves into seeming knowledge, when we should 
submit ourselves to an unknown fear. 
All's Well That Ends Well, II. iii. 1-6 
The above passage from All's Well was already used by Prosser as an effective 
epigraph to the section on Hamlet in Hamlet and Revenge (95). In view of the direction 
of the present discussion this passage is again highly appropriate. Unlike Prosser's, the 
current analysis will concentrate on the peculiarity of Hamlet which starts, apparently, 
by leaving its characters only the possibility of `seeming knowledge', without the option 
of'should '73. The latter rings of didactic nostalgia and does offset well the bitter and 
ostentatious mournfulness of Hamlet's first appearance in Act 1 scene 2. But it is 
necessary to remember, especially in the context of the emphasis on various forms of 
self-conscious ostentation (dramatic and intertextual) that characterise this play 
according to modem critics, that its very first scene, while no less ostentatious in its 
subject matter, is completely independent both from the main narrative sources and from 
the main characters. It is not up to them, let alone the secondary characters present in the 
scene, to initiate the ostending. Given the play's notoriously complex textual condition, 
it is not completely up to the author either. The shape of Hamlet has been constantly 
fluctuating from edition to edition, production to production, analysis to analysis, 
altering the proportion of the characters' dramatic presence - and such modern studies of 
this text as Lacan's, Erlich's, Adelman's, Garber's, Lupton and Reinhard's, and 
73 Prosser's treatment of Hamlet still sees these options as more or less balanced. 
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Greenblatt's have done a lot to emphasise the ghostliness of this shape, in various senses 
of this term. 
In the context of this double emphasis on ghostliness and ostentation, it is 
difficult to overlook the reverse of this proposition which reflects the peculiarity of the 
dramatic situation - that is, the unique position of authority enjoyed by the Ghost from 
the first scene. This has nothing to do specifically with the well-known speculation that 
Shakespeare himself doubled as the Ghost and the player-king74, although such a linking 
increases the metatheatrical accent of these crucial segments of the plot. Neither does it 
inhere in the specific kind of intertextuality described by the above mentioned critics 
where Hamlet is presented through the dense network of its theoretically and culturally 
mediated appropriations. Rather, it is to emphasise the fact that Hamlet as such is a 
thoroughly metatheatrical (and intertextual) play, for it is the Ghost, which in this plot is 
the extraneous element par excellence, that from the first scene enigmatically draws the 
characters and, consequently, the whole action off their reasonably self-contained course 
into an unsettling version of the Hamlet narrative. Such a doubling of the plot, involving 
the characteristic splitting and alteration of the atom of the original narrative, has already 
been observed in Sophocles' Oedipus: both plays set the action in the dramatic situation 
which substantially separates the protagonists from the founding event and the 
straightforward trajectory toward the denouement of their respective dramas. In this 
respect, Lacan's explicit differentiation between Oedipus and Hamlet as the one who 
does not know and the one who knows75, respectively, is misleading: neither character 
74 Succinctly analysed by John Quincy Adams, Jr., in `Some Notes on Hamlet' (Modern Language Notes, 
Vol. 28, No. 2, Feb. 1913, pp. 39-43). 
's `as I have said, the thing that distinguishes Hamlet from Oedipus is that Hamlet knows' (`Desire and the 
Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet', p. 19). 
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has full awareness or control of his plot; instead, they are faced with the situation in 
which they are forced to discover it, with only a partial success. Unlike Hamlet, Oedipus 
may be physically implicated in the founding crimes (his exposure and the ensuing 
parrincest); he may be the more focused protagonist who does not wait for information 
but sends for it to Apollo and then plays the quick and persistent interrogator. But until 
he is finished with the very last witness, the relationship between him and the founding 
crimes in his plot is in question. And even after he identifies himself with the outcast- 
perpetrator of the oracles (and thus the source narrative), he goes on to appropriate 
authority by his self-blinding, which literally erases the distinction between him as an 
unwitting, blind victim-perpetrator and the daimon that brought the crimes to pass. If 
there should be a distinction made between Oedipus and Hamlet with regard to 
knowledge, then it is Oedipus who at the start of the plot has, at least, heard about the 
crime from the oracle and whose whole trajectory is motivated by his `seeming 
knowledge' of that pronouncement. 
Hamlet, on the contrary, does not even start, with regard to the main sources, 
until the end of the first Act, when the main character finally receives knowledge of the 
founding crime that is comparable to that of Amleth in Saxo's tale (and, subsequently, 
Belleforest's)76. Until he first hears about the Ghost, Shakespeare's Hamlet does not 
give any sign of even clearly suspecting anything or anyone. Instead, he is steeped in 
melancholy and repulsed by his mother's hasty remarriage to the point of finding it 
physically nauseating to live on: 
76 The Variorum Hamlet quotes Seymour as saying: `This whole scene appears unnecessary to the design 
and conduct of the play, and might with advantage be omitted. The hand of Sh. is visible in it 
occasionally, but it is part of that undigested plan which is manifest throughout the play. [Seymour finds 
the same fault in Macbeth and Lear Ed. ]' (1). 
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O, that this too too solid flesh would melt 
Thaw and resolve itself into a dew! 
Or that the Everlasting had not fix'd 
His canon `gainst self-slaughter! 0 God! God! 
How weary, stale, flat and unprofitable, 
Seem to me all the uses of this world! 
(1.2.129-34) 
It is hardly possible to imagine him devising a revenge strategy against his uncle at this 
moment - and thus approximating the role of the protagonist in the source narrative - 
without an informing and catalysing mediator. 77 
The first scene, which precedes this moment, certainly introduces such a 
potential mediator, but its figure makes the task of mediation uniquely daunting. 
Compared with Sophocles, the mediation of the plot in Hamlet is more `accidental', to 
use the term from Horatio's final speech, because in the former case all the information 
and major events are centred on Oedipus from the very start - while in the latter the 
Ghost first appears in front of two, all but incidental soldiers, wearied by the nightly 
watch in preparation for the war. Their randomness as witnesses would be complete and 
anonymous if it were not for their apparent acquaintance with Horatio (which itself is 
not explained). Even with this link in mind, the coincidence through which the reality at 
Shakespeare's Elsinore is drawn into the orbit of the Hamlet narrative seems 
extraordinary: not only does the informing mediator introduce himself to almost 
completely incidental figures but his very nature puts him, and his message, at the 
greatest possible disadvantage. He is certainly not the simple, non-descript stranger, 
looking for a reward for his service as it is in the case with the Corinthian in Sophocles' 
77 In the comparable circumstances, that is at the news of his wayward daughter's prodigality, Shylock 
utters `The curse never fell upon our nation till now! I never felt it till now! ' (The Merchant of Venice, 
3.1.39-40). However, his state of deep oppression and melancholy does not prevent him from seizing the 
occasion to turn the bond he made with Antonio into a revenge opportunity. 
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Oedipus. Neither is he comparable to Teiresias, who, for all his extraordinary status, is 
accepted and revered as a prophet. In Hamlet, the mediator is of the most `questionable 
shape', whose very existence and motives, even if his message can be found truthful (as 
Prosser notably emphasised), should constantly be in question from the start. Thus the 
precipitation of the particular turn in the plot that it comes to effect is, as a result, bound 
to be `wondrous strange', alien to the other characters, the protagonist, and literally the 
plot itself compared to the source narrative. Barnardo's famous opening `Who's there? ' 
epitomises this situation of the two alienated segments of dramatic reality coming, 
uncertainly, to face each other. 
Yet, paradoxically, it is the very nature of the Ghost's alienness that provides the 
ultimate object of attraction for the characters involved. A comparison between 
Sophocles and Shakespeare is again illuminating here: the Corinthian messenger has no 
difficulty in penetrating the plot because he has absolutely no prior existence for anyone 
in Thebes except the old shepherd; his connections with the latter are as straightforward 
as his reasons for coming to Thebes, which he announces immediately upon arrival. 
Teiresias, Creon, Jocasta, and the old shepherd in their respective roles of the plot 
mediators are less neutral and thus less credible for Oedipus precisely because of their 
prior relationship with him, however, there is nothing in any of them, as opposed to what 
they (unwittingly) come to say, to arrest Oedipus' attention and unsettle him. 78 
By contrast, the Ghost in Hamlet is an instantly and radically unsettling figure79. 
In its very first scene - which is crucial for its role as the mediator - it appears twice but 
" This is held against Oedipus by Ahl in his Sophocles' Oedipus: Evidence and Self-Conviction which 
emphasises Oedipus' lack of attention not only to the glaring inconsistencies in his witnesses' reports but 
also to the individual psychology of each witness. 
79 Self-blinded Oedipus is also radically unsettling, but he has nothing to mediate when he appears at the 
very end. Likewise, in terms of the visual register, he and the Ghost of King Hamlet are vastly different, 
although both leave a deeply foreboding impression. 
169 
says nothing. This, however, does not in the least prevent it from starting to fulfil the 
role because its very appearance, as the `person' of the late king, prompts itself into an 
enigmatic message. As soon as Horatio confronts the Ghost the first time, failing to elicit 
a response, he concludes: `This bodes some strange eruption to our state' (1.1.69). At the 
end of the scene, after having confronted the Ghost twice with the same result, Horatio 
claims `upon my life, /This spirit, dumb to us, will speak to him', that is `young Hamlet' 
(1.1.170-71) - who, before he even sees the Ghost, himself proclaims with characteristic 
exaltation: 
My father's spirit - in arms! All is not well, 
I doubt some foul play: would the night were come! 
Till then sit still, my soul: foul deeds will rise, 
Though all the earth o'erwhelm them, to men's eyes. 
(1.2.254-57). 
What makes Horatio and Hamlet say what they say at these respective moments? It may 
be, following the arguments of modem critics (such as Greenblatt), a dramatised cultural 
reflex. Indeed, the scenes where the characters encounter and discuss the Ghost are self- 
consciously filled with references and behaviour based on the traditionally religious and, 
what Greenblatt and Freud long before him would call, aesthetically secularised 
pneumatology, as well as politics and history relevant to the moment at hand (Horatio's 
excursus into the old Hamlet versus old Fortinbras case, his Roman interpretation of the 
haunting as an `omen' of `eruption' to `our state', his and Marcellus' uneasy recollection 
of the Christian spirit lore). However, the Ghost and all the complex details of its 
visitations exceed all this `seeming knowledge', which creates a mismatch between the 
reflex and stimulus. In fact, Lafeu's opposition between the `seeming knowledge' and 
the `unknown terror', quoted in the epigraph, is not so much cancelled by Hamlet in the 
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sense that it simply confronts the characters with the Ghost, thereby leaving them no 
option of foregoing their ordinary knowledge in order to gain access to the occult and 
primal one (as it happens with Doctor Faustus, for example). On the contrary, Hamlet 
undermines this opposition in the sense that it is this very `seeming knowledge' about 
the impossible that primes the subject for the terming encounter with `it'. Tobe 
absolutely precise, there should be nothing particularly terrifying or foreboding in the 
figure of the armed king itself, appearing on the battlements of his castle. It is the 
knowledge of the witnesses that the king has been dead for months and the conviction 
that, while the dead are not supposed to return, when they do it always means something 
terrible that immediately define the figure as a revenant and, therefore, a `dreaded sight' 
(1.1.25). Thus, the first necessity for the success of the `accidental' mediation of the plot 
by the Ghost resides in the knowledge and convictions of the witnesses. This is the point 
of a deep affinity with Oedipus who has, essentially, no one to blame for his discovery 
except his own mind (and the daimon which, conceptually, is never thoroughly distinct 
from it). Ultimately, with his urge to discover, he is himself the principal plot-mediator 
and, in a sense, his own revenant (this is certainly not to diminish the degree of 
otherness manifested in the extraordinary events of Oedipus' discovery). In Hamlet's 
case, the watchers in the first scene, similarly, have the urge to discover, are terrified of 
the consequences, and, most importantly, decide to impart their discovery exclusively to 
the young Hamlet. All these links, unlike Oedipus' case, are much less straightforward 
and must be further looked into. 
To start with the link between terror and revenants: Viola and Sebastian in 
Twelfth Night, in comparable circumstances, do not become as terrified and suspicious 
as those who encounter the long lost king and father in Hamlet. The immediate 
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difference here is that both twins have no difficulty in confirming to each other that they 
are, in fact, still living - while Horatio, Marcellus, and Barnardo attended the king's 
funeral and, in the first scene, confum with considerable certainty that their visitor is `as 
the air, invulnerable', can be virtually ubiquitous (' 'Tis here! 'Tis here! 'Tis gone! ', 
(1.1.45,42-44)), and therefore cannot be their former, human king. The language of the 
scene that designates the Ghost with consistent indefiniteness as `it', `thing', `sight' is 
thus thoroughly precise: their king, just as Viola and Sebastian - although for the 
opposite reason - has not really returned from the dead. The figure that they see only 
looks like the former `majesty of Denmark' and therefore is, as far as they are concerned, 
what Horatio calls it - an `illusion' (1.1.127). This returns us to our main question: if all 
the characters involved in the encounter with the Ghost in the first scene, and Hamlet 
later in Act 1 scene 5, are convinced that this `thing' cannot literally be the impossible - 
that is, their king and father returned from the dead - why are they terrified? What 
prompts them to translate its presence into the message about `eruption', which leads 
them to the young Hamlet and `foul play'? After all, the audience of Marlowe's Faustus 
that witnesses the illusion representing `Alexander and his paramour' and the audience 
of Prospero's `insubstantial pageant' are not terrified but rather amused by the spectacle. 
There is certainly a fundamental difference between the `illusion' in Hamlet and 
the illusions in Doctor Faustus and The Tempest which can be well appreciated in the 
context of another famous epigraph of one of the already mentioned modern studies of 
Hamlet. Marjorie Garber prefaces her analysis of the play with the following quote from 
The Magic Mountain: 
But the calling back of the dead, or the desirability of calling them back, was a 
ticklish matter, after all. At bottom, and boldly confessed, the desire does not 
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exist; it is misapprehension precisely as impossible as the thing itself, as we 
should soon see if nature once let it happen. What we call mourning for our dead 
is perhaps not so much grief at not being able to call them back as it is grief at 
not being able to want to do so. (Shakespeare's Ghost Writers, 124) 
The apparitions in Doctor Faustus and The Tempest have nothing to do with mourning 
and the desire of actually calling back the dead; they are also completely contained by 
the power of the performing magician. Because of these two aspects, they are indeed 
pure illusions, without any substance of their own. The complexities of the situation in 
Twelfth Night are indeed related to mourning and the more general fact that every 
character's desire there is strongly motivated by the object that promises the least 
probable opportunity for satisfaction. The very devotion of their desire to this object 
(either lost or straightforwardly unattainable) makes its obtainment all but impossible if 
it were not for `fate' (and, indeed, absolutely impossible in Malvolio's case). 
The situation in Hamlet is uniquely different. On the one hand, the appearance of 
the Ghost is not a pure accident of `fate' in the way that the shipwreck at the coast of 
Illyria is in Twelfth Night. On the other, it is not the result of conjuration or magic 
performed by the living; their desire, or lack thereof, is in this case absolutely irrelevant. 
It is true that the father's image presents itself to Hamlet's `mind's eye' at the felicitous 
moment when Hamlet, expressing to Horatio his dismay at his mother's remarriage with 
his uncle, says that he would he had `met his dearest foe in heaven' before he had ever 
`seen that day' (1.2.182-3). However, Hamlet's desire here, expressed at more length in 
his preceding first soliloquy, quoted above, is not to see his father again, or his spirit, but 
to join him in the other world - that is, to die. More importantly, the Ghost has already 
appeared to Horatio, and before that, to Marcellus and Barnardo, neither of whom, as far 
as we know, have had any desires even remotely approaching otherworldly matters. This 
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is the first hint at the fact that the dead in Hamlet not only appear in spite of the desire of 
the living but by the very circumstances of their appearance seem to interpret that desire 
in a peculiarly ironic fashion. 80 Here the difference from visitations in other 
Shakespeare's tragedies is suggestive: Brutus, Macbeth, and Richard all have 
straightforward psychological reasons to have their otherworldly visitors. It is quite 
remarkable, in this context, that the young Hamlet, who is the only one of the witnesses 
with a psychological link to the late king, does not have the Ghost come directly to him; 
it is he that has to go and, as it were, visit the Ghost first. This underscores not only the 
dramatic independence of the Ghost but the necessity to explore further the matter of his 
attraction. 
The exploration certainly leads to more questions and comparisons. Julius 
Caesar features the account of `prodigies', witnessed by Casca in 2.3, which is explicitly 
referred to by Horatio in his interpretation of the Ghost in the first scene ('In the most 
high and palmy state of Rome, / A little ere the mightiest Julius fell', etc. (1.1.79-80). 
However, the two cases cannot be more different with regard to the nature of the 
observed phenomena. Although there is similarity in the secondary nature of the 
witnesses, it is specifically clear that the prodigies in Julius Caesar have neither shown 
themselves exclusively to Casca nor have been confined to one exclusive shape nor have 
exclusively consisted of revenants - they are bewilderingly varied and witnessed by 
everyone, which suits well the purpose of signifying to the city the civil chaos that will 
80 This Liiek characteristically describes in a number of his works as `the answer of the Real' - an 
extraordinary coincidence - which, to the subject, appears to make sense in spite of its very randomness. 
This goes back certainly to Lacan's discussion of the Ghost as the signifier veiling the 'hole in the real' 
and, in the same context, of the 'uncanny' which he defines as an instance of the decomposing fantasy 
engulfing the 'image of the other subject' ('Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet', 37-38; 22) 
- and further back to Freud's original discussion of the uncanny as the bizarre, but often strangely 
meaningful, surfacing of the primitive (animistic and anthropocentric), long-repressed beliefs. 
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ensue after Caesar's assassination. By contrast, the exclusivity of the Ghost's 
presentation to Marcellus, Barnardo, Horatio, and then Hamlet, contradicts the meaning 
that Horatio ascribes to the apparition. This exclusivity is poignant not only in its first 
interview with Hamlet but also, if not more so, in the closet scene with Gertrude. If it 
bodes some eruption to the state of Denmark, why does it not show itself more openly? 
If it means to care for Gertrude's soul and reputation, as J. D. Wilson insisted it does, 
why does it not make itself visible to her? Finally, again, what exactly makes the 
visitation terrifying when neither the witnesses nor the revenant should have any reason 
for inducing and experiencing terror, respectively? In other words, what is it that ensures 
the success of the Ghost's plot-mediating mission? 
This complex of details and questions leaves us with the sense of inexplicability 
of the Ghost's visitation from the point of view of straightforward motivation and the 
palpable presence of some other, non-straightforward, intention. The `illusion' in 
Hamlet, unlike either the insubstantial illusions of Faustus and Prospero or the spirits of 
the murdered victims in other tragedies of Shakespeare, has a substance, agenda, and 
message of its own. As Polonius says about young Hamlet's strange behaviour, `Though 
this be madness, yet there is method/in't' (2.2.203-04). The comparison between the 
first scene's visitation and this latter moment, where Polomus is trying to sound Hamlet 
out, suggests itself because here it is young Hamlet himself who appears as a revenant in 
Ophelia's closet, after she `denied his access' to her, following Polonius' `command' 
(2.1.105-107): 
My lord, as I was sewing in my closet, 
Lord Hamlet, with his doublet all unbraced; 
No hat upon his head; his stockings foul'd, 
Ungarter'd, and down-gyved to his ankle; 
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Pale as his shirt; his knees knocking each other; 
And with a look so piteous in purport 
As if he had been loosed out of hell 
To speak of horrors, - he comes before me. 
(2.1.74-81) 
Just as the soldiers on the battlements, Ophelia is very much `affrighted' by this sight. 
However, her reaction is easier to explain. The revenant aspect of the visitation is due to 
the profound alteration in the visitor's decorum and, as David Hillman would emphasise, 
'discretion'81: it is both the place and, especially, the manner of Hamlet's dress that are 
startlingly inappropriate. Everything about his appearance and behaviour in Ophelia's 
closet seems to cry `madness', as Polonius duly concludes. Before his first interview 
with the prince after the closet incident, Polonius, not unlike Freud, presents to Claudius 
and Gertrude a plausible deterministic aetiology of this madness: 
And he, repulsed--a short tale to make- 
Fell into a sadness, then into a fast, 
Thence to a watch, thence into a weakness, 
Thence to a lightness, and, by this declension, 
Into the madness wherein now he raves, 
And all we mourn for. 
(2.2.146-151) 
However, after their first interview - and especially after their `lawful' spying on 
Hamlet in the nunnery scene - it becomes clear both for Polonius and Claudius that 
although his unsettled melancholic mood can be reasonably traced to the known recent 
events, it certainly has some hidden `method' in it: 
There's something in his soul 
O'er which his melancholy sits on brood; 
And I do doubt the hatch and the disclose 
Will be some danger [... ] 
81 `Puttenham, Shakespeare, and the Abuse of Rhetoric', Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900, vol. 36, 
No. 1, The English Renaissance, (Winter, 1996). 1 
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(3.2.163-166) 
Polonius' initial unwitting linking of Hamlet's sudden descent into madness and 
mourning is certainly very apposite. The abrupt change in Hamlet's person, and namely 
his extraordinary visitation of Ophelia's closet, occurs precisely after he encounters the 
Ghost at the end of the first act. The exact motivation, as in the case of the Ghost, is not 
easy to fathom, especially with regard to the facilitation of Hamlet's role as the avenger 
(if anything, this incident draws attention to his motives not helps to cover them). The 
pattern of the visitation itself is strikingly similar in its enigmatic character to all the 
appearances of the Ghost: 
He took me by the wrist and held me hard; 
Then goes he to the length of all his arm; 
And, with his other hand thus o'er his brow, 
He falls to such perusal of my face 
As he would draw it. Long stay'd he so; 
At last, a little shaking of mine arm 
And thrice his head thus waving up and down, 
He raised a sigh so piteous and profound 
As it did seem to shatter all his bulk 
And end his being: that done, he lets me go: 
And, with his head over his shoulder turn'd, 
He seem'd to find his way without his eyes; 
For out o' doors he went without their helps, 
And, to the last, bended their light on me. 
(2.1.84-97) 
This description certainly has important parallels to the other closet visitation performed 
by the Ghost in the third Act: the piteousness, the respective states of undress82, and the 
poignant focus on the woman. Regarding the latter, however, there is certainly an 
already noted distinction between the visitations in that Ophelia can, at least, see Hamlet 
82 In Q1, the Ghost appears in Gertrude's closet in his 'nightgown'; Q2 and F1 `leave open the possibility 
that the Ghost is appearing again in his armor' (The Norton Shakespeare, Hamlet 3.4.94, footnote 6, 
1722). 
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whose behaviour indeed leaves a profound mark on her mind. Thus the important facts 
of the matter here are that in the two closet scenes in the play it is the young Hamlet who 
plays the ghost for the onstage female audience: the first time a mute, the second time a 
speaking one (thereby reproducing the pattern of the main Ghost's visitations). This 
helps focus the observation of the obvious parallels on the crucial aspect of the 
relationship between the roles of the young Hamlet and the Ghost. After the one goes to 
meet the other in the first Act, he takes over the Ghost's role of the plot-mediator - not 
only in its function but also in its very problematic, ghostly aspect. The enigmatic 
peculiarity of this transmission is that it does not happen momentarily and constitutes 
neither a straightforward transmission between nor a straightforward replacement of the 
characters in question. Nor does this transmission go one way from the Ghost to young 
Hamlet. The second closet scene with Gertrude presents an extraordinary manifestation 
of doubling and superimposition of the mediators and scenes where Hamlet, virtually, 
plays the role of the speaking Ghost, which he witnessed in Act 1 scene 5, to his mother, 
while the Ghost appears exclusively to him, allegedly, to reinforce his original mediating 
message from the same scene ('Do not forget: this visitation/Is but to whet thy almost 
blunted purpose. ', 3.4.110-11). Furthermore, if we pay attention to the stage directions 
in Q1, there is a remarkably reciprocal change in the Ghost since its last encounter with 
Hamlet: it is its turn to appear undressed down to its `night-gown, ' while it is Hamlet 
now who is armed and speaking `daggers' to the queen; another remarkable change in 
comparison with the first Act is that this time the Ghost comes directly to Hamlet, just as 
Hamlet came to `it' (and later to Ophelia). 
All these further complications of the dramatic structure of the play only 
strengthen our initial proposition of a strong but alien relation between the play and its 
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plot and returns us to the matter of the Ghost's enigmatic presence which introduces this 
relation through its entry in Act 1 scene 1 and certainly through its interview with young 
Hamlet in scene 5 of the same Act. This relation, although consistent throughout the 
scenes, is at best only partially intelligible to the participants themselves, as our latest 
comparisons show. It has indeed that peculiar status of the madness with `a method in't', 
or as Eliot famously noted apropos Hamlet's antic disposition, it is `less than madness 
and more than feigned' ('Hamlet and His Problem', 146). Despite, and indeed because 
of, the doubling of the mediation, the founding event of the plot, the `matter' of the play, 
manages'to stay shadowed - regardless of the fact that in'the second closet scene its 
main communicator is not a ghost. At the dramatic level of the scene, this shadowing of 
communication is certainly caused by the exclusive and thus problematic presence of the 
Ghost, which casts a dramatic shadow over Hamlet's behaviour and thus on the outcome 
of the scene. However, this very circumstance objectively points out the depth of the 
mystery concerning the founding matter of the plot: if the answer to Hamlet's 
intermediary state between madness and feigning is the Ghost's presence, either 
relatively real (as in the scene with Gertrude) or immediately recalled (as in the case of 
his visiting Ophelia), the Ghost's behaviour produces a similar impression, especially in 
the first scene, without quite the same explanation. 83 The idiosyncrasy of its appearances 
invites but does not offer any. So far, it is only possible to conclude that, according to 
the play's logic, there must be something in the founding knowledge of the plot itself 
that resists pure, straightforward communication but is, nevertheless, able to enter into 
its own relationship with the characters involved in the communication and influence 
83 The case of Marlowe's Mephistopheles in the B-text of Doctor Faustus is instructive here in that his 
presence is genuinely divided between the world of Faustus and Lucifer, his master, who constantly 
oversees the play in congregation with the other high-ranking demons. 
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them. In other words, unlike any other supernatural apparition in Shakespeare, the Ghost 
in Hamlet does not only represent a certain (unusual or secret) content but rather a 
peculiar power of appeal which, while baffling the witnesses' beliefs, also stimulates 
their faith and allegiance. As has already been noted above, Horatio becomes sure by the 
end of the first scene that the `thing' will speak to young Hamlet and that it is `needful 
in' their `loves' and `fitting' their `duty' to `acquaint' Hamlet with the phenomenon 
(1.1.153-54). It is certainly too obvious that such a decision is based on the fact that the 
apparition looks like Hamlet's father and that `once... /It lifted up its head and did 
address/Itself to motion, like as it would speak' (1.2.215-27). However, it is also too 
obvious that, even though Horatio remains cautiously skeptical, this decision constitutes, 
as it were, the minimum hop leading to the major leap of faith in Hamlet's first address 
to the Ghost, thus hinting at the acceptance of the impossible - the identity of the Ghost 
and the dead king - which constitutes the sine qua non of the plot development. This 
acceptance of the Ghost's genuine otherness is, despite all the precautions of the 
`seeming knowledge', quite consistent throughout the scene: from `Who's there? ' to 
`Stay, illusion' to `This spirit, dumb to us, will speak to him' (italics added). 
Before returning to the particulars of the two main Ghost scenes in the first Act 
in order to elucidate the dynamics of this uniquely compromised dramatic 
communication, it is necessary to note the relationship to this situation of the other 
characters. Another fact of our latest comparison is that not only almost incidental 
characters such as Marcellus and Barnardo, and the more important one such as Horatio, 
get directly caught in the ghostly enigma of plot mediation. The fact that these characters 
are positioned on the physical periphery of the castle and the dramatic periphery of the 
plot certainly does not distinguish them from the more central characters with regard to 
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the awareness of the founding event. The commonly noted distinction between 
Shakespeare's Hamlet and Saxo's and Belleforest's versions of the story is indeed that in 
the latter the founding crime is not a secret. Turning this crime into a secret has not only 
deprived the protagonist and the secondary and peripheral characters of the centralising 
motif. Most importantly, it has deprived of it the perpetrator himself. To be sure, 
Claudius knows that he has committed the crime in the `orchard' (W. W. Greg and 
Nicolas Abraham notwithstanding84). But what he cannot know is whether anyone else 
knows. Thus, objectively, in the second scene of the first Act, when he and the young 
Hamlet first appear on stage, Claudius is quite self-assured and even less prepared to 
follow the plot of the original narrative than Hamlet, precisely because he is the only one 
who knows about the crime. His counterpart in Saxo's tale, Feng, knows that he has to 
be focused on his young nephew from the start for a very precise reason. Claudius does 
want Hamlet to stay in court, but his reason at that point seems motivated more by guilty 
generosity than murderous circumspection (although the latter is certainly never too far 
from his mind): 
We pray you, throw to earth 
This unprevailing woe, and think of us 
As of a father: for let the world take note, 
You are the most immediate to our throne; 
And with no less nobility of love 
Than that which dearest father bears his son, 
Do I impart toward you. For your intent 
In going back to school in Wittenberg, 
It is most retrograde to our desire: 
And we beseech you, bend you to remain 
Here, in the cheer and comfort of our eye, 
Our chiefest courtier, cousin, and our son. 
84 'Hamlet's Hallucination', Modern Language Review, XII (1917), pp. 393-421 and `The Phantom of 




It is hard to imagine Feng addressing Amleth in such a manner. Thus, for Claudius to 
approximate the role of Feng, to assume the essential portion of the dramatic initiative in 
the plot, he is in need of mediation just as much as the young Hamlet. Moreover, this 
mediation must be concerned with the inner state of Hamlet's mind in great precision, 
which is a much more intricate task here than in Saxo's tale because not only cannot 
Claudius approach the matter directly - if there is anyone interested in queen's and his 
own reputation, it is certainly Claudius - but he cannot even start suspecting Hamlet 
properly without some drastic change in the latter's behaviour. He may certainly be 
concerned about Hamlet's melancholic rudeness and dejection in Act 1 scene 2, but he 
does not have anything serious yet to worry about. After all, Hamlet does make `a loving 
and a fair reply' (1.2.121) to Claudius' and Gertrude's combined plea for him to stay: `I 
shall in all my best obey you, madam' (1.2.120). It is hard to interpret this as a conscious 
expression of hidden menace. At this point, when Hamlet is about to break into his first 
soliloquy, he is speaking to them rather out of disgustful weariness, ready to say 
anything just to get rid of the happy couple's interfering presence - to `walk out of the 
air' they have been breathing together since the scene's start. In itself, the moment is 
deeply poignant, as the ensuing soliloquy famously shows. This is not so much because 
of its extreme poetic intensity but because of its stark juxtaposition with the ultimate 
ordinariness of the situation, which precludes any possibility of action, except 
unpacking one's heart with words85. His noble father died, his mother, did not turn out to 
be exactly `Niobe, all tears', and his uncle turned out a `satyr' (which he, according to 
8S As John Jones puts it in On Aristotle and Greek Tragedy: `While Hamlet is extraordinary, his situation 
is commonplace in that many men - men of unremarkable capacities - could have handled it efficiently' 
(42). 
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Hamlet, always was anyway). But what is one to do? Hamlet knows very well that 
women do not often turn literally into the rocks shedding never-ending tears for their 
husbands; the difference between old Hamlet and Claudius can be striking, but they are, 
as has been commonly noted, brothers and also only mortal humans, which in the later 
references become uneasily alike. The real tragedy of Shakespeare's Hamlet, in the 
modem sense of the term, noted long ago by T. S. Eliot, is precisely the depressing lack 
of criminality of such a situation: 
Hamlet is up against the difficulty that his disgust is occasioned by his mother, 
but that his mother is not an adequate equivalent for it; his disgust envelops and 
exceeds her. It is thus a feeling which he cannot understand; he cannot objectify 
it, and it therefore remains to poison life and obstruct action... And it must be 
noticed that the very nature of the donnees of the problem precludes objective 
equivalence. To have heightened the criminality of Gertrude would have been to 
provide the formula for a totally different emotion in Hamlet; it is just because 
her character is so negative and insignificant that she arouses in Hamlet the 
feeling which she is incapable of representing. (`Hamlet and his Problem', 101) 
However, far from constituting an artistic failure, this initial premise is one of the play's 
deepest insights. The concealment of the crime - which itself is a modem feature in 
comparison with the original plot - reveals the degradation of the age which Hamlet. so 
volubly and intensely deplores. The extremity of this condition can indeed be measured 
by the necessity to introduce an ostensibly archaic feature, the Ghost, to drive Ophelia 
insane86, to involve a traveling company of actors and even a pirate ship, in order to 
make the action against this situation possible, at least in principle87. However, even this 
is certainly not enough to make the action and resolution of this crisis straightforward. 
86 By contrast, it is possible to let the anonymous decoy-girl in Saxo's tale make a much more infonned 
decision about being Amleth's or Feng's ally precisely because of the public knowledge of the crime. To 
be sure, Feng does not leave this knowledge unpolished but presents himself as the saviour of his brother's 
wife from the latter's cruelty. However, this ploy can do little to conceal the nature of the deed, let alone 
free Feng from implication in his brother's death altogether. 
87 It is remarkable that `incest', which here, just as `Niobe', `Hyperion', and `satyr', is much more 
figurative than literal, is never mentioned in the first soliloquy; it is the Ghost that first utters the word. 
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The concealment of the crime here is not just an incidental feature but is made possible 
largely because of its virtual non-existence in the way Shakespeare conceives the initial 
situation. The `better wisdoms' of courtiers, after all, `have freely gone/with' Claudius' 
marriage, as he proudly announces in his first speech (1.2.15-16) - therefore, it is not 
just the marriage itself in Hamlet's mind that turns the world of Elsinore overnight into 
an `unweeded garden, / That grows to seed' with `things rank and gross possess[ing] it 
merely' (1.2.135-37). The deep collusion between the concealment of the founding 
crime and the ordinariness of the resulting situation for the `world' makes the 
engagement with it not only virtually impossible, if it were not for the Ghost, but also so 
traumatic and `accidental' that it results simply in annihilating all the major characters, 
except Horatio, which ensures that the seed of its unresolved crisis is intact as the story 
is being passed on. 
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3.3 Perturbed Spirit 
This certainly returns us to the Ghost and its uniquely problematic features as the 
primary mediator with more urgency. Its major feature stands out more sharply now: the 
already emphasised peculiar ordinariness of its appearance in its first scene in Act 1. To 
be sure, it comes `Armed at point exactly, cap-ä-pie' (1.2.200), with `martial stalk' 
(1.1.66), and looks exactly like the dead king. Nevertheless, the main effect of the 
apparition resides exclusively in the public knowledge of the king's death - which is, 
certainly, no slight matter, especially given its true circumstances. However, there is 
nothing in its appearance to suggest the difference between these and the official, 
innocuous account - as, for example, there is in the ghost of Banquo which is also a 
silent, appearing-disappearing figure, but which not only takes its place at Macbeth's 
banquet table in an ordinary manner but is shaking `his gory locks' at his murderer 
(Macbeth, 3.4.62-3), not unlike the ghost of Laius in Seneca's Oedipus Rex, certainly 
known to Shakespeare and the audience of the period. Neither does it recall in words, in 
the first appearance, the crime done to the king as does the extraordinary ghost sequence 
of Richard Gloucester's victims in Act 5 scene 3 of The Life and Death of Richard the 
Third, with its chilling refrain `despair and die! '; nor does King Hamlet's Ghost appear 
as the `monstrous apparition' that `comes upon' Brutus in his tent. The latter's reaction 
to this figure is very close to the one we witness in Hamlet's first scene: 
Art thou any thing? 
Art thou some god, some angel, or some devil, 
That makest my blood cold and my hair to stare? 
(Julius Caesar, 4.3.323-5) 
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What art thou that usurp'st this time of night, 
Together with that fair and warlike form 
In which the majesty of buried Denmark 
Did sometimes march? by heaven I charge thee, speak! 
(Hamlet, 1.1.46-9) 
The significant differences from Hamlet here are certainly the fact that the spirit appears 
to look nothing like Caesar, while King Hamlet's ghost proves unsettling precisely 
because it is instantly recognisable: 
Barnardo Looks it not like the king? mark it, Horatio. 
Horatio Most like: it harrows me with fear and wonder. 
(1.1.43-4) 
This difference can be attributed to Brutus' weakening eyesight on which he himself 
blames the apparition at first: 
How ill this taper bums! Ha! Who comes here? 
I think it is the weakness of my sight 
That shapes this monstrous apparition. 
(Julius Caesar, 4.3.321-22) 
Objectively, it is difficult to say what Caesar's ghost looks like in principle because 
there is no description of it either in stage directions or in references to it in the ensuing 
dialogue. Finally, the major difference between the two cases, already noted, is the 
psychological bond between Brutus and his revenant which grounds the situation and the 
emotion. The bond is deep here not only due to Brutus' relation to Caesar as such but 
also and rather because the ghost does not actually say that it is the ghost of Caesar; 
instead, it presents itself plainly as Brutus"evil spirit' (4.3.327). Moreover, unlike King 
Hamlet's ghost, this spirit openly announces'the reason why it has appeared: `To tell 
thee thou shalt see me at Philippi'(4.3.325). This approaches the starkly ominous tone of 
the witch scenes in Macbeth rather than the ambiguous visitation at Elsinore. To finish 
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with the differences between Julius Caesar and Hamlet regarding this matter, it is worth 
noting that King Hamlet's Ghost does not appear on the battlements as a man `all in 
fire', as some of the `prodigies' witnessed by Casca - with which Horatio, nevertheless, 
associates this figure, as we saw earlier. Partial explanation for that can be that Horatio 
is, as he describes himself at the memorable moment of Hamlet's death in the final 
scene, `more an antique Roman than a Dane' (5.2.322). 
Curiously, the fiery aspect of the Roman apparitions would have, indeed, been 
very apposite for Hamlet's Ghost, if it were not, alas, for the express nature of its 
condition (revealed later to Hamlet): 
I am thy father's spirit, 
Doom'd for a certain term to walk the night, 
And for the day confined to fast in fires. 
(1.5.9-11, emphasis added) 
It seems reasonable to take this piece of information as the ultimate answer to all the 
questions about the mystery of its appearance: such is its `doom'. However, apart from 
the much discussed fact that the Ghost's appearance and words are not taken at face 
value by anyone in the play, not the least by the late king's devoted son, this would not 
solve the objective question of understanding what it is exactly in this figure that makes 
it work in the given dramatic context - that is, enables it to unsettle the witnesses, 
especially the first ones, in the particular way which leads to the central point of plot 
mediation in its interview with young Hamlet - and all this almost without the traditional 
attributes of a ghost. 
Another oddity of the Ghost worth noting in this context and this time 
exclusively peculiar to this play is manifested at the dramatic climax of the first scene: 
Horatio's `crossing' of the apparition: 
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Enter Ghost 
But soft, behold! lo, where it comes again! 
It* spreads his arms 
III cross it, though it blast me. Stay, illusion! 
(1.1.108-9) 
The disputed stage direction T* spreads its arms', in the various textual variants 
attributed either to Horatio or the Ghost itself, certainly points to a sort of spatial and, as 
far as it is possible, physical confrontation between the two characters. Apart from the 
fact that it may be indeed more logical to assume that it is Horatio that spreads his arms 
in an attempt to stop the figure, the more important fact is that this moment in 
Shakespeare is not only uniquely intense but markedly at odds with its subject. Crossing 
the path of a ghost, or standing at the place where the ghost had stood, was traditionally 
considered extremely life-threatening. In addition to the main legend regarding Hamlet's 
Ghost, according to which Shakespeare composed the scene in the Charnel House near a 
cemetery in London, there is another, quite Mozartian story according to which an actor 
in Shakespeare's company died after having twice crossed the way of a tall, grey man 
who, because of the actor's subsequent death, was considered to be a ghost (The 
Variorum Hamlet). The contrast between the latter anecdote and the climactic moment at 
hand is immediately remarkable: after Horatio crosses the Ghost, nothing happens to 
him. In all the other major cases of visitation in Shakespeare, except the current one, 
there is always an element of palpable adversity, even despite the overt denial of it by 
the haunted character. 
It is possible to assume that the power that doomed the Ghost to walk in a certain 
place at a certain time also doomed it to assume a certain shape, qualities, and behaviour 
as is the case with the `Gast of Gy' to which Greenblatt devotes an entire chapter in 
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Hamlet in Purgatory; in this context, it is naturally possible to rely on the already 
mentioned cultural reflex which, for Greenblatt (and Freud), would ensure the particular 
reactions to what is witnessed in the scene. However, this would not do justice to the 
obviously more-than-doctrinal complexity of the Ghost - indeed, to the very need of 
introducing it into the play in the first place. While the significance of its presence may 
not be straightforward, it is certainly not comparable to the Ghost of Andrea and 
Revenge in The Spanish Tragedy, who do not play any visible role in the precipitation of 
the plot itself, or the `Gast of Gy' that is there to enhance the faith in Purgatory (or the 
doll Olympia and Coppelius whose significances are inseparable from Nathaniel's inner 
state in Freud's discussion of the uncanny with reference to Hoffmann's The Sandman). 
Instead, the figure of Hamlet's Ghost and its crucial impact in the first scene 
recalls the crux of Hamlet's first soliloquy and T. S. Eliot's notion of the objective 
correlative. Both the recent remarriage of the queen and the figure of the Ghost have, that 
negative significance (to use Eliot's terms) which does not simply provoke an emotional 
reaction in excess of its object but, in this very negativity, conceals (and transmits) 
something inexpressible. At this juncture it is necessary to modify the initial designation 
of the most salient feature of Hamlet's Ghost as `ordinary' with more precision in 
relation to the peculiar dynamics of its compromised plot-mediation. The fact that it, 
unlike all other ghosts considered above, does appear but not to the perpetrator of the 
crime, nor with anything about itself to suggest a crime, nor at the moment when there is 
nothing major left to suggest, make the Ghost of King Hamlet, paradoxically and 
significantly, a figure of concealment just as much as, if not more than, a figure of 
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revelation88. This is true not only about its `dumb' appearance, as Horatio calls it, in the 
first scene, when the observers have to intuit that the Ghost must be there for someone 
else's sake (presumably, young Hamlet8). When it finally gets to see young Hamlet 
later in Act 1 scenes 4 and 5, it does not start talking until they are able to conceal 
themselves from Horatio and the two soldiers. Further, the Ghost's very first lengthy 
oration is essentially an act of teasing concealment: 
I am thy father's spirit, 
Doom'd for a certain term to walk the night, 
And for the day confined to fast in fires, 
Till the foul crimes done in my days of nature 
Are burnt and purged away. But that I am forbid 
To tell the secrets of my prison-house, 
I could a tale unfold whose lightest word 
Would harrow up thy soul, freeze thy young blood, 
Make thy two eyes, like stars, start from their spheres, 
Thy knotted and combined locks to part 
And each particular hair to stand on end, 
Like quills upon the fretful porcupine: 
But this eternal blazon must not be 
To ears of flesh and blood. 
(1.5.9-22) 
This is certainly very impressive, but how is all this relevant to young Hamlet? Why 
would the spirit of the father whom Hamlet obviously worships, to whom he has 
remained faithful to the point of risking his life in an otherworldly encounter - which the 
Ghost could appreciate in the short intense prelude to their interview at the end of scene 
68 Indeed, the unanimous response that it provokes successively in the soldiers, Horatio, and Hamlet is 
'dreadful secrecy'. After Horatio finishes his report, Hamlet pleads with them: 
`If you have hitherto conceal'd this sight, 
Let it be tenable in your silence still; 
And whatsoever else shall hap to-night, 
Give it an understanding, but no tongue. 
(1.2.246-49) 
89 It is certainly conceivable that the apparition could have led the soldiers to Claudius who is, after all, the 
late king's brother. The fact that it does not is certainly a very eloquent indication of the way the 
difference between the two brothers is perceived not just by young Hamlet. 
190 
4- need to amaze him almost out of his mind, reducing him practically to the state of 
Macbeth, Richard, Brutus, or Seneca's Oedipus? It is certainly true that, overtly, the 
Ghost professes to do exactly the opposite - that is, it only claims that it could reduce 
Hamlet to the state of a `fretful porpentine'. However, in reality the effect of this 
extended apophasis on young Hamlet is conspicuous. We have already noted the utterly 
disordered state in which Hamlet appears in Ophelia's closet. In the second closet scene, 
when Hamlet encounters the Ghost again, Gertrude does describe his state with precision 
unwittingly recalling the Ghost's opening speech: 
Forth at your eyes your spirits wildly peep; 
And, as the sleeping soldiers in the alarm, 
Your bedded hair, like life in excrements, 
Starts up, and stands on end. 
(3.4.119-22, italics added) 
Thus, whatever the Ghost's overt apoph4tic restraint, the depth of its effect on Hamlet 
is profound and indisputable - and already in scene 5 after the Ghost leaves. More 
importantly, precisely because of this apophasis - that is, a seeming restraint which in 
reality creates excess of communication - the Ghost manages not so much to spare his 
son the forbidden knowledge of his trauma but, on the contrary, to transmit it precisely 
in that form of pure affect, of a self-enclosed message which is impossible to metabolise 
into straightforward knowledge and which invades the psychosomatic realm of the host, 
exercising its affective influence under favourable conditions. This is what can be 
inferred from the fact that Hamlet switches into a distinctly ghostly shape after the 
interview for quite some time9° which culminates in his appearance in Ophelia's closet 
'° There are various hints at the beginning of Act 2-e. g., Polonius' sending money to Laertes with 
Reynaldo, the arrival of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern who had to be sent for previously after Hamlet's 
extraordinary change in behaviour persisted long enough to arouse Claudius' suspicions, the return of the 
191 
as a spurned admirer; Gertrude's description of him, unwittingly and thus truly, 
reproduces Ghost's own description of what Hamlet would have looked like if he knew 
the secrets of the Ghost's `prison house' (which, indeed, he does now because they are 
not what one sees there but what the sight does to the observer). The latter case is even 
more telling precisely because of the disputed nature of the Ghost's presence in the 
second closet scene. Here, in the scene's split and doubled reality, discussed above, the 
Ghost and its condition is `peeped forth' by Hamlet's whole being just as much as it 
constitutes an autonomous physical presence 91 To put it in Lacanian style, by Act 3 the 
Ghost's message has turned Hamlet into a (g)host. 
In the straightforward context of the interview scene, the apophaatic description 
of the `prison-house' seems to have its straightforward function of 'stir[ring]' Hamlet's 
love and remembrance of his father. But apart from the commonly noted absurdity of the 
need to stir these feelings in Hamlet at this moment, the apophasis, as we have seen, 
mutates more and more into its opposite. As the scene develops, the Ghost abandons 
even the seeming restraint and becomes much more passionate, open, and even graphic 
about the crime against the king, about its perpetrator, and about his former queen. In the 
case of a straightforward communication whose purport is request of revenge, the 
following passage - 
Now, Hamlet, hear: 
Tis given out that, sleeping in my orchard, 
A serpent stung me; so the whole ear of Denmark 
Is by a forged process of my death 
ambassadors from Norway- which suggest that several weeks at least must have passed between the end 
of Act 1 and the beginning of Act 2. 
91 To emphasise the depth of Hamlet's ingestion, so to say, of the Ghost at this point, the directors 
sometimes make the Ghost invisible in the second closet scene to the audience as well. 
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Rankly abused: but know, thou noble youth, 
The serpent that did sting thy father's life 
Now wears his crown. 
(1.5.34-40) 
- could have been enough. The Ghost has already found the young Hamlet `apt', after 
the latter promised that he would `sweep' to his revenge on `wings as swif ! As 
meditation or [indeed] as thoughts of love' (1.5.29-31). However, the spirit goes on to 
rail against Claudius, 
that incestuous, that adulterate beast, 
With witchcraft of his wit, with traitorous gifts, -- 
o wicked wit and gifts, that have the power 
So to seduce! --won to his shameful lust 
The will of my most seeming-virtuous queen 
(1.5.43-46) 
and certainly about the latter, the garbage-preying `lust' (which in Ql is capitalised). 
Despite the tight time-limit of which this tirade against the traitorous couple makes it 
aware - 
But, soft! methinks I scent the morning air, 
Brief let me be. 
(1.5.58-9) 
- the Ghost goes on to substantiate his lament against the injury done to his pride by 
this `most unnatural' union ('0 Hamlet, what a falling-off was there/ From me... ' 
1.5.47-8) with an extraordinary description of the injury done to `all my smooth body': 
Upon my secure hour thy uncle stole, 
With juice of cursed hebenon in a vial, 
And in the porches of my ears did pour 
The leperous distilment; whose effect 
Holds such an enmity with blood of man 
That swift as quicksilver it courses through 
The natural gates and alleys of the body, 
And with a sudden vigour doth posset 
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And curd, like eager droppings into milk, 
The thin and wholesome blood: so did it mine; 
And a most instant tetter bark'd about, 
Most lazar-like, with vile and loathsome crust, 
All my smooth body. 
(1.5.61-73) 
It is necessary to note here, at the climactic moment of this crucial scene, the stark 
contrast between the Ghost and the founding criminal act it is describing: the Ghost 
looks nothing like the poisoned king. The crime itself is literally concealed by the 
armour which covers it `cap-ä-pie', except the face, which in its turn is covered partially 
by the headpiece and by the `sable silver'd' beard (1.2.242). Such a relationship between 
the Ghost's appearance and the truth of its message is certainly in deep affinity with the 
overall air of concealment that it inspires and also with the correspondingly divided state 
of reality at Elsinore, decried by Hamlet, before their interview (as was noted above). 
Only before the interview the mismatch between the appearance (`Niobe, all tears') and 
the subsequent revelation of its essence ('lust') seemed a symptom of an inexplicable, 
generalised condition ('the unweeded garden' that `grows to seed', the `satyr' that turns 
out to inhabit it). Now, this state can be certainly attributed to a very definite author and 
his, as the play gradually reveals, half-conscious consort: 
O villain, villain, smiling, damned villain! 
My tables, -meet it is I set it down, 
That one may smile, and smile, and be a villain; 
At least I'm sure it may be so in Denmark- 
(1.5.106-09) 
Their marriage, awkwardly divided between `mirth' and `dirge', `delight' and `dole' 
(1.2.12-13), does conceal, with varying degrees of consciousness, the `wicked speed' 
with which 
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was I, sleeping, by a brother's hand 
Of life, of crown, of queen, at once dispatch'd: 
Cut off even in the blossoms of my sin, 
Unhousel'd, disappointed, unanel'd, 
No reckoning made, but sent to my account 
With all my imperfections on my head: 
0, horrible! 0, horrible! most horrible! 
(1.5.74-80) 
However, the crucial twist - and certainly one of the most discussed conundrums which 
the whole of the scene has been building up to - occurs at this concluding moment of the 
Ghost's speech. Its expected purport is to be a plea for restoration of the ruined dignity 
and splendour of the `radiant' angel, who suffered `damned defeat' at the hands of the 
serpent-brother and his `most pernicious woman', as well as alleviation of its current 
painful condition ('unhousel'd, disappointed, unanel'd' - `0, horrible! 0, horrible! most 
horrible! '). Apart from the commonly perceived inconsistency which crops up already in 
the juxtaposition between this angelic splendour and the blossoming `sins' of the late 
king, the striking peculiarity of the tenor of the Ghost's whole part here is its complete 
unconcern with `pity' and restoration as such. 
In the very first scene, Horatio's traditional plea 
If there be any good thing to be done, 
That may to thee do ease and grace to me 
Speak to me 
(1.1.148-50) 
remains conspicuously unanswered. Later, at the start of their interview, right after they 
managed to get away from their anxious followers, the Ghost sternly cuts Hamlet short 
with `Pity me not', after the latter is moved (`Alas, poor ghost! ') by the Ghost's 
announcement that its `hour is almost come' when it `to sulphurous and tormenting 
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flames/ Must render up' itself (1.5.3-5). Neither does the Ghost seem concerned with 
improving the queen's spiritual well-being: 
But, howsoever thou pursuest this act, 
Taint not thy mind, nor let thy soul contrive 
Against thy mother aught: leave her to heaven 
And to those thorns that in her bosom lodge, 
To prick and sting her. 
(1: 5.97-101) 
This is certainly uncharacteristic of a traditional purgatorial spirit. Even more 
remarkable, or rather absolutely scandalous, as has been commonly noted (most 
painstakingly by Prosser) for such a spirit is its request for `revenge' (which certainly 
threatens damnation to Hamlet). However, even though the request for revenge is quite 
in line with the Ghost's general tone of wrathful humiliation, it is problematised right 
from the start by the Ghost's designation of `murder' as `most foul, as in the best it is' 
(1.5.33). Furthermore, its `taint not thy mind' and `remember me' injunctions invert 
everything it has laid out after the general incriminating equation of the random `snake' 
with Claudius and the revenge plea. The spirit unfurls all its humiliating misery to 
Hamlet, subjects him to the same mental or, rather literally, psychosomatic torture 
(evident right after their interview in Hamlet's `0, fie! Hold, hold, my heart; /And you, 
my sinews, grow not instant old, But bear me stiffly up' 1.5.120-23), yet at the end asks 
him not to think about it - that is, literally not to think about his father, the condition he 
is in now, the reality that his presence is replaced with, i. e. his mother's so-called 
`incest', and thus to question the revenge action itself. At the same time, these 
admonitions are meant to make Hamlet concentrate on remembering the father and on 
revenging his `most unnatural murder' and not letting `the royal bed of Denmark be/ A 
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couch for luxury and damned incest'(1.5.82-3)92. Thus, the short and easy introductory 
apophasis on the `prison-house' is simply the Ghost's introduction of the major and 
much more contradictory one about the memory, incest, and revenge which constitutes 
the cornerstone of the entire plot and which it entrusts wholly to Hamlet. 
This arrangement seems to be suited more to someone like Macduff who in Act 4 
scene 3 of Macbeth manages to balance very quickly the manly `feeling' and `dispute' 
of the news that his family has just been annihilated by the `devilish' tyrant: 
0, I could play the woman with mine eyes 
And braggart with my tongue! But, gentle heavens, 
Cut short all intermission; front to front 
Bring thou this fiend of Scotland and myself; 
Within my sword's length set him; if he'scape, 
Heaven forgive him too! 
(4.3.273-276) 
Certainly Laertes whose heady jumping into revenge conspiracy, first, for his father's 
murder and, then, Ophelia's madness and death, is also in a perfect opposition to 
Hamlet's ensuing `brooding'(as the prince himself acknowledges93). Fortinbras is 
certainly another prominent example of someone who does not hesitate to pursue his 
`rights of memory'. One crucial advantage that Macduff, Laertes, and Fortinbras have 
over the young Hamlet is that none of them can be in doubt as to the circumstances of 
their relative(s)' demise (the specific doubt in Ophelia's case rather encourages 
vengeance). For Fortinbras and Macduff, there is the strong additional incentive of the 
political gain. Even in Laertes' case this also seems to be quite a possible prospect (as 
92 The latter is not necessarily a plea for restoration because what the Ghost is explicitly concerned with is 
stopping the incest, not specifying either the means or the outcome. 
9' `For, by the image of my cause, I seelThe portraiture of his' (5.2.84-5). 
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the palace-storming `rabble', as `The ocean, overpeering of his list', shouts `Laertes 
shall be king, Laertes king! ', 4.5.71,74,80). 
For Hamlet, the task is objectively much more problematic. The political benefit 
of revenge for him is no less significant and certainly quite easily achievable in 
comparison with the above-mentioned characters (which is clearly confirmed by 
Claudius' whole scheming against him), but the event of his father's death is much less 
certain, even and especially after the interview with the radically ambivalent figure of 
the Ghost ('spirit of health or goblin damn'd'). However, the difficulty certainly resides 
not just in the questionable reliability of the witness and evidence. It is their very nature 
that problematises the action that they (seem to) call for. It does not quite cancel the 
possibility of action altogether, as Hamlet proves indeed far from an absolutely passive, 
apathetic character he periodically presents himself to be. On the contrary, the instances 
of his rhetorical self-flagellation (the three major soliloquies in Acts 2,3, and 4) 
represent a particular manner in which the encounter with the tormented Ghost perverted 
(but not extinguished) the action into this very self-accusing process. Adjusting Freud's 
often cited formulation from `Mourning and Melancholia' to the case in hand, the 
unsettling encounter with the object that proves far from lost casts a thick shadow over 
and into Hamlet's being. It does not help that the object is elusive to the touch and the 
majority of the living population. The `to be or not to be' soliloquy in Act 3 is certainly 
the most famous meditation on the matter: the meaning of action has become obscured 
due to the preoccupation with the nature of its boundaries; up till now, these boundaries, 
physical and metaphysical, have been all but hermetically closed by (the notion of) the 
`bourn' of the `undiscover'd country', which closure the Ghost certainly ruptures. 
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Goethe's classic characterisation of this situation is extremely eloquent and illuminating 
in its imagery: 
To me it is clear that Shakespeare meant to represent a great deed imposed as a 
duty upon a soul that is not equal to it. Here is an oak-tree planted in a costly 
vase that should have nurtured only the most delicate flowers: the roots expand; 
the vase is shattered. A too pure, noble, highly moral nature, but without that 
energy of nerve which constitutes the hero, sinks under a burden which it can 
neither bear nor renounce. (qtd. in Hamlet and Oedipus 27) 
Such an appraisal of Hamlet is certainly echoed by Ophelia after the nunnery scene: 
0, what a noble mind is here o'erthrown! 
The courtier's, soldier's, scholar's, eye, tongue, sword; 
The expectancy and rose of the fair state, 
The glass of fashion and the mould of form, 
The observed of all observers, quite, quite down! 
(3.1.150-54) 
The only, no less compelling, adjustment to this view that has already been made by 
numerous critics after Goethe is that it is impossible to draw a clear-cut distinction as 
that between a `costly vase that should have nurtured only the most delicate flowers' and 
an `oak-tree' in Hamlet's case (and thus between `to be' and `not to be' options in the 
soliloquy). The unsettling and seducing power of the Ghost resides precisely in the fact 
that it is able to stir the affects which are already brewing in the first witnesses and later 
in the young Hamlet, without providing them with an adequate means to master them. In 
his fast soliloquy, Hamlet's imagination is already boiling (`Let me not think on it! ') 
and close to `Vulcan's stithy' (3.2.48) - that is, his darkest moments in the play when he 
insults Ophelia, contemplates Claudius' murder and the fateful visit to the mother's 
closet. While overtly the Ghost urges Hamlet to contain the `writhings' of his 
imagination (as J. D. Wilson calls them) and translate them into action ('howsoever thou 
pursuest this act'), in reality the whole scene certainly catalyses their proliferation. Most 
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importantly, the apopý antic nature of the Ghost's speeches reveals specifically that it 
itsellf is essentially composed of these nrithings - rather than the cool resolve of 
Fortinbras or the hotheadedness of Laertes. 
The Ghost in Hamlet is thus neither a pure revenge spirit nor a purgatorial spirit, 
which results in its, already noted, very unsettling effect as the plot mediator. In 
principle, its role was to lift the situation out of the stifling mundanity to the level of a 
determined dramatic conflict - that is, to return the plot to its own characters, and with it 
the ideals of justice, valour, loyalty, purity, integrity, and, primarily, even fate. This is 
what Horatio, and then Hamlet, associate it with at first sight ('If thou art privy to thy 
country's fate'; 'My fate cries out', 1.1.15 1; 1.4.92). Quite relevantly, it comes all 
decked out in armour, brandishing a truncheon, martially stalking and looking very 
austere. Horatio conveniently, though not very consistently with his age, remembers the 
fabulous moments of King Hamlet's military heroism, down to the expression on his 
noble face: 
Such was the very armour he had on 
When he the ambitious Norway combated; 
So frown'd he once, when, in an angry parley, 
He smote the sledded Polacks on the ice. 
(1.1.76-9) 
However, these and other numerous details suggest a profound distance and inadequacy 
between the custom in the late king's heyday and the current situation in Denmark. It is 
not only Hamlet's idealising tone - e. g., 'He was a man, take him for all in all, /! shall 
not look upon his like again' (1.2.194-5). The, most probably, old-fashioned armour of 
the Ghost (featuring a 'beaver'), in which the king `combated' 'the ambitious Norway', 
looks quixotically inconsistent with the cannon shots that resound throughout the play: 
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the former suggests the idealised heroic age of noble combat, the latter the real, 
indiscriminate and impersonal, slaughter of the increasingly industrialised modem 
warfare". The example of Fortinbras, `a delicate and tender prince' (4.4.48), is the 
tellingly transitional case in point: he may want to produce the impression of a noble son 
of a noble father claiming his rights of memory in Denmark `with sorrow' (5.2.338), but 
he is no Don Quixote: he `sharked up a list of lawless resolutes' to die for him in the 
senseless battle for an `eggshell' (4.1.58). It may simply be to alleviate the frustration of 
his initial plans to invade Denmark or to use the `eggshell' campaign as a springboard 
for the future invasion or both. In any case, he does not seem concerned to remember his 
father literally - that is, to challenge Claudius first to a single combat, `priced on by a 
most emulate pride' (1.1.100). Neither is Claudius concerned to hold up the image of 
`our most valiant brother. So much for him' (1.2.27) and confront Fortinbras in a joust: 
he is much more adept at conspiracy and diplomatic pressure (although he says he has 
'served against the French' (4.7.68), it is really his `Switzers' that tend to his security). 
The fact that young Hamlet and Laertes have been `exercising' in courtly fencing and 
horse-riding while they, most probably both, have gone to university abroad95 - not to 
forget the upbringing of young Osric - completes the picture of difference: it is hard to 
" Emphasised to a great, if comic, effect in I Henry IV by the face-off between Hotspur and the unnamed 
foppish envoy (not unlike Osric) demanding the surrender of his prisoners in King's name and expressing 
his regrets that 
it was great pity, so it was, 
This villanous saltpetre should be digg'd 
Out of the bowels of the harmless earth. 
Which many a good tall fellow had destroy'd 
So cowardly; and but for these vile guns, 
lie would himself have been a soldier. 
(13.62-7) 
's Even Polonius has gone to 'university' and 'did enact Julius Caesar' there (3.2.60,64). 
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imagine Saxo's Amleth being a `scholar', a 'courtier', a playwright, and 'the glass of 
fashion'. 
However, the difference between the Ghost's appearance and the current age is, 
in another respect, only seeming. the Ghost may look nobly old-fashioned, aloof, alien, 
austere, stem, and menacing; it may have come to demand revenge and expunction of 
the incest from the royal bed of Denmark - but, as we saw, it is itself obsessed, beyond 
question and measure, with the unseemly crime lying at the heart of the current reality. 
To radicalise this case, it can be pointed out again that, unlike other ghosts and despite 
all his armour and stern looks, it never confronts either the perpetrator or the guilt- 
conscious queen. Claudius' and Gertrude's behaviour in the The Mousetrap scene, the 
prayer scene, and the second closet scene, respectively, provides plentiful evidence to 
suppose that should the Ghost have presented itself to them both or severally, it would 
certainly have had a tremendous effect. To this insinuation that the king was a coward 96 
it may be objected that there is the public record of his exploits97. However, the contrast 
between this record reflected in the Ghost's appearance and its actual behaviour 
reflected in its secrecy and shying away from its direct enemies is indisputable. This 
contrast underscores the already noted problematic nature of the actual return of King 
Hamlet, observed in the context of Horatio's, the soldiers', and Hamlet's leap of faith 
regarding the identity of the Ghost. But this time, after considering the Ghost's interview 
with Hamlet in detail, it becomes obvious that the return of the old valiant king is 
problematic because he himself seems to be largely an image constituted by his very 
% Developed, indeed, by Nicolas Abraham in his 'The Phantom of Hamlet or the Sixth Act'. " It is noteworthy that throughout his famous 'delay', Hamlet comes to accuse himself of cowardice more 
and more bitterly ('Am Ia coward? ' (22.4(4); 'Thus conscience does make cowards of us all' (3.1.93); 
Now, whether it be/Bestial oblivion, or some craven scruple/Of thinking too precisely on the eventJA 
thought which, quarteed, path but one part wisdom/And ever three parts coward, I do not know/Why yet I 
live to say 'This things to do' (4.4.44-8). 
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historical remoteness, his death, and the queen's unseemly remarriage. At best, he used 
to be a great warrior, but he was murdered during his habitual sleep in an orchard. The 
valiance of his actual exploits may not be in itself disputable, although those who 
express their admiration for it in the play (young Hamlet and his fellow-student Horatio) 
can certainly not have witnessed it directly98. However, the very ideal value that is 
attached to it in the play, not least quite immodestly by the Ghost himself, is the 
indication of its ghostliness, its intermediary status between the historical, dead king and 
the time that literally superseded him. This is again not to reduce the Ghost's character 
to a status of a mere projection but to underscore his own deep susceptibility to the myth 
of the great king which he himself is trying to save and project. 
The very ease with which Claudius' extraordinarily awkward opening speech in 
Act 1 scene 2 refers to the court's unforced acceptance of his marriage is again a most 
telling piece of evidence in this respect: 
Though yet of Hamlet our dear brother's death 
The memory be green, and that it us befitted 
To bear our hearts in grief and our whole kingdom 
To be contracted in one brow of woe, 
Yet so far kath discretion fought with nature 
That we with wisest sorrow think on him, 
Together with remembrance of ourselves. 
(1.2.1-7) 
The point of the speech - which curiously approximates the Ghost's apophasis - is 
indeed to demonstrate the naturalness of forgetting, using the very example of `our most 
valiant brother'. And although this brother keeps cropping up throughout, not unlike the 
'$ Hamlet was, indeed, born on the very day when King Hamlet overcame Fortinbras, if we are to believe 
the gravedigger. More particularly, the editors of The Variorum Hamlet have pointed out the absurdity of 
the apparently valiant looking smiting of the 'sledded Polacks in an angry parley' - i. e. what is so valiant 
about smiting someone who is riding a sleigh? - They suggest that the king frowned and smote his 
'sledded poleax' out of impatience while sitting in a sleigh and holding some diplomatic talks on the 
neutral territory. 
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things that the Ghost professes not to talk about, this happens in the context associating 
him fumly with death, with what is past, and with the attitudes to it which are 
considered proper, `wise', and thus shared by everyone. Hamlet's mournful posture is 
certainly quite at odds with all this, but precisely because of this opposition, it is 
considered by Claudius, Gertrude, and presumably Polonius and the rest of the court, to 
be childish - from the peevish aside `a little more than kin and less than kind' to 
Claudius' characterisations of him, indeed, as `peevish', `obstinate', `impious', 
`stubborn', 'unmanly', 'impatient', `simple and unschool'd': 
For what we know must be and is as common 
As any the most vulgar thing to sense, 
Why should we in our peevish opposition 
Take it to heart? Fie! 'tis a fault to heaven, 
A fault against the dead, a fault to nature, 
To reason most absurd: whose common theme 
Is death of fathers, and who still path cried, 
From the first corse till he that died to-day, 
`This must be so. ' 
(1.2.102-10) 
Claudius' logic, centred around the `fast corse', may be very slippery (it is, indeed, that 
of a murdered brother and not the naturally deceased father), but Hamlet does not pick 
up on this inconsistency. He does accuse Claudius, his mother, and everyone else whose 
opinion went freely with the `affair' of putting on a `show' of mourning, while 
professing that his own mourning corresponds to `something within' him which `passeth 
show' (1.2.89). However, the fact of the matter is that no one, apparently, even 
pretended that mourning for them was significantly more than a formal, virtually empty 
gesture, with regard to the old king - an acknowledgement of tradition which has all but 
been replaced by the voice of 'nature' and 'reason': `this must be so'. Evidently, having 
gone to great length to conceal the true nature of the King's death, Claudius did not 
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count on anyone's, least of all Hamlet's, `obstinate condolence'. Neither should he, 
apparently, have expected it from a Wittenberg student. The fact that Hamlet's `intent in 
going back to school' is `most retrograde' to Claudius' desire may be ascribed, apart 
from his guilty generosity, to his frustration with the effect it has apparently had on 
Hamlet: Claudius' speeches make him sound like a much better protestant than his 
nephew. 
Furthermore, at the end of his first soliloquy, Hamlet does voice a vague sense 
that the 'wicked speed' of marriage cannot come to good (parallel to Horatio's sense of 
`strange eruption' at the sight of the Ghost in the previous scene); however, he himself 
does not really mourn for his father in a traditional manner but just like Claudius and, 
most importantly, the Ghost, who never asks for it, is shown to be caught up in a 
compulsive and painful contemplation of what replaced the mourning in this situation. 
The Lacanian designation of the Ghost as 'phallus' (faithfully developed by Garber and 
Lupton and Reinhard) seems apposite here to a certain extent because the objective fact 
of the play is that, despite their professedly progressive views on `mourning', both 
Claudius and Gertrude know perfectly well that their lack of mourning is just an 
awkward mask (as Claudius puts it, while testing Laertes' readiness, `the painting of a 
sorrow, /a face without a heart' 4.7.90-1). For them, mourning as such, whether they 
believe in it or not, is impossible. Gertrude may not be privy to the full truth of the 
former king's death, but, nevertheless, she does confess to the unseemly nature of her 
relationship with Claudius, and therefore the impossibility of mourning, after Hamlet's 
invective in the closet scene: 
O Hamlet, speak no more: 
Thou turnst mine eyes into my very soul; 
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And there I see such black and grained spots 
As will not leave their tinct. 
Hamlet Nay, but to live 
In the rank sweat of an enseamed bed, 
Stew'd in corruption, honeying and making love 
Over the nasty sty, - 
Gertrude 0, speak to me no more; 
These words, like daggers, enter in mine ears; 
No more, sweet Hamlet! 
Hamlet A murderer and a villain; 
A slave that is not twentieth part the tithe 
Of your precedent lord; a vice of kings; 
A cutpurse of the empire and the rule, 
That from a shelf the precious diadem stole, 
And put it in his pocket! 
Gertrude No more! 
(3.4.99-116) 
From the start, the mourning itself, despite Lacanian emphasis on it99, is irrelevant. 
Rather, it is, in the generalised terms of psychoanalytic criticism, a symptom of some 
concealed affliction, the `something rotten in the state of Denmark', which cannot 
`resolve itself into a dew' precisely because, for a murder, there cannot be an adequate 
way of doing it in traditional terms. This does not refer to the abolition of purgatory and 
catholic faith in the contemporary period as such but is based on the particularities of the 
plot situation. The play represents the fact in the context of what Claudius and Hamlet 
say in their opening scene. If Claudius believes that extensive, meaningful mourning is 
irrelevant, why all this elaborate, ostentatious balancing of `defeated joy' -'an 
auspicious and a dropping eye', `mirth in funeral and with dirge in marriage', `In equal 
scale weighing delight and dole' (1.2. ) - in his behaviour? The only answer seems to be 
that it is his guilty attempt to use, not even the obsolete social custom but a pretense at 
99 'From one end of Hamlet to the other, all anyone talks about is mourning' (`Desire and the 
Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet', 39). 
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it, as an impossible payment for what it, by definition, cannot repay. Later in the same 
scene, when Hamlet is talking to Horatio about the wedding, he uses the celebrated 
expression 
Thrift, thrift, Horatio! the funeral baked meats 
Did coldly furnish forth the marriage tables. 
(1.2.186-7) 
Precisely because of his laboriously dismissive rhetoric in the same scene, Claudius can 
hardly have a different impression of his affair with Gertrude. And it is with this 
knowledge in mind that he is enjoying this marriage nevertheless; that is, what he and 
Gertrude are enjoying, perversely and thus painfully, is indeed the death of their former 
king and relative, the `cold meat'. This enjoyment corresponds exactly to what the Ghost 
stands for and Claudius voices in the prayer scene -a profound psychosomatic torment 
at, but also the lack of alternative for, the impossibility of mourning and prayer, not 
unlike the Faustian inability to accede to `one drop' of `Christ's blood' that `streams in 
the firmament' and that `would save my soul' (Dr Faustus A, 5.2.70-1): 
O, my offence is rank it smells to heaven; 
It hath the primal eldest curse upon't, 
A brother's murder. Pray'can I not, 
Though inclination be as sharp as will: 
My stronger guilt defeats my strong intent; 
And, like a man to double business bound, 
I stand in pause where I shall first begin, 
And both neglect. What if this cursed hand 
Were thicker than itself with brother's blood, 
Is there not rain enough in the sweet heavens 
To wash it white as snow? Whereto serves mercy 
But to confront the visage of offence? 
And what's in prayer but this two-fold force, 
To be forestalled ere we come to fall, 
Or pardon'd being down? Then I'll look up; 
My fault is past. But, 0, what form of prayer 
Can serve my turn? 'Forgive me my foul murder'? 
That cannot be; since I am still possess'd 
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Of those effects for which I did the murder, 
My crown, mine own ambition and my queen. 
(3.3.42-61) 
While Marlowe's Faustus may be luckier in that he at least has the good angel, 
his fellow-students, and the virtuous old man (in the B-text) visiting him, praying for 
him, and giving him examples in spiritual courage till the last minute, the angels in 
Claudius' case are conspicuously silent (and the Ghost never mentions them, except to 
compare itself to one, rather improvidently, which only underscores their difference). In 
this juxtaposition of the Ghost and Claudius it is thus apparent that Claudius' crime is 
indeed primal in that it by its very intra-familial nature fundamentally alters thg 
relationship between the dead and the living. It seems to destroy literally the very 
possibility, the promise, of a meaningful exchange between them through mourning 
(however inadequate in itself it could be considered) on both sides of the eternal divide. 
This is proved not only by Claudius' defective prayer but, as has already been 
noted, by the whole scene of the Ghost's interview with Hamlet and its later appearance 
in Gertrude's closet. The Ghost does not come to ask, traditionally, for prayers or even 
to instruct Hamlet properly in the matter of revenge. Its one express request to spare 
Gertrude, as was already observed, is not really concerned with saving her soul. 
Apparently, the Ghost has indeed come not only his `tardy son to chide' but to point out 
to Hamlet enigmatically that 
amazement on thy mother sits: 
0, step between her and her fighting soul: 
Conceit in weakest bodies strongest works: 
Speak to her, Hamlet. 
(3.4.128-31) 
208 
The objective result of this intervention without showing himself to Gertrude at the 
moment when Hamlet has all but pierced through to her conscience (in the above quoted 
`Hamlet, speak no more! ' passage) is, as Prosser most perceptively pointed out, that she 
feels let `off the hook' because her son is talking to the `incorporal air' and, therefore, 
`alas', is `mad' (3.4.135); this makes it easier for Gertrude to disregard everything 
Hamlet has said about the murder, shield Claudius from Laertes later (perhaps, even 
with her own body), and thus contribute to the final duel scheme and her own unwitting 
and thoroughly unprepared demise (very similar to the old Hamlet's). The Ghost may 
not have intended any of this in his brief appearance in the closet, but it certainly does 
not appear as the `Gast of Gy' to instruct his wife, beyond any doubt, in the necessity to 
repent. Of all the characters, it is the Ghost who should have stepped between `her and 
her, fighting soul'. Therefore, Prosser's insistence that, in the context of other suggestive 
features, the Ghost appears as a demonic spirit is compelling. Indeed, the general 
attitude towards the apparition in the play is rather binary ('spirit of health or goblin 
damn'd'), with no mention of the middle state - and quite a few critics have found 
enough ground in the play's material to assign the Ghost explicitly to `the kingdom of 
hell' (as even Lacan does in his `Desire in Hamlet' (44)). 
However, this cannot be true precisely because if we stick to the letter of what 
the Ghost says about its condition in the already quoted passage - 
Doom'd for a certain term to walk the night, 
And for the day confined to fast in fires, 
Till the foul crimes done in my days of nature 
Are burnt and purged away. 
- it is quite explicitly purgatorial. The conflicting presence of the revenge demand here 
suggests rather, as Greenblatt insists, a radical imaginative reinvention of the 
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decomposing catholic, and generally Christian, paradigm. In the context of the 
Reformation's dramatic splitting of the Christian world and doctrine, the Ghost 
represents a curious spirit that, indeed, is in the middle state, suffering a limited term in 
purging fire but, most importantly, not seeking traditional intercession from the living. 
What we can infer from his behaviour is that it simply comes to pass onto the living the 
torment of its impossible state - the very torment under which some are already toiling 
in various degrees of consciousness (Claudius, Gertrude, Hamlet) and which these will 
spread to others (Ophelia, Polonius, Laertes). 
The overwhelming concentration on its wounds and the most vulnerable spots of 
the living at the expense of relief, which motivates the Ghost, thus not only distinguishes 
him from the traditional purgatorial or demonic spirit (that is much more concerned with 
capturing mortal souls than obsessed with transmission of its secret pain) but also from 
the straightforward designation of it as `phallus' and/or `Other' in the Lacanian readings. 
It is not a signifier (or the Signifier) precisely because of its deep, personalized 
suffering. The particular facial expressions and modes of movement that it assumes 
throughout its presence on stage ('It is offended'; `it stalks away'; `So frown'd he once'; 
`it [... ] being so majestical'; `It was about to speak'; `it started like a guilty thing/Upon a 
fearful summons'; `Look you, how pale he glares! '; `His form and cause conjoin'd, 
preaching to stones, /Would make them capable. Do not look upon me; /Lest with this 
piteous action you convert /My stem effects') are beyond inert, fixed signification and 
irreducible to the inanimate phallic representations which the `Ancients' employed in 
their mysteries and to which Lacan explicitly refers in a related context'°°. The Ghost is 
'oo 'fie Signification of the Phallus', in Ecrits: A Selection, trans. Bruce Fink (W. W. Norton & Company, 
Inc, 2002), p. 275. 
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not dead, impersonal, and impenetrable in the same way as this schematic image is. He 
is neither the partial object with which Lacan contrastively juxtaposes his notion of the 
phallus nor only the representation of the forbidden object of desire ('the funeral bak'd 
meats') which both Claudius and Gertrude perversely enjoy `in the real'. In a sense quite 
opposite to the abstraction of the phallus as the fantasmatic object, it is the very king 
himself turned `cap-ä-pie' into one throbbing wound, shamefully but ineffectually, 
covered with armour. It may have once been a noble, Hyperion-like, valorous king, but 
the age (as it is shown by the player-king in The Murder of Gonzago) and above all the 
brother's and his wife's secret crime have reduced him to a `thing of nothing', a mere 
bundle of human imperfections, which not only must be painfully purged but which, in 
their very ignominy, constitute the Ghost's great torment ('0, horrible! 0, horrible! most 




This tortured state (neither wholly Christian nor wholly vindictive), which, as we 
have seen, is transmitted to Hamlet and precludes straightforward revenge, certainly 
enables the Ghost to elicit a peculiar sense of compassion. In the light of the main 
question regarding the uniqueness of the Ghost and its role as the primary plot mediator, 
this state can be described at this point, indeed, as humanity amounting to the impossible 
return of the dead king, which thus constitutes its uniqueness. The extraordinary imagery 
of Hamlet's initial response to the Ghost is deeply suggestive: 
Angels and ministers of grace defend us! 
Be thou a spirit of health or goblin damn'd, 
Bring with thee airs from heaven or blasts from hell, 
Be thy intents wicked or charitable, 
Thou comest in such a questionable shape 
That I will speak to thee: I'll call thee Hamlet, 
King, father, royal Dane: 0, answer me! 
Let me not burst in ignorance; but tell 
Why thy canoniz'd bones, hearsed in death, 
Have burst their cerements; why the sepulchre, 
Wherein we saw thee quietly inurn'd, 
Hath oped his ponderous and marble jaws, 
To cast thee up again. What may this mean, 
That thou, dead corse, again in complete steel 
Revisit'st thus the glimpses of the moon, 
Making night hideous; and we fools of nature 
So horridly to shake our disposition 
With thoughts beyond the reaches of our souls? 
Say, why is this? wherefore? what should we do? 
(1.4.45-63) 
There is an apparent contradiction with the actual `majestic' appearance of the Ghost 
that has nothing in itself to suggest a `corse' `inurn'd' for quite some time now. It is 
indeed as his newly returned `father' that Hamlet addresses the Ghost, asking him to 
enlighten them on the meaning of king's `canoniz'd bones' return. In terms of 
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Laplanche's discussion in `Seduction, Persecution, Revelation', Hamlet's leap of faith in 
this address resembles the peculiar compulsion to enter into a deep identificatory 
relationship with the other based on unexpected recognition of a prior bond between 
them, which is thus irreducible to a straightforward projection. Here it is not only the 
obvious father-son relationship but the already observed intense and bilaterally 
enigmatic modality of it that vouchsafes the peculiar reality of the other and his message 
(despite the apparent psychoanalytic consensus on the abstract, projective nature of this 
relationship). In more recent psychoanalytic studies, the Ghost's reality has been linked 
to the notion of trauma and its specifically intermediate, irreducible position between the 
two, temporally distinct, pathogenic events. Heather Anne Hirschfield, for example, in 
her essay `Hamlet's "first corse": Repetition, Trauma, and the Displacement of 
Redemptive Typology' °' proposes a compelling reading of the Ghost-Hamlet 
relationship in the context of a psychoanalytically interpreted puritan typology and, in 
particular 
the ways in which Shakespeare's play is organized according to a narrative of repeated 
and deferred recognitions ... [Hirschfield suggests] that this pattern represents Hamlet's 
response, precipitated by the death of his father, to the traumatizing impact of the 
doctrine of Original Sin [that is] the psychic ramifications of a theological precept that 
depicts a scene of primal transgression and loss which configures parental generativity 
as both consequence and cause of sin and death. (426) 
In response to Michael Neill's and Greenblatt's related arguments, which assign the play 
to the species of 
a compensation for lost Catholic ritual, functioning "as a response to a particularly 
painful aspect of the early modem reimagining of death the wholesale displacement of 
the dead from their familiar place in the order of things by the Protestant abolition of 
purgatory and ritual intercession [(Neill, Issues of Death, 46)]". (436) 
101 Shakespeare's Quarterly, vol. 54, No. 4, winter 2003, pp. 424-448. 
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Hirschfield sets out to reintegrate the psychological ('traumatic') aspect of the play into 
its Christian ('redemptive') problematics. Unlike her acknowledged predecessors along 
this route, Adelman and Garber, who relied on the Lacanian emphasis on the mother's 
perverse jouissance and the father's `sin', respectively, to interrogate the possibility of 
redemption in the play, Hirschfield relies on Laplanche's theory of trauma essentially for 
the same purpose: to maintain the traumatic (and dramatic) negativity of the revenant- 
father as a factor that does not so much make the redemption impossible in the play, as 
suspend its entire logic when related to the contemporary typological canon (Hirschfield, 
ibid)102. In the context of this latest radical reassessment of the play's problematics from 
the Laplanchean position, the current analysis intends to insist on quite the opposite 
emphasis: namely, that it is this very negativity of the father, with its baggage of the 
double trauma of the Original Sin and primal fratricide 103, that provides the only hope 
for redemption, however demonic, traumatic, or purely devastating it may seem. This 
hope resides in the very impossibility of the Ghost, its poignantly human challenge to 
the nature and structure of things at Elsinore - that is, the physical laws, the `seeming' 
doctrinal knowledge, the `seeming' normality of the situation at court, as well as the 
theatrical canon. This challenge, full of traumatic pathos, is well offset by Falstaffs no 
less human but comic and (literally) down-to-earth challenge to the code of honour and 
valour when he `counterfeits' death in the fight with Douglas, and then is taken by Hal 
and Lancaster, characteristically, for a `fantasy/ that plays upon our eyesight' (1 Henry 
N 5.4.126-7). More importantly, the Ghost does not come to the battlements, like 
Emma in the classical Freudian trauma study, driven by the mechanism of which it is 
102 Avi Erlich, in his Hamlet's Absent Father, gravitates towards the same conclusions. 
103 For, as Laplanche formulates it in The New Foundations for Psychoanalysis, `it always takes two 
traumas to make a trauma' (88). 
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completely unaware or as a character completely coincident with its paradigm; on the 
contrary, it comes, to use Hamlet's words about the player, eventually to 
Make mad the guilty and appal the free, 
Confound the ignorant, and amaze indeed 
The very faculties of eyes and ears. 
(2.2.544-46) 
The match here is certainly not exact, for young Hamlet and then Ophelia (not to 
mention Polonius, Rosencrantz and Guildenstem) are not guilty in the same way as 
Claudius and even Gertrude are. However, by the very lack of a straightforward revenge 
equivalence and the overall idiosyncratic exclusivity of its haunting, which leads to the 
insanity and death of the innocent, the Ghost does not only `reveal' and `confirm' the 
traumatic, contaminating link between innocence and primal crime which underlies 
reality at Elsinore and, generally, the double structure of trauma, as Hirschfield argues 
(423) - but explodes it. The morally paralysing atmosphere of the court after Gertrude's 
remarriage may indeed be a confirmation of both the Original Sin and Hamlet's 
brooding intuition; and the ensuing `bloody acts' based on his acquaintance with the 
Ghost may be the matching pieces of the traumatic puzzle. However, the very 
appearance of the spirit which underlies this sequence, as Horatio intuits from the 
beginning, turns it rather into an `eruption', which does not so much defy or confirm 
mortality in a straightforward manner but opens up its traumatic nature and structure to 
experience, conflict, meditation, and thus, to use Laplanche's term, metabolisation'°4. 
This is made possible precisely because the Ghost, unlike Freud's Emma, or more 
104 Unlike the classic Lacanian emphasis which makes Hamlet a representation of `the level in the subject 
in which it can be said that his fate is expressed in terms of a pure signifier, a level at which he is merely 
the reverse-side of a message that is not even his own. ' (`Desire in Hamlet', 12) to which Hirschfield's use 
of Laplanche uncannily approximates. 
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pertinently, mad Ophelia, comes back with a full conscience of its traumalos. This 
conscious survival is not that of a more or less psychological crisis, which may leave 
consciousness in more or less damaged but essentially functional state; it is a survival of 
the ultimate trauma which is supposed to wipe out consciousness and life itself and thus 
the very hope of survival. One crucial implication of Hamlet's `To be or not to be' 
meditation is the noted paradox of everyone rushing to make their `quietus' with a `bare 
bodkin' if they were absolutely sure that there is indeed no such hope beyond the 
`bourn' of this `weary life' (3.1.87). And it is the Ghost representing in all its tormenting 
ambivalence the unnamed nightmarish `dream' in that `sleep of death' that, 
paradoxically, is the unlikely guarantor and instigator (the `linchpin' although not 
entirely catholic106) of survival and action. 
To be sure, the lines of the soliloquy which refer to this issue - 
who would fardels bear, 
To grunt and sweat under a weary life, 
But that the dread of something after death, 
The undiscover'd country from whose bourn 
No traveller returns, puzzles the will 
And makes us rather bear those ills we have 
Than fly to others that we know not of? 
(3.1.86-92) 
- are some of the most disputed ones in the play, because they seem to be in a stark 
contradiction with the crucial'event of the Ghost's visitation. However, it should be 
remembered that at this point in the play Hamlet is indeed contemplating action (The 
Mousetrap) with the Ghost's story in mind and is thus distancing his own particular case 
los In the play, conscience is certainly found in the 'pregnant' state of combining the (now obsolete) 
meaning `inward awareness' with the modern one, `moral sense' or `insight'. 
106 Roy Battenhouse's term in 'The Ghost in Hamlet: a Catholic "Linchpin"? ', SP XLVIII (1951), pp. 161- 
192. 
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from `us', made `cowards' by the `conscience'. To be even more precise, Hamlet's `us' 
here, at the start of Act 3, must refer primarily to Hamlet himself in Act 2 where he 
becomes bitterly conscious, especially after the actor's Pyrrhus-Priam-Hecuba speech, of 
the apparent lapse in his behaviour: 
I, 
A dull and muddy-mettled rascal, peak, 
Like John-a-dreams, unpregnant of my cause, 
And can say nothing; no, not for a king, 
Upon whose property and most dear life 
A damn'd defeat was made. Am Ia coward? 
(2.2.399-404) 
However, this lapse and Hamlet's painful awareness of it, resurging in the next two acts, 
is inseparable from the kind of action that he finds himself confronted with in his plot. 
Hamlet's progress through the action after Act 2 is necessarily far from the imposing 
and straightforward Trojan case, not so much because he, in psychoanalytic terms, is 
compelled to revisit and reproduce his own, secret and ignominious, traumatic event in 
spite of his apparently heroic conscious will, but precisely because what the Ghost has 
stimulated to the utmost in Hamlet's already susceptible mind is the peculiar act of 
conscience. The Lacanian critics who follow the master in assigning to Hamlet the status 
of the character who lost his `phallus', and thus his `desire' and action, due to the choice 
of his `m(O)ther' disregard the dramatic reality which represents desire here precisely in 
a strong ethical opposition to the more straightforward demand-driven action - indeed, 
in the very ethical dimension of difference between `need' and `demand' which Lacan 
himself assigns to desire elsewhere 107. As the play amply demonstrates, it is not only 
quite easy to devise and commit acts - from eavesdropping to invasion - but that it is 
107 'desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction nor the demand for love, but the difference that results 
from the subtraction of the first from the second, the very phenomenon of their splitting (Spaltung)' ('The 
Signification of the Phallus', 276). 
217 
this very ease of action, couched in terms of `nature', `custom', `duty' etc., as opposed 
to the act of conscience in its full implication, that corrupts the subjects and leads 
directly to the founding crime and ease of its concealment. The Ghost comes, as we saw, 
to make Hamlet face this corruption and urges him, accordingly, not to revenge the 
crime straightforwardly (`howsoever thou pursuest this act') but, virtually, to invent such 
a form of vengeance that would remain completely conscious of its revolting cause and 
purpose ('the `damned incest' and `foul murder, as in the best it is') and yet would not 
let it taint his mind and the remembrance of his father ('remember me'). The fact that 
Hamlet explicitly comes to an agonizing awareness of lapse in action and to the doubt 
about the Ghost's nature does not really point to the lapse in his desire: on the contrary, 
his desire indeed is to `catch the conscience' of everyone who is busy putting on acts 
around him from the start. The Ghost certainly encourages this desire by the whole 
traumatic ambiguity of its figure and message, which makes its inclusion among the 
objects of catching no surprise. On the surface, this inclusion at the end of the above 
quoted soliloquy ('the spirit that I have seen/May be the devil' 2.2.433-4), cropping up 
completely unprepared by the foregoing Act, certainly looks like a poor, neurotic 
excuse. However, taking into account the extraordinariness of the case, the obsessive- 
compulsive diagnosis, commonly applied to Hamlet in modem studies, or the more 
traditional tag of `delay', is inadequate. Throughout the second Act - and further on - 
Hamlet does not simply avoid doing something fairly straightforward and innocuous for 
no rational reason, because he is unconsciously compelled to create an obstacle to his 
desire (such an interpretation, as Prosser rightly pointed out, makes for a peculiarly 
bloodthirsty critic108). On the contrary, the stake in Hamlet's revenge is the `soul', his 
108 `Whenever I see the play, I wonder at those who, in the calm of the study, hail this rash and dangerous 
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own, his mother's, uncle's, and everyone else's, which in itself is an impossible object 
for a mortal to act on. Hamlet's general `doubt', `brooding', or `delay', as has already 
been suggested, represents his peculiar acceptance of the Ghost into his own distracted 
globe - which he performs right after the interview. He may vow to `wipe away all 
trivial fond records, /All saws of books, all forms, all pressures past' (1.5.107-8) from the 
`table of his memory' and his 'distracted globe' (1.5.106,105), but it is certainly no easy 
task. And his `weakness' and `melancholy' which follow and against which he 
constantly grates (rather than simply pining away) testify precisely to that peculiar 
acceptance of the other - the father's spirit and message - that was already discussed. 
They are precisely the susceptible, passionate soil (rather than Goethe's simply `delicate 
vase') to which the father's message is able to return. With this charge of welcoming the 
familiar `stranger', Hamlet now has to be on the look-out for his own conscience as well. 
He has to confront and master the baser matter of his weaknesses in order to do his 
charge justice. 
But, first of all, precisely because of Hamlet's passionate core - very similar to 
Oedipus' - there cannot be a precise strategy from the start. Following Goethe's 
metaphor (which here anticipates Laplanche's theory of translation), the strategy 
gradually grows through Hamlet's interaction with the world in the aftermath of the 
interview. The psychological insight of the text presents Hamlet in the state of 
accommodating himself to the traumatic extraordinariness of his case and task. It has 
been objected at least since Wilson to Greenblatt, and most radically by Eagleton, that 
such an interpretation is a misguided, unnecessary psychological rationalisation of 
hothead [Laertes] as "a blast of fresh air" who has the loyalty and courage to act as we want Hamlet. ' 
(Hamlet and Revenge, 213 - in reference to G. Wilson Knight's position in Wheel of Fire, p. 40). 
219 
Hamlet's purely irrational character that simply resists `available definitions' 109. If 
Hamlet were written (e. g. ) by Beckett (or, indeed, Lacan), where alienation and 
absurdity are absolute, this objection would have certainly made sense. As it is, it 
disregards the uniqueness of the plot based on the dramatic uniqueness of the Ghost. 
Hamlet has a distinct ethical inclination and reason to resist the `available definitions' 
because it is they that lapsed, not he ('The time is out of joint: 0 cursed spite) That ever 
I was born to set it right! ', 1.5.211-12) - even according to the perpetrator himself, as 
was already observed. The ideal may seem unattainable but, nevertheless, it is 
conceivable: 
'Sblood, there is something in this more than 
natural, if philosophy could find it out. 
(2.2.267) 
109 See the quotation from Eagleton's William Shakespeare discussed above on page 2+4. ISO 
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3.5. His Sword Seemed i'th' Air to Stick 
It is certainly not enough to assert that Shakespeare's plot, based on the secret 
crime and unverifiable elusive witness/victim, progresses according to a peculiar process 
of psychological growth rather than to a traditional dramatic formula and that, as a 
result, it amounts not to an aleatory, `baroque' sequence (as Lupton and Reinhard 
characterise it), resisting all `available definitions', but to a glimpse of an aesthetic and 
ethical alternative rooted in its very accidental nature. Appreciation of the possibility and 
relevance of such a reading requires further detailed investigation of the relationship 
between the practicalities of Hamlet's dramatic sequence and its ambiguous 
psychological/aesthetic dimension from Act 2 onwards. 
It is worth resuming the investigation with restating the essential facts of the first 
Act in terms of the plot's later progression: after the interview with the Ghost, Hamlet 
emerges with a particularly `wounded name' - the name of his father, entrusted to his 
care, which, in its turn, aggravates Hamlet's own deep mental agony. 
The net effect of the Ghost on the plot's precipitation towards revenge is in itself 
quite negative. Hamlet is not a lot better oriented now than he was in the state of mental 
nausea and vague suspicions towards the end of Act 1 scene 2. The progress from Act 1 
to Act 2 amounts in general terms to a peculiar modification of the original impasse: 
instead of asking the question `what is to be done with a seemingly inexplicable, 
`natural' corruption of the state? ', Act 2 seems to be asking what is to be done with the 
`wondrous strange' incriminating knowledge about the root of this corruption? The 
problem of transition from knowledge to action after Act 1 has certainly been one of the 
key issues in the Hamlet debate at least since Thomas Hanmer's deliberations in 1736. 
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The key assumption in these and later deliberations is that the issue of usability of the 
knowledge received in the first Act is what Hamlet himself as the protagonist is 
constantly deliberating on. Indeed, for some 19th century critics the particularly legal 
unreliability of the Ghost's evidence, the impossibility of bringing Claudius to public 
justice, was indeed the crux of the tragedy. 
However, it is certainly quite conspicuous that public inquest, characteristic of 
Oedipus' case, or any open deliberation on the importance of immediate action, is far 
from Hamlet's mind for almost the complete length of Act 2. Unlike Oedipus, Hamlet 
does not seem to separate either himself or almost anyone else from the corruption he is 
witnessing, which implicitly undermines the very possibility of action against it in 
Denmark (`for me, 'tis a prison' and the man `quintessence of dust' - 2.2.250). He has 
too intimate a knowledge' lo of that `vicious mole of nature', the `dram of evil', which 
`both all the noble substance over-daub/To his own scandal' (1.4.25,37-39): 
I am myself indifferent honest, but yet I could accuse me of such things 
that it were better my mother had not borne me. 
(3.1.124-5) 
Hamlet's meaning in this later moment is certainly, as Adelman emphasises, that it is 
specifically because of his mother, and thus the deepest level of his `natural' being, that 
he is now able to lay such accusations on himself and the rest of man and womankind. 
And, indeed, it is the very secrecy of the crime - and the Ghost's nature - that seems to 
provide the last defense for the name of the late King from `corruption' of `general 
censure'; for the not too sensitive and uninformed public he is still the `valiant king'. 
1 10 To which Oedipus can admit only to a much lesser extent when, half way into the play, he is trying to 
explain to Jocasta why he took the apparently ridiculous jibe of the drunk-man more seriously than 
truthfulness of his loving (Corinthian) parents. 
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The rivals of Hamlet's watch intuitively appreciate the importance of preserving this 
status quo from the very start. Their intuition is wildly rewarded in the shifting-ground 
ritual of swearing to secrecy immediately after the interview. Its main purpose must be 
to make the secret as `wondrously' strange and incommunicable as possible. J. D. 
Wilson's reading of the moment which interprets the bizarre combination of the Ghost's 
grave endorsement of the oath and Hamlet's impudent quipping on this endorsements ll 
as virtually deliberate masquerade, leading the minds of the secondary witnesses as far 
away from the grave truth of the apparition as possible, is certainly much more 
compelling than Prosser's and Greenblatt's respective and exemplary emphases on the 
demonic and purgatorial aspects of the scene as such. ' 12 
The other part of the oath in the ritual concerns the `antic disposition' which 
Hamlet `perchance hereafter shall think meet to put' on (1.5.193-94). This, famously, 
contradicts the rationale of the first part, for Hamlet's strange `lunacy' indeed makes the 
others eager to pluck out the heart of its mystery rather than leave it alone. Amleth's 
dissimulating tactic in Saxo's chronicle, by contrast, is perfectly logical because his 
bizarre preparations for revenge have the conscious purpose of dissembling the plot and 
simultaneously drawing Feng and his retinue into it. In this respect, Hamlet's decision to 
put on an antic disposition as a finishing touch to the secrecy ritual seems to suggest a 
conscious step towards developing a similar strategy against Claudius and his courtiers. 
But the problem (already perceived by Harmer in 1736) with what Act 2 shows us of 
"'the 'purgatorial tag' Hic et ubique and the derogatory 'Ah, ha, boy! say'st thou so? art thou there, 
truepenny? ', `old mole', 'worthy pioneer' (1.5.171,184,185), associated traditionally with the evil spirits. 
112 However, despite Wilson's emphasis on Gertrude's reputation in this context, it is indeed for the 
father's sake and with the father's explicit inspiration and involvement that the ritual is performed (and, 
indeed, aimed against the mother's confidence). 
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Hamlet's current behaviour and the behaviour in the interim is that it lacks Amleth's 
teleological precision at the equivalent stage in the narrative: 
In a word, you would not have thought him a man at all, but some absurd 
abortion due to a mad fit of destiny. He used at times to sit over the fire, and, 
raking up the embers with his hands, to fashion wooden crooks, and harden 
them in the fire, shaping at their lips certain barbs, to make them hold more 
tightly to their fastenings. When asked what he was about, he said that he was 
preparing sharp javelins to avenge his father. This answer was not a little 
scoffed at, all men deriding his idle and ridiculous pursuit; but the thing helped 
his purpose afterwards. Now it was his craft in this matter that first awakened in 
the deeper observers a suspicion of his cunning. For his skill in a trifling art 
betokened the hidden talent of the craftsman; nor could they believe the spirit 
dull where the hand had acquired so cunning a workmanship. (Gesta Danorum 
qtd. in Narrative and Dramatic Sources of Shakespeare, 178). 
Hamlet may have vengeance on his mind (as his `tables' soliloquy, after the Ghost's 
descent in to the cellarage, seems to imply), but it is difficult to discern anything in his 
activity in the second Act that would suggest an exercise of an intelligible 
`workmanship' with an ulterior purpose. Indeed, as he acknowledges to the newly 
arrived Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, 
I have of late-but wherefore I know not-lost all my mirth, forgone all 
custom of exercises; and indeed it goes so heavily 
with my disposition that this goodly frame, the 
earth, seems to me a sterile promontory, this most 
excellent canopy, the air, look you, this brave 
o'erhanging firmament, this majestical roof fretted 
with golden fire, why, it appears no other thing to 
me than a foul and pestilent congregation of vapours. 
(2.2.251, italics added) 
It is true that at that point in the Act Hamlet has essentially lost all the trust he (may 
have) had in his `excellent good friends'. However, what he tells them here reflects quite 
faithfully not only the knowledge of the rest of the court (whom he has reasons to 
deceive) but the perception of the audience; for the most of the Act, Hamlet has no 
asides or soliloquies. So it is certainly remarkable that the audience, but most 
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importantly, Claudius and the rest of the onstage court, are drawn to Hamlet's behaviour 
none the less. Admittedly, *the audience maybe fascinated by the sheer spectacle of the 
character while Claudius is drawn into a more and more specific `suspicion', not unlike 
that of the court in Saxo, by this dazzling and disturbing display. The insightful dramatic 
difference between Saxo and Shakespeare here is certainly that in the latter the character 
no longer has to do anything even remotely meaningful or menacing in itself (like 
fashioning crooks) to arouse fascination and suspicion. Indeed, it is because he does 
`nothing' that the two are aroused even more in this case. The `workmanship' is 
transposed into the creation of Hamlet's idleness which provides a dissimulation so 
effective that it appears to hide the object underneath it even from Hamlet himself. 
The play provides an ironic and ominous `answer of the real' to such an appraisal 
of Hamlet's behaviour, for he is not the only one that produces an antic impression. 
Conspicuously yet so far harmlessly, Polonius gets caught up in his own devices twice 
during the Act. The first time it happens takes place right at the beginning of Act 2, that 
is, textually, right after Hamlet has promised to put the antic disposition on at the end of 
Act 1 scene 5. Polonius is so impressed by the subtlety of his own plan to spy on Laertes 
in Paris that when he finally comes to explaining the purpose of it all, he cannot 
remember what it was: 
Polonius Marry, sir, here's my drift; 
And I believe, it is a fetch of wit: 
You laying these slight sullies on my son, 
As 'twere a thing a little soil'd i' the working, Mark you, 
Your party in converse, him you would sound, 
Having ever seen in the prenominate crimes 
The youth you breathe of guilty, be assured 
He closes with you in this consequence; 
`Good sir', or so, or `friend', or `gentleman', 
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According to the phrase or the addition 
Of man and country. 
Reynaldo Very good, my lord. 
Polonius And then, sir, does he this - he does - what was I 
about to say? By the mass, I was about to say 
something: where did I leave? 
(2.1.44-58, italics added) 
The next time follows almost immediately when he is expostulating with Claudius and 
Gertrude on the matter of Hamlet's madness. The extraordinary convolution through 
which he goes in order to introduce his chief (yet far from conclusive) piece of evidence 
- Hamlet's brief letter to Ophelia - can be sampled from its final stage where the 
meaning of the evidence should already be clear, both to the presenter and the audience 
(which is far from the case): 
Madam, I swear I use no art at all. 
That he is mad, 'tis true: 'tis true 'tis pity; 
And pity 'tis 'tis true: a foolish figure; 
But farewell it, for I will use no art. 
Mad let us grant him, then: and now remains 
That we find out the cause of this effect, 
Or rather say, the cause of this defect, 
For this effect defective comes by cause: 
Thus it remains, and the remainder thus. Perpend. 
I have a daughter - have while she is mine - 
Who, in her duty and obedience, mark, 
Hath given me this: now gather, and surmise. 
(2.2.107-19) 
Polonius, the father of double blessings, `precepts' and `good news', can never stop 
inventing, especially when it comes to truth - even when it rather seems to be the matter 
of trust between him and his children. The compulsion to be right, the urge to catch the 
`carp of truth', `though it were hid indeed/ within the centre' (2.2.169-70) proves too 
strong, certainly stronger than its need. The spying scheme against Laertes is matched at 
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that moment by the earlier admonition to Ophelia in Act 1 scene 3 on the matter of 
Hamlet's favours ('think yourself a baby', `you'll tender me a fool'). The matter of 
separation of truth from friends, relatives, and indeed reality makes Polonius a true 
`Aristotelian' alter-ego of Hamlet: Amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas113 can 
certainly be their motto, specifically for the second and third Act. 
This curious affinity between them provides a glimpse of the dramatic necessity 
that underlies the unfolding events of the second Act which, with regard to what should 
have become the plot's main concern - revenge, appear puzzling. The Act opens, as we 
have seen, with Polonius' instructions to Reynaldo on how to catch the `carp of truth' 
about Laertes' behaviour in Paris, which is quite unrelated to the plot's main concern. 
The fact that with Reynaldo Polonius is also sending Laertes some money ('Give him 
this money and these notes', 2.1.3) seems to suggest, as many critics pointed out, that a 
considerable amount of real time must have passed since the fateful night on the 
battlements. But as other critics no less pertinently point out, this pause is hardly 
emphasised in dramatic terms because Polonius and Reynaldo appear right after the end 
of the battlements scene. 
Their conversation is almost interrupted by the agitated entrance of Ophelia 
which, indeed, draws the attention away from the question of time as such. Hamlet's 
haunting appearance in her closet, already discussed above with regard to the Ghost's 
impact, must also be considered in its own dramatic context. It comes right after 
Polonius' bumbling discourse on how to extract truth from behind the mirror of 
appearances and, although completely different in its method, shares its peculiar focus. 
The whole episode is one intense moment of observation where Hamlet is drawing 
113 'Plato is a friend, but truth is a greater friend'. 
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Ophelia's face, extracting its essence, completely absorbed in the sight to the very last 
instant, walking out with his head turned backwards. Because we already know after Act 
1 scene 3 that there has been a relationship between them and, moreover, that this 
relationship is threatened, this moment in itself is not surprising. What captivates in the 
sheer and quite graphic intensity of the spectacle (located offstage like the most intense 
moments of classical drama) is its excessive nature with regard to its object. Indeed, 
Ophelia has every reason to expect a display of hurt feelings from Hamlet, but not a 
ghost loosed from hell; and yet it is, as Gertrude puts it later on, `all' that she sees. 
Perhaps, it is indeed all that Hamlet wants her to see at that moment. The critics have 
certainly often pointed out that it is Gertrude who is the true cause and addressee of this 
display. However, it is plainly obvious that neither Hamlet nor Ophelia can appreciate 
the fact. They are too absorbed in the mutual reality of the moment whose deeper sense 
can only be gleaned from an informed, leisurely distance. 
Unfortunately for himself and his daughter, Polonius is convinced that he is 
informed enough to translate the meaning of this visitation. If Hamlet intended it as the 
first dissimulating step in his grand revenge scheme, it appears that he could not have 
chosen a better moment, method, and target: Polonius' appetite for discovery and 
penchant for persuasion ensure that Claudius and Gertrude, who, as it turns out, have 
indeed been wondering about the cause of Hamlet's changed behaviour, immediately 
receive the above mentioned report about the prince's love-stricken state. It is most 
remarkable that Polonius says nothing about Hamlet's closet visitation, his holding 
Ophelia by the wrist and his intent forlorn perusal of her face. This should have been so 
much more effective than the brief profession of the letter which is too conscious of its 
awkwardness and all but abjures itself. This seems to be another example of Polonius' 
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thinking too precisely on the event, as Hamlet puts it later about himself. No wonder the 
royal couple is not convinced. Nevertheless, they have no choice but to be `hooked' by 
Polonius' report, partly because it does present real evidence and no less importantly 
because their own self-consciousness of their `o'erhasty marriage' makes them really 
want Polonius' report to be true - and so they decide to `try' it ` further. Thus, even 
before the nunnery scene, Ophelia seems to play the decoy for Hamlet, through 
Polonius' blindness, against the royal couple. 
While they and Polonius are still in conference over the matter, Hamlet may 
have, accidentally or not, overheard them in his disputed entrance at 2.2.162 exactly 
when Polonius offers to `loose' his daughter to Hamlet in order to test his love-madness 
theory. After this, Hamlet enters almost right away, `madly attired' (according to the 
Q1), lets Polonius `board him', and engages with him in an `antic' conversation in which 
he takes him for a `fishmonger'. Just as his appearance in the closet presents itself to 
Ophelia's blind eyes, so the bulk of his ominous, offensive quipping falls on Polonius' 
deaf ears. The only thing that Polonius is able to verify is indeed what he is already 
convinced of. that Hamlet has an interest in his daughter. However, the nature of this 
interest, contained in the `art' of Hamlet's replies and rooted in his hidden knowledge 
(perhaps of Polonius' conference with Claudius and certainly that of Gertrude's 
`frailty'), almost completely eludes him. He does appreciate the presence of a `method' 
and `pregnancy' in Hamlet's baffling responses, but he ascribes it totally to the 
`extremity of love' - such, indeed, as he himself 'very nearly suffered' from: `Take this 
from this if this be otherwise'! (2.2.204,167). This self-assurance makes Polonius take 
another unwitting step towards the arras in Gertrude's closet. 
229 
The entertaining contrast between the rich intensity of Hamlet's two appearances 
and Polonius' unwittingly ridiculous attempts to interpret them ensures that at their 
given moment no questions arise as to their purpose. But this does not mean that this 
purpose becomes obvious as the respective scenes progress. Their elaboration is quite 
overwhelming both in terms of their content and the dramatic space they take up. Thus if 
Hamlet's treatment of Ophelia and Polonius at this stage was a careful preparation for an 
important move against Claudius, he is interrupted by the arrival of his `excellent good 
friends', which he could not have foreseen. During their brief conversation, he certainly 
proves a much shrewder interpreter than Polonius: he can almost immediately see 
through the inadequate `colour' with which their modesties are trying to cover the 
awkward purpose of their mission. So he learns that it is not just Polonius that is 
watching him at his own and/or Claudius' initiative. Claudius has certainly made his 
provisions to spy on the prince even before Hamlet makes his appearance in Ophelia's 
closet. Polonius' report on Hamlet's extreme love for his daughter seems to provide an 
indirect response to this move - yet, for the above mentioned reasons, Claudius cannot 
remain fully convinced and wants further proof. Thus if Hamlet wanted to bind 
Claudius' and everyone else's attention to himself as an antic lover, he certainly 
achieved it. 
However, he does not have a chance to take stock of his achievements. Before he 
manages to lose all interest in the two turncoats, get rid of their presence, break into a 
soliloquy (as he does in Act 1 scene 2) and perhaps devise a further step (move in for the 
kill? ), they announce another arrival which diverts his attention: the tragedians of the 
city. Thus room for a new entertaining contrast, that between Hamlet's treatment of his 
`sponge' friends and of the actors, is created. 
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As is the case with Ophelia and Polonius earlier, this contrast resonates with 
Hamlet's hidden knowledge of the Ghost. However, this time the ghostly colouring is 
represented in full view (as opposed to the reported episode in the closet) and also in 
front of Polonius (rather than Ophelia) and certainly his two even less informed friends. 
That is, characteristically, the play does not simply make a reference to its earlier 
dramatic situation but almost physically juxtaposes three, in this case consecutive, 
segments of its action, united by the common leitmotif. This leitmotif is certainly the 
spectacle of Hamlet as an open secret, first manifested in Ophelia's closet, then with 
Polonius in the `fishmonger' dialogue, then with Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, and 
finally in the declamatory exchange with one of the players. The fourth and last segment 
of this repetition is in itself a doubling because there Hamlet gets to experience his own 
spectacle as a member of baffled audience - or rather, by the end of the Pyrrhus-Priam- 
Hecuba exchange he finally gets a glimpse of what he has and, most significantly, what 
he has not been doing throughout the Act. This becomes possible certainly because here 
he is ostensibly engaged in playing someone who is formally unconnected with Elsinore 
and reality as such, and thus he can consciously step out of himself and make a 
comparison, while in his previous appearances he was immersed in his own act of the 
moment. Also, more specifically, Hamlet can make the comparison because the figure 
he is concentrating upon, `the rugged Pyrrhus', stands in almost a perfect opposition to 
his previous performances in this Act with regard to his hidden agenda. In his distraught 
appearances in Ophelia's closet, in front of Polonius, and with Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstem, Hamlet is essentially playing a victim: a Ghost-like figure ('And with a 
look so piteous in purport/As if he had been loosed out of hell/To speak of horrors'), an 
eccentric intellectual ('madly attired, reading on a book') enduring essentially the same 
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contemplation of 'frailty' in women ('good kissing carrion'), senility in old men 
('tedious old fools! '), perfidy in young (friends), degeneration of the whole world ('most 
excellent canopy') into `a foul and pestilent congregation of vapours' and thus the man 
in general into a `quintessence of dust'. In other words, Hamlet is there inspired by the 
Ghost itself - and, perhaps, even by Yorick - to play `the antic' at the court of `Death' 
within the `hollow crown' of Denmark, (characteristically, anticipating the grave-scene). 
By contrast, the figure of Pyrrhus makes Hamlet perform a complex turn to the 
other side of death, that of the grim reaper, and thus the other side of the founding crime, 
that is the murder and murderer - and certainly not any murder but the murder of a king 
and father. Simultaneously, Pyrrhus' act does not only represent this kind of murder as 
such but, crucially, a vengeance for such a murder. The specific background to Pyrrhus' 
fury in the declaimed passage is the treacherous murder of his father Achilles by the 
poisoned bolt of Priam's son Paris (directed by Apollo) and the fact that Pyrrhus cannot 
directly avenge this death, for Paris is already killed by Philoctetes. Thus the vengeful 
rage with which Pyrrhus is driving at the old Priam is displaced, although it still 
presumably makes sense within the larger context of the war (if Helen's and various 
gods' involvement is not scrutinized). The displacement is also most peculiar, if we take 
into account the fact that Priam and Hecuba themselves tried to get rid of Paris after he 
was born (in the characteristically Oedipal manner by sending him to Mount Ida) after 
they received the prophecy that his birth will bring the downfall of Troy. 
However, all these spiraling circles of treachery and vengeance are certainly not 
elaborated in the given moment of the exchange. Instead, they are extraordinarily 
condensed in 
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The rugged Pyrrhus, he whose sable arms, 
Black as his purpose, did the night resemble 
When he lay couched in the ominous horse, 
Hath now this dread and black complexion smear'd 
With heraldry more dismal; head to foot 
Now is he total gules; horridly trick'd 
With blood of fathers, mothers, daughters, sons, 
Baked and impasted with the parching streets, 
That lend a tyrannous and damned light 
To their lord's murder: roasted in wrath and fire, 
And thus o'er-sized with coagulate gore, 
With eyes like carbuncles, the hellish Pyrrhus 
Old grandsire Priam seeks. 
(2.2.306-318) 
Similarly, the hidden suffering of the Ghost was, in a sense, evinced by Hamlet's earlier 
closet appearance. However, Pyrrhus' exterior, unlike Hamlet's, has no air of hidden 
knowledge; on the contrary, it is as black as his purpose, as the dark womb of the 
`ominous horse' from which he emerges, and as the gore with which he covers the 
streets of Troy. 
Nevertheless, the relationship to the play's hidden knowledge here is most 
intimate because in the context of the scene Pyrrhus emerges virtually from Hamlet's 
head; the uncanny aspect of this emergence is reinforced by the quite possible fact that at 
the moment of declamation Hamlet is still in his Ghostly, `mad' attire (if we stick to the 
stage directions in Q1) that in the context of the speech must acquire an unexpectedly 
sinister quality. 
The already mentioned peculiar play between contingency and necessity at this 
juncture merits further attention. In the so far observed progress of the Act, Hamlet has 
seemed doubly distracted: on the one hand because he, presumably, wanted to seem 
distracted and on the other, because whatever concrete purpose this spectacle was 
supposed to pursue seemed always distracted by unexpected appearances - e. g., 
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Polonius, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, and, most remarkably, the actors (whose arrival 
in itself is supposed to signal distraction -'delights' and `pleasures', as Claudius calls 
them). However, this last instance, which literally juxtaposes all the previous key 
episodes - Hamlet, Polonius, Rosencrantz and Guildenstem watching an unexpectedly 
arrived actor perform an apparently disconnected fragment - helps bring out, with 
extraordinary subtlety, the peculiar relationship between action and purpose in them. 
First of all, it certainly brings out into the open, for the first time since the end of the last 
Act - and it is almost a whole Act later - the purpose that was supposed to be hidden 
within Hamlet's antic disposition. Instead of having the courtiers wonder at Amleth's 
dexterity in fashioning little crooks, Shakespeare makes them wonder at a whole speech 
about extreme vengeance and destruction, performed with extreme passion/empathy. To 
be more precise in this comparison, Saxo's Amleth does consciously prepare the crooks 
and thus makes the court wonder at his dexterity, while in the latter case the display 
cannot be wholly ascribed to Hamlet's intention, and it does not possess the same 
functionality. This, in itself, cannot be ascribed to the necessity to maintain secrecy 
about revenge, for Hamlet does initiate the Pyrrhus episode insofar as the speech in 
question emerges in his memory as soon as he hears about the actors. However, it is not 
entirely up to Hamlet to initiate this association and declamation because it is due to the 
almost pure accident of the actors' arrival - and not just any actors from the city, but 
namely those whom he has seen perform this particular Pyrrhus speech before. The 
accident is `almost pure' because the `war of the theatres', which brings the actors to the 
court and which Hamlet is absorbingly discussing with Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, 
becomes curiously linked by the prince to Claudius' accession: the lowly thirst for 
sensationalism which is fueling this war does not appear to him 
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very strange; for mine uncle is king of 
Denmark, and those that would make mows at him while 
my father lived, give twenty, forty, fifty, an 
hundred ducats a-piece for his picture in little. 
(2.2.268) 
Nevertheless, if traveling for the actors is here inevitable, the precise moment of their 
arrival is pure coincidence. And thus it is by a coincidence that Hamlet, in the only 
soliloquy in this Act occurring at its very end after the declamation episode, seems to 
remember about his obligation. Hamlet starts this soliloquy most significantly with 
`Now I am alone'. This suggests that he did feel the lack of asides and soliloquies in this 
Act. This fact acutely problematises the question of time/delay which began to lurk from 
the very start of the Act. On the one hand, there are numerous objective indications of 
the considerable amount of time that has passed since the moment in the last scene of 
Act 1. In addition to the already observed implications of elapsed time in the matter of 
Polonius' preoccupation with Laertes and the arrival of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, 
there is yet another arrival - that of Claudius' ambassadors from Norway - which adds 
to these implications. Furthermore, there are Claudius' and Gertrude's references to the 
persistence of the change in Hamlet's behaviour which is making them increasingly 
worried (and certainly Ophelia's later statement that it is now `twice two months' since 
the death of King Hamlet, instead of the `two months' in the first Act). All this has 
certainly made the many generations of critics wonder what on earth Hamlet has been 
waiting for all this time. 
This judicious and detached perception of time largely disregards the dramatic 
reality of the Act, signaled by the `Now I am alone' and corroborated by the observed 
scenes. As it was already emphasised by Waldock, for example, what we see on stage in 
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the second Act is far from `a mere colourless lapse of days' 114 . Hamlet's oath to the 
Ghost at the end of the first Act is juxtaposed very closely in terms of dramatic time with 
the emergence of Ophelia's rejection; the affective nature of his appearance in the closet 
in this context suggests more emotion than calculation. Hardly does he manage to 
emerge from the closet, when Polonius boards him `presently' after Claudius hurriedly 
dismisses the ambassadors from Norway in order to let Polonius `try further' the issue 
that is troubling them both most, and Polonius is followed immediately by Rosencrantz 
and Guildenstem and the actors. Thus the impression is indeed that Hamlet has hardly 
had the time to collect his wits and devise a plan of action since the Ghost's visitation. 
Yet the initiative in this dramatically objective `delay' is peculiarly divided. 
Hamlet is not simply being beset by the endless string of visitors whom he impatiently 
dismisses - he is himself deeply engaged in the scenes, even when he apparently should 
not enjoy it, as in the case of the `fishmonger' dialogue with Polonius. Thus, on the one 
hand, by the end of the act he suddenly realises the amount of time that has passed and 
on the other, up till that very moment, he has been so deeply engaged in the reality of a 
given moment that he must have not noticed the time's passage. It is true that Hamlet 
and others refer to his persistent brooding and apathy, but the objective observation 
matters much less here than the embedding of the subject in the movement of dramatic 
time itself. 
This is not to suggest that Hamlet reveals himself as someone whose attention is 
constantly and completely led astray by a random concern of the moment. On the 
contrary, his very susceptibility to being led astray is deeply linked to his constant 
awareness of his obligation. His antic disposition - and thus the focus on his secret 
14 Hamlet: A Study in Critical Method (Cambridge 1931, p. 81) 
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knowledge and task - suggestively persists in each of his scenes in spite of the 
increasing randomness of the events that prompt them (Ophelia's unexpected rejection, 
Polonius' tiresome attention, unexpected arrival of the old friends and the actors after 
them). Indeed, his concentration on his sworn task appears to increase with this 
randomness, culminating in the Pyrrhus passage which, while arising from perhaps the 
most contingent event in the Act, proves to be the closest to Hamlet's central concern. In 
terms of his later soliloquy, introducing his departure for England, Hamlet can indeed 
see how `all occasions do inform against' him; he is `thinking too precisely on the event' 
(4.4.37,46). He is overwhelmed by the myriad ways in which `the event' returns to 
haunt him virtually every single moment and thus spills over to others in his `pregnant' 
replies. 
The moment of Pyrrhus-Priam-Hecuba speech is by far the most overwhelming 
at this stage. This is not the least because for. all his enthusiasm about this `caviar to the 
general', for all the relish of anticipation, Hamlet, characteristically, must hardly be 
aware of the impact it is going to have on him afterwards (judging by his subsequent 
soliloquy). The thought of Pyrrhus, as perhaps the silent perusal of Ophelia in the closet 
scene, is an instant, short but distinct, of pure inspiration. However, it is certainly 
because of what this moment turns into that it acquires the status of a turning point. 
The matter of Pyrrhus' virtual emergence from Hamlet's memory has already 
been noted. This emergence certainly underscores their affinity, which must 
unexpectedly transform Hamlet's `mad' attire into quite an ominous suit (if the prince 
appears in his traditional black, the visual relevance is still there - `black as his purpose' 
- with the twist of highlighting what Hamlet's mournfulness and moodiness must be 
transforming into). However, unlike Pyrrhus, Hamlet cannot anticipate the moment of 
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emergence. Thus the fact that Pyrrhus' emergence in the speech is literally nursed and 
delivered by premeditated deception ('lay couched in the ominous horse') which thus 
assumes a distinctly animate, almost intentional relationship to the deed; the `tyrannous 
and damned light' that the streets `lend' to the figure in response to his indiscriminate 
slaughter; the fact that Pyrrhus is looking for the Troy's `old sire' Priam and that Priam's 
body is associated with `Mars' armour' which directly recalls the Ghost's appearance on 
the battlements' 15 - all these features combine to make Pyrrhus acquire the attributes of 
Claudius 116. Hamlet's consciousness of this link is uncertain, although it is indirectly 
corroborated by his railing against his uncle in the immediately following soliloquy 
('bloody, bawdy villain! /Remorseless, treacherous, lecherous, kindless villain! ' 2.2.414- 
15). The main discovery that Hamlet does make in his soliloquy, after facing the 
embodiment of his task, is that everything that he has done and, presumably, thought 
about in this Act did not have a conscious purpose. His enigmatic, `pregnant', antic 
behaviour, which proved so elusive and bewildering to the court, was also such for 
Hamlet himself. If the players had not happened to arrive, it is perfectly imaginable that 
Hamlet, after sending Rosencrantz and Guildenstern away, would have exclaimed like 
Polonius: By the mass, what was I about to do? This possibility is not only bitterly 
acknowledged by Hamlet in the soliloquy but is prefigured by the climactic pause in the 
very middle of Pyrrhus' speech, which in the context of the scene acquires a most 
haunting quality: 
115 This identification is certainly echoed later by Hamlet in his closet scene with Gertrude where, 
preaching to her the difference between the portraits (and personas) of her two husbands, he describes his 
father's expression `An eye like Mars, to threaten and command' (3.4.67). 
116 The Ghost currently refers to the royal bed of Denmark as `A couch for luxury and damned incest' and 
certainly all but directly links it to the murder of the King. The correspondence with Pyrrhus' ominous 
horse makes this link more suggestive. 
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But with the whiff and wind of his fell sword 
The unnerved father falls. Then senseless Ilium, 
Seeming to feel this blow, with flaming top 
Stoops to his base, and with a hideous crash 
Takes prisoner Pyrrhus' ear: for, lo! his sword, 
Which was declining on the milky head 
Of reverend Priam, seem'd i' the air to stick: 
So, as a painted tyrant, Pyrrhus stood, 
And like a neutral to his will and matter, 
Did nothing. 
But, as we often see, against some storm, 
A silence in the heavens, the rack stand still, 
The bold winds speechless and the orb below 
As hush as death, anon the dreadful thunder 
Doth rend the region, so, after Pyrrhus' pause, 
Aroused vengeance sets him new a-work; 
And never did the Cyclops' hammers fall 
On Mars' armour forged for proof eterne 
With less remorse than Pyrrhus' bleeding sword 
Now falls on Priam. 
(2.2.326-345) 
Apart from prefiguring Hamlet's realisation of the pause in his action, the passage 
certainly recalls the Ghost's message, the double crime done against the king. Thus in a 
very particular sense the Ghost's message, communicated as and by the permeable (as 
Marcellus testified) `invulnerable air' itself permeates, `like eager droppings into milk', 
the dramatic reality of the second Act and makes it quite sticky, vulnerable, and 
repugnant to action. This message is exercising its influence not only directly within 
Hamlet's mind. The fact of the Act is that although his antic behaviour remains an open 
secret, it nevertheless fills the atmosphere and minds of the court with its mystery, the 
`method' that Polonius and others see lurking in it. This is particularly true of Claudius, 
the other Pyrrhus of the play, whom Hamlet's `lunacy' does turn for the moment into a 
painted tyrant, making his sword stick in the air. 
There is, surely, an apparent contrast between Hamlet's erratic behaviour and 
Claudius' purposefulness. He does concentrate on Hamlet all his attention and activity, 
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even at the expense of the important matter of Fortinbras who is, indeed, another variant 
of Pyrrhus, unable to challenge the vanquisher of his father directly but willing to try it 
with the successor: he has a whole army at his disposal which is about to enter Claudius' 
borders and which eventually will show up claiming the `rights of memory'. However, 
Claudius seems completely satisfied by the assurances of Fortinbras' uncle and indeed 
convinced that this `ominous horse' is indeed just a horse - surely forgetting that once 
Fortinbras manages to place his army on the other side of Denmark, there will be no 
uncle Norway to stop him at Claudius' request. 
For the moment though, Claudius wishes to believe that Fortinbras is in check, so 
he can concentrate on the various means to fmd out what it is that his nephew is 
brooding on. The paradox of these activities is certainly that Claudius is almost sure 
from the start of the Act - even before the nunnery scene later on - that Hamlet's 
behaviour can hardly be motivated by love or mourning only. In other words, just like 
Hamlet in Act 2, Claudius is brooding on the possibility that Hamlet has either found out 
about the murder or suspects him. Given the later development of the situation, 
Claudius' behaviour here, while on the surface more reasonable, is almost as absurd as 
Hamlet's. More, because what is the point of Claudius' trying to discover what it is that 
Hamlet may be planning under the guise of his lunacy if this something may be 
Claudius' own death? The whole point of his role as the secret villain ought to be 
anticipation rather than discovery. Instead of behaving like one, whose knowledge of his 
primal crime ('0 heavy burden! ') outweighs anyone's in the play and anything he thinks 
he may ever learn, he behaves like Polonius, which places him in a weak position at the 
moment. If Hamlet, like Amleth, was indeed using his antic disposition to mystify 
Ophelia, and through her Polonius, and through Polonius Claudius into a dazzled 
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inaction so that after leading them along the false `love' trail he could suddenly strike 
him like a toreador, he could have certainly accomplished it now and would have thus 
presented quite a faithful and more sophisticated elaboration on the original revenge 
plot. 
As it is, Shakespeare's elaboration here is even more remarkable because Hamlet 
manages to achieve larger results without knowing exactly what he is doing. Returning 
to the situation at hand, it is worth pursuing the comparison between him and Claudius 
in the context of Pyrrhus' speech a little further because at this stage Claudius does know 
why he has not had Hamlet killed yet, while Hamlet does not know why he has been 
delaying. More precisely, he has not yet even become aware of his delay. It is the 
hyperbolic imagery of the passage that gives him the necessary epiphanic jolt: in the 
characteristically metatheatrical manner of the play, the fierce, remorseless fall of 
Pyrrhus' sword on Priam's body arrests Hamlet's mind on his own state epitomised by 
the immediately preceding, sublime instant of that sword stuck in the air made thick by 
the `hideous crash' of `senseless Illium'. Although Hamlet clutches onto the figure of 
Hecuba in the immediately following soliloquy, he does it certainly because of what the 
actor did to represent her extreme abjection. Thus the matter of the unexpectedly 
discovered, profoundly unsettling and `pregnant' pause in his action is certainly 
Hamlet's central concern: 
What would he do, 
Had he the motive and the cue for passion 
That I have? He would drown the stage with tears 
And cleave the general ear with horrid speech, 
Make mad the guilty and appal the free, 
Confound the ignorant, and amaze indeed 
The very faculties of eyes and ears. Yet I, 
A dull and muddy-mettled rascal, peak, 
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Like John-a-dreams, unpregnant of my cause, 
And can say nothing; no, not for a king, 
Upon whose property and most dear life 
A damn'd defeat was made. Am Ia coward? 
Who calls me villain? breaks my pate across? 
Plucks off my beard, and blows it in my face? 
Tweaks me by the nose? gives me the lie i' the throat, 
As deep as to the lungs? who does me this? 
Ha! 
'Swounds, I should take it for it cannot be 
But I am pigeon-liver'd and lack gall 
To make oppression bitter, or ere this 
I should have fatted all the region kites 
With this slave's offal: bloody, bawdy villain! 
Remorseless, treacherous, lecherous, kindless villain! 
0, vengeance! 
(2.2.391-416) 
Thus Hamlet, virtually unexpectedly, finds himself stuck in the air at the end of Act 2, 
madly looking for answers. `About my brain! ' he says and finds one immediately: 
I have heard 
That guilty creatures sitting at a play 
Have by the very cunning of the scene 
Been struck so to the soul that presently 
They have proclaim'd their malefactions; 
For murder, though it have no tongue, will speak 
With most miraculous organ. I'll have these players 
Play something like the murder of my father 
Before mine uncle: I'll observe his looks; 
I'll tent him to the quick: if he but blench, 
I know my course. The spirit that I have seen 
May be the devil: and the devil hath power 
To assume a pleasing shape; yea, and perhaps 
Out of my weakness and my melancholy, 
As he is very potent with such spirits, 
Abuses me to damn me: I'll have grounds 
More relative than this: the play's the thing 
Wherein I'll catch the conscience of the king. 
(2.2.433-4) 
Critics speculated that this - `The spirit that I have seen / May be the devil' - is what 
stimulated Hamlet's delay consciously from the start; that this is what drove his antic 
disposition. However, the context of the soliloquy and the whole Act contradicts this. It 
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is impossible to cry `bloody, bawdy villain! /Remorseless, treacherous, lecherous, 
kindless villain! 0, vengeance! ' first and then doubt the truth of the Ghost's word 
consciously at the same time. The explanation for this coup de main must be thai Hamlet 
simply cannot forgive himself the embarrassing discovery of such an inexplicable lapse 
in his behaviour, especially given his lack of doubt as to the Ghost's truth in all the 
scenes observed so far and in the soliloquy itself. Such a `noble mind', the foremost 
`courtier', `soldier', `scholar', `expectancy and rose of the fair state' and more 
particularly of the father and `king upon whose property and most dear life/A damned 
defeat was made' - and such a lapse! There simply must be a reason for it! `If only 
philosophy could find it out'! 
Hamlet's very compulsion to find a plausible excuse for this baffling delay is the 
key indication that he certainly believes the Ghost's message, the guilt which dominates 
the larger part of the soliloquy is the strong and unmistakable indication of it. It is at this 
crucial point that Hamlet gets entangled in the logic of guilt which motivated Claudius 
from his very first speech and most particularly in his search for the truth of Hamlet's 
inner mind. According to this logic, Claudius cannot simply kill the most probable 
avenger who, evidently just like his father, stands now in the way of his enjoyment - the 
weight of the original crime presses him to make this new killing justified. And Hamlet 
cannot kill Claudius now right away because.. . 
he did not kill Claudius right away (after 
the Ghost's visitation). He is not sure exactly how this happened ('Am Ia coward? ') but 
this is as bad as being Claudius, or a 'coward', a `drab', a `scullion', or Gertrude 
dexterously posting to incestuous sheets with funeral tears still galling her eyes. Thus 
what Hamlet wants to justify at this point is not the killing itself, as he overtly professes, 
but the lapse, the unexpectedly discovered `vicious mole' in his `nature' which turned 
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his antic disposition, his elaborate secret mindfulness of the Ghost's command, into 
`bestial oblivion' (as he puts it later on). The Freud-Jones classic psychoanalytic reading 
of the play insists that this oblivion has deep, `internal', roots in Hamlet's fundamental 
unconscious identification with his uncle's double deed, the jealous identification of the 
potential `evil-doer' with the actual one (E. Jones 88). According to this reading, the plot 
simply reveals this unconscious identification and its underlying fantasy enough to 
subject Hamlet to attacks of the repression-induced guilt and thus derail his ability to act. 
Erlich argued in his later revision of this reading that this does not make sense in 
psychoanalysis' own terms because if repression is punishing Hamlet with guilt for 
recognising the image of his desire in Claudius' deed, 
why not mitigate that guilt by killing Claudius? This would make the 
identification with Claudius a successful defense mechanism, in that the conflict 
between wish and inhibition would be resolved in the outer world without damage to the 
self. Claudius would bear the brunt of Hamlet's problems. (21) 
A more logical reinforcement of the Freud-Jones original psychoanalytic point, offered 
by Fineman' 17, is exactly that killing Claudius now that he has already accomplished the 
double crime would simply make Hamlet repeat it. Hence it appears that Freud's 
original opinion that 
the loathing which should drive him on to revenge is replaced in him by self. 
reproaches, by scruples of conscience, which remind him that he himself is 
literally no better than the sinner whom he is to punish ('Interpretation', 367) 
still holds true in psychoanalytic terms. However, as Freud himself acknowledged, his 
reading of Hamlet never presumed to provide the ultimately exhaustive answer (even if 
Freud was only being polite) to the play's crux nor to base this answer on a detailed 
1 17 `Fratricide and Cuckoldry' in Representing Shakespeare: new psychoanalytic essays, ed. Murray M. 
Schwartz and Coppelia Kahn, Baltimore; London: John Hopkins University Press, 1980. 
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reading. What becomes obvious from the close reading of the play is that, although 
Freud's main emphasis on the peculiar identification between Hamlet and, Claudius 
remains relevant, the dramatic form of this identification in the play itself is different 
from the inevitably more schematic notion of the plot which underlies his 
psychoanalytic discussion. In particular, in terms of the above analysis of the second Act 
which bears crucial relation to the question of transition from knowledge to action, it is 
clear that rather than being unable to kill Claudius because of a deep identification with 
his deed Hamlet gets caught up in this identification because of the sudden realisation of 
his inaction. The `loathing' of the uncle at this moment is not `replaced' with 'self- 
reproaches'; rather, in the above discussed soliloquy, they painfully clash. However 
painful this realisation of inaction is for Hamlet at this moment, it is remarkable that he 
does not simply give in to the guilty identification and let his purposefulness disintegrate 
into the `specific aboulia' (E. Jones 52), but he virtually meets this diagnosis head-on 
and perceives it as an enigma which he must solve. Like Oedipus with the number of 
Laius' killers, he may be clutching onto straws: `The spirit that I have seen/ May be the 
devil', `I have heard that guilty creatures sitting at a play... proclaimed their -- 
malefactions', but these are the straws that not only bespeak Hamlet's aboulia but help 
him confront it. Claudius here is much more neurotic because he does not have any 
rational reason for spying on Hamlet and thus sparing him for the moment. His tactic is 
perfectly in line with the general perversity of his enjoyment, `yet so far hath discretion 
fought with nature', discussed above: he publicly presents his marriage to Gertrude (and 
thus the fratricide) as an act of `moderation' between nature and discretion. Hamlet, on 
the other hand, does have the ambivalent support of the Ghost on the side of his 
neurosis: due to the extraordinary nature of this figure, Hamlet is indeed placed in 
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between all certainties. The Freud-Jones interpretation of the play assumes the non- 
uncanny nature of the Ghost ('The Uncanny', 351) and the general irrelevance of the 
Ghost as figure to Hamlet's convictions concerning his uncle (E. Jones, 54) thus 
concentrating exclusively on the Oedipus complex. However, all the dramatic evidence 
certainly points to the extraordinary nature of the Ghost whose emergence perfectly 
reverses Freud's own treatment of the return of the dead outside fiction: 
All supposedly educated people have ceased to believe officially that the dead can 
become visible as spirits, and have made any such appearances dependent on 
improbable and remote conditions; their emotional attitude towards their dead, 
moreover, once a highly ambiguous and ambivalent one, has been toned down in the 
higher strata of the mind into an unambiguous feeling of piety. ('The Uncanny', 365) 
In the context of the play, the Ghost is, as was already observed, a thoroughly 
unexpected, most strange appearance, taking place in spite of the witnesses' beliefs, and 
although the feelings it inspires are far from unambiguous piety, the primitive beliefs 
manage to take hold of the witnesses - especially, the educated ones - only in part', as 
Horatio puts it. Hamlet's peculiar urging of secrecy afterwards does nothing to reduce 
the uncanniness/ambiguity of the apparition. The epiphanic ending of the second Act 
ultimately repeats for Hamlet the encounter with the Ghost: his inaction seems to him as 
unexpected and inexplicable, as fraught with meaning. Garber and Hirschfield who, in 
their respective ways, single out the compulsive repetitiveness in the pattern of Hamlet's 
behaviour, certainly point out what at the end of Act 2 seems to become the crucial 
feature of Hamlet's relationship with the Ghost and its message. However, it is 
important to emphasise that together with setting the traumatic, compulsive pattern for 
the rest of the action, this turning point in the play also lays down a paradoxical 
foundation for the redemptive possibility precisely through revealing Hamlet's 
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thoroughly conscientious and thus thoroughly compromised, erratic, attitude to revenge 
(counterbalanced by Claudius' guilty villainy). 
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3.6 Up. Sword 
Conscience, indeed, becomes the leitmotif of Act 3 dominated by the intersecting 
theatricality of The Mousetrap and Claudius-Polonius' scheme of spying on Hamlet. 
After the baffling realisation that he has not considered the matter of the Ghost, 
revenge, and his uncle carefully enough, Hamlet is formally giving himself and Claudius 
another chance. In reality, as is obvious in the last soliloquy of Act 2, his mind is firmly 
set against Claudius, and the secret theatrical investigation that he is about to subject him 
to is certainly far from impartial. What is this if not Oedipal procrastination and/or 
traumatic compulsion leading Hamlet to dwell on the primal scene, which in this case is 
a composite of the original Sin ('incestuous sheets'), the original murder (fratricide), and 
adultery? psychoanalysts will ask. What is this, in other words, if not a compulsive 
return to the enigma underlying all of these acts, as Hirschfield argues? 
Hamlet is grappling virtually with these same questions in the already partly 
discussed `To be or not to be' soliloquy with which he enters Act 3. He is not that far 
from giving himself a straightforward psychoanalytic diagnosis, having taken stock of 
the problem in his progress so far and made up his mind about the general nature of 
delay in `enterprises of great pith and moment' (3.1.96). However, as was already noted, 
he is distancing himself from those who simply `grunt and sweat under' this `weary life', 
unable to face the uncertain `dread' of `something after death' (3.1.87,88). The relation 
between this `dread' and `conscience' that daunts `us all' into inaction is not 
straightforward: the two are related but not identical, because taking `arms against a sea 
of troubles', which is much closer to an `enterprise of great pith and moment', is not the 
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same as ending one's life with a `bare bodkin' -a possibly dignified but nevertheless 
defeatist escape for those overwhelmingly oppressed by 
the whips and scorns of time, 
The oppressor's wrong, the proud man's contumely, 
The pangs of despised love, the law's delay, 
The insolence of office and the spurns 
That patient merit of the unworthy takes 
(3.1.80-4) 
Indeed, the very contrast between these two poles of human action is crucial for the 
appreciation of the difference in the nature of their absolute limit. In the latter case it is 
indeed the `dread' - or, in Freud's technical terms, `anxiety' - of something absolutely 
unknown, because indeed there is no framework of interaction in which this dread can 
be confronted with even a semblance of equality between the victim and the oppressor. 
This is hardly Hamlet's case. He has already faced an ambiguous but irrefutable image 
of this `dread' and received a message commanding action in its name - that is, the 
name of his murdered father and king. It is true that it is Hamlet who bestows this name 
on the spirit but what matters is that the spirit responds and thus makes itself dependent 
on the verbal and most importantly moral mechanism of human communication. Thus, 
for Hamlet, the question of action now is not that of a simple escape from `the thousand 
natural shocks that flesh is heir to', of walking `out of the air' which has become too 
unbearable to live in, curbed by the unknown dread. Hamlet hardly ever considers 
suicide seriously ('0 that the Everlasting had not fix'd his canon 'gainst self-slaughter' 
does not sound exactly suicidal). The question of action is here that of a `great 
enterprise' which consists not in evading but in facing the terrifying enigma of the 
primal crime, in verifying its existence and living up to the terms of his obligation to its 
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victim, even to the letter' 18. He cannot let his consciousness either falter over this task or 
deter the action - he cannot allow another lapse. Thus the greatness of the enterprise is 
measured not so much by the necessity of murdering the current king but in first making 
the original crime resurface in his (and the queen's) conscience enough to disturb the 
equilibrium of their appearances, which also means the equilibrium of their consciences. 
From psychoanalytic point of view, this requirement is only a further step toward a more 
sophisticated procrastination and/or compulsive return to the traumatic scene; however, 
from the genre's point of view, this `pathological' fixation is Hamlet's principal source 
of vindication, as it is the case with Shylock, Hieronimo, Titus, Angelo. Hamlet's 
uniqueness certainly is that he is not simply fixated on the letter of his, 
revenge/punishment pledge; not even on eliminating the murderer in a specifically 
apposite way, based on the original offence. To reverse Angelo's credo in Measure for 
Measure 119, Hamlet is fixated indeed on attacking the offence itself (and not only the 
`actor') in the very conscience, the `soul', of the offender. He does talk about it in terms 
of `purgation' and `physic' later on, describing himself as `scourge and minister' at the 
same time 120. This certainly does not mean that he, like the Duke in Measure for 
Measure, is absolutely bent on forcing his subjects and transgressors into contrition and 
humility without having to punish anyone in reality (except through marriage). But the 
amount of pressure that Hamlet has already put on the consciences of his main targets 
I" Certainly, this is quite like Oedipus' relation to the riddle of the oracle both in the background narrative 
and the play itself. 
11 `Mine were the very cipher of a function, 
To fine the faults whose fine stands in record, 
And let go by the actor. ' (2.239-41) 
`0 Which, as Prosser points out, is not a neutral hendiadys but an oxymoron because a scourge of God is 
normally punished by God with the very punishment that he metes, whereas a minister is the embodiment 
and agent of grace. Hamlet certainly tries to see himself as combining the two roles by the end of his 
closet scene with Gertrude. 
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and the amount that he is going to add in this Act proves indeed almost enough to 
convert both Gertrude and Claudius to genuine confession and penitence. And the fact 
that this does not happen is certainly not entirely Hamlet's fault. 
Although Claudius is also fixated on Hamlet's conscience, he, on the contrary, is 
the one that is ready to bury it together with the `actor' as soon as he discovers enough 
of it to confirm his suspicions. His method of discovery is largely the same -a kind of 
theatrical performance involving Polonius and Ophelia, which Hamlet himself provoked, 
inadvertently, by his distraught appearance in Ophelia's closet. Thus if Act 2 was 
dominated almost exclusively by Hamlet's own metatheatrical performances, in Act 3 
the rest of the cast catches up, which turns the action into a veritable `war of theatres'. 
This war changes the temporal pattern of the action. If in Act 2 waiting was not 
prominent, in Act 3 Hamlet's first soliloquy ('To be') does not only happen because of 
the possible continuation of the epiphany the prince has had at the end of the previous 
Act but because he needs to wait until the start of the evening entertainment. 
Simultaneously, Claudius is waiting for Hamlet to appear in the lobby where he 
summoned him to, `as 'twere by accident', `affront Ophelia' (3.1.36-7). More 
fundamentally, Hamlet and Claudius become much more focused as antagonists; the 
alternation between pauses and acts in their action acquires a closer interrelated dramatic 
rhythm. Lacan's designation of this pattern as `the hour of the Other' 121 is suggestive to 
the extent that it acknowledges this peculiarity, but it does not do justice to the complex 
interplay between the subject and the Other specifically in this Act where each 
antagonist waits not only for the other to assume a certain position in time and space that 
121 'And Hamlet stops, because it's not time. It's not the hour of the Other. not time for the Other to render 
his "audit" to heaven.. . Not for a moment does he think that his time has come... Whatever Hamlet may do, he will do it only at the hour of the Other' ('Desire', 18). 
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would be convenient for his action, but also for the moment of a particular relevance 
which will justify action in terms of his own particular agenda. The desire driving the 
antagonists is not, as Lacan insists, schematically and inscrutably phallic - it is largely 
interpretative. This is particularly true of both Hamlet and Claudius who, unlike his 
nephew, is increasingly concentrated not so much on the right moment but on the right 
method for his actions. This divergence between them is not perfect, however, which 
leads to the paradox of the prayer scene determining all the subsequent action and 
representing the major crux of the play. 
It is prepared for by the very opening of the Act when Claudius enthusiastically 
accepts the invitation to attend the evening performance, commissioned by Hamlet, 
while also anxiously preparing to join Polonius in a `lawful espial' on Hamlet, with 
Ophelia `sugaring' them `o'er'. This moment is the first time in the play when Claudius 
verbally acknowledges his guilt ('0 heavy burden! ') in the short painful aside 
immediately preceding Hamlet's entrance with the `To be or not to be' soliloquy. The 
two certainly speak to each other not only because of the juxtaposition but because 
Claudius certainly anticipates Hamlet's arrival, while Hamlet may not be aware that he 
is being watched, given the stage directions122. Claudius reveals here for the first time 
the inescapable haunting reality of his guilt on which he will elaborate in the prayer 
scene later in this Act. The gist of that elaboration represents the tipping of the balance 
between guilt and action in favour of the latter in Claudius' behaviour. The moment of 
his personal spying on Hamlet at the beginning of the Act is the first step he takes 
towards action under the very influence of his guilt. This provides a perfect backdrop to 
122 During his soliloquy Hamlet is already in the lobby where Ophelia is `reading on a book'; and yet he 
manages to stay immersed in his speech for quite some time (30 odd lines) before he notices her with quite 
a surprise ('Soft you now! '). 
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Hamlet's own development in the same direction manifested in his soliloquy at the end 
of Act 2 and the shortly following `To be or not to be'. Claudius is, par excellence, the 
man who not only dreads `something after death' but is convinced exactly what he is 
going to face there: the heavenly judgment where he will be `compell'd/ Even to the 
teeth and forehead of [his] faults/ To give in evidence' (3.3.68-7), as he puts it in the 
prayer scene. Therefore, he has every reason not only to bear the `pangs' of guilt and 
`grunt and sweat under a weary life' but to make sure that no one sends him to his 
judgment too soon. His motivation for great enterprises - more specifically, for 
arranging first for Hamlet's withdrawal to England after the nunnery scene and then his 
execution there after Gonzago - is indeed very high precisely because of his knowledge 
and conviction about his crime 123. By contrast, Hamlet's resolution to act cannot by 
definition be as strong because he does not have Claudius' knowledge of the crime. 
Hamlet has realised by now that he has seen `something' - his mother's remarriage, the 
Ghost - and, as he is going to tell Ophelia shortly, these tormenting, enigmatic sights 
have made him `mad' - that is, both enraged and `unpregnant' of his `cause'. By staging 
Gonzago Hamlet is trying to approximate Claudius' certainty on the matter of action. 
However, the unique irony of the two antagonists' respective trajectories in this Act is 
that while Hamlet is looking to get Claudius' resolve through confronting him with his 
crime, the effect of this confrontation is to throw Claudius back on his knees in the 
prayer scene and look for Hamlet's state of `the new-born babe' whose knees are still 
capable of kneeling, mind of sending genuine prayers, and whose hands are still as 
`white as snow'. 
123 Incidentally, he never explicitly accuses himself of incest or adultery in his soliloquies. 
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By that ironic moment, both adversaries have received all the confirmations they 
wanted of each other's inner secrets. Hamlet has managed to elicit from Claudius the 
primary reaction he was looking for (presumably, the `wincing' of the `galled jade' on 
the `talk of poisoning'). Claudius is finally convinced that his nephew has not only 
suspected him but somehow found out about the crime and is planning revenge. With 
these observations in mind, both have decided on their next steps. The additional irony 
of Claudius' praying fit is that it comes not only after The Mousetrap but after he has 
already sealed the letters demanding Hamlet's execution in England and given them to 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. 
Hamlet, on the contrary, is understandably quite undivided after The Mousetrap 
and resolved in the blackness of his purpose, as he demonstrates in the short soliloquy 
that he utters on the way to Gertrude's closet and immediately before he chances upon 
Claudius in prayer: 
'Tis now the very witching time of night, 
When churchyards yawn and hell itself breathes out 
Contagion to this world: now could I drink hot blood, 
And do such bitter business as the day 
Would quake to look on. 
(3.2.277-81) 
This moment seems quite a logical stage in the development of his aggression which has 
been steadily rising since his entrance in this Act with `To be or not to be'. In the 
immediately following scene with Ophelia, Hamlet, in addition to the commonly noted 
increasing brutality of his manner, explicitly tells her (most probably, with the suspected 
eavesdroppers in mind) that `those that are married already - all but one - shall live' 
(3.1.131). During The Mousetrap, Hamlet, again quite cruelly using Ophelia as a 
backdrop, acts as an aggressive chorus anxious to elicit the guilty reaction from Claudius 
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he is looking for so that, presumably, he could sweep to his revenge. Despite the 
psychoanalytic critics' emphasis on the repetition compulsion value of the play-within- 
the-play here, the main focus of the scene for Hamlet is indeed Claudius' and Gertrude's 
faces at least as much as, if not more than, the playlet's action. He emphatically 
interrupts the performance at the key moments in order to amplify its effect and certainly 
spurs it on impatiently in anticipation of Lucianus, the poisoner, whom he identifies with 
himself by first presenting the character to the already alarmed Claudius as `nephew to 
the king'. He then continues forcefully whetting Claudius' anxiety by emphasising the 
play's potentially satirical edge 124: 
'tis a knavish piece of work: but what o'that? your majesty and we that 
have free souls, it touches us not: let the galled jade wince, our 
withers are unwrung. 
(3.2.184) 
Then he certainly goes on to urge the actor playing Lucianus with `Pox, leave thy 
damnable faces and begin. Come: "the croaking raven doth bellow for revenge"' 
(3.2.232, italics added). Finally, when Lucianus' `poison' enters the ears of the sleeping 
player-king, Hamlet immediately comments at length: `A poisons him i'th' garden for 's 
estate. His name's Gonzago: the story is extant and writ in choice Italian. You shall see 
anon how the murderer gets the love of Gonzago's wife' (3.2.239-241). Apart from the 
quite relevant Oedipal slip here resulting from Hamlet's earlier identification of himself 
with Lucianus, this is indeed the crucial moment of his building up his vengefulness by 
getting the desired reaction from Claudius. Here the paradoxical difference between 
Hamlet and Amleth is sharply obvious: Hamlet wants to sweep to his revenge precisely 
124 Which is ironically very close to the use that the children's theatre companies would make of the play - 
the very example that Hamlet decries in his earlier discussion with Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. 
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by making his plan more and more explicit to Claudius, rather than hiding it behind 
some incomprehensible preparations. Simultaneously, by making his knowledge of the 
crime more and more explicit, Hamlet prepares himself for the act of vengeance. Thus 
after all this pressure culminates in Claudius' apparently dazzled self-incriminating 
departure (`Give me some light: away! '), Hamlet's words about drinking hot blood and 
contemplating Nero's deeds are certainly quite believable. Surely, he goes on to profess 
that in the interview with his mother (to which he is summoned almost right after 
Claudius leaves The Mousetrap by Rosencrantz and then Polonius) he will `speak 
daggers but use none'. Nevertheless, he says this precisely because the `soul of Nero' is 
indeed knocking on the door of his `firm bosom'. 
However, this proves to be both more and less than real murderousness just as 
his Mousetrap delivers him not exactly the prey he has been looking for. In his `Nero' 
soliloquy, as well as in his talk with Horatio immediately after the play scene, Hamlet is 
so carried away with his own performance during The Mousetrap and its apparent 
success that he is completely unprepared to stumble upon a praying Claudius -a praying 
devil who, in this case unwittingly, is sugaring over himself with `devotion's visage/ 
And pious action'. When he struck upon the idea of making his revenge more accessible 
through catching the conscience of the king with a play, he never contemplated the 
possibility that by the same device he may make revenge even less accessible by turning 
the prey into a penitent victim: 
Now might I do it pat, now he is praying; 
And now I'll do't. 
[He draws his sword] 
And so he goes to heaven; 
And so am I revenged. That would be scann'd: 
A villain kills my father; and for that, 
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I, his sole son, do this same villain send 
To heaven. 
0, this is hire and salary, not revenge. 
He took my father grossly, full of bread; 
With all his crimes broad blown, as flush as May; 
And how his audit stands who knows save heaven? 
But in our circumstance and course of thought, 
Tis heavy with him: and am I then revenged, 
To take him in the purging of his soul, 
When he is fit and season'd for his passage? 
No! 
[He sheathes his sword] 
Up, sword; and know thou a more horrid hint: 
When he is drunk asleep, or in his rage, 
Or in the incestuous pleasure of his bed; 
At gaming, swearing, or about some act 
That has no relish of salvation in't; 
Then trip him, that his heels may kick at heaven, 
And that his soul may be as damn'd and black 
As hell, whereto it goes. My mother stays: 
This physic but prolongs thy sickly days. 
(3.3.80-103) 
The patience of critics, and certainly psychoanalytic ones, with Hamlet's excuses at this 
point is often spent. His logic here has been deemed indefensible not only on 
psychoanalytic but also on the religious/moral grounds, albeit for different reasons. For 
the traditional and modem psychoanalysts, this moment is the supreme proof of 
Hamlet's inhibition preventing him from fulfiling his task whatever the excuse; and this 
excuse in particular - that there actually is a conceivable possibility of Claudius getting 
to heaven after what Hamlet has just confirmed about him - is perhaps the most 
ridiculous. It is almost a perfect equivalent of the ambiguous premise in his soliloquy at 
the end of Act 2: Claudius is a villain, but I doubt the Ghost's truth. The critics certainly 
feel that Shakespeare himself supports their insight precisely because he shows Claudius 
in the same scene woefully failing at prayer. The religiously oriented critics (such as 
Bowers and Prosser) sincerely abhor this moment for the reason that Hamlet displays a 
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damnable lack of mercy by wanting to punish not only the body but the soul of the 
offender. They consider this moment in the play indeed to be the nadir of Hamlet's 
descent into the devilish snare laid out for him by the demonic Ghost. The almost 
immediately following murder of Polonius and his increasingly brutal treatment of 
Ophelia are only the corresponding steps in this moral degradation. Those who, like 
Hirschfield, attempt to integrate religion and psychoanalysis certainly emphasise the 
inextricable link between Hamlet's trajectory and the `symptomatic' compulsion to 
return to, `despite the effort to overcome', the original traumatic double scenes of the 
Fall ('the incestuous pleasure of his bed') and the original fratricide (Hirschfield 440). 
All these readings are certainly relevant to the dramatic moment at hand, 
especially within their individual perspectives. However, in its own dramatic context, 
especially in relation to the preceding Act, this moment represents a continuation of the 
specific ambivalence in Hamlet's character already observed there: on the one hand an 
extreme conscientiousness regarding his task and on the other a complete absorption in a 
given situation which derails his straightforward progress towards it. At the point of 
Claudius' prayer scene this ambivalence unwittingly reaches and passes the point of no 
return. This is where Hamlet for the first time seriously considers murder - according to 
the Q2 stage directions, after the words `And now I'll do it' `He draws his sword'. The 
various specialist interpretations here almost help to obscure the basic but also 
fundamental revelation of this speech: Hamlet is not a conscious murderer, despite the 
apparent contradiction of what is going to follow. He cannot think like one, particularly 
in Shakespeare, at this moment. A perfect comparison for his contemplation of Claudius 
in prayer is, for example, Richard's contemplation of his plot to murder his brother 
Clarence: 
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Go, tread the path that thou shalt ne'er return. 
Simple, plain Clarence! I do love thee so 
That I will shortly send thy soul to heaven, 
If heaven will take the present at our hands. 
(The Tragedy of Richard the Third, 1.1.123-6) 
The difference between the two characters cannot be more pronounced: Richard is 
certainly not interested in Clarence's soul because the state of his own soul as a killer, 
like that of Claudius, precludes such interest. What matters is that the soul of the 
opponent does not linger in this world longer than is necessary for their respective 
agendas which they need to fulfil while they are still alive. Hamlet, on the contrary, at 
the moment of Claudius' prayer still lives in the world of infinite possibility. As he puts 
it to Ophelia only an hour or so before, 
I could accuse me of such things that it 
were better my mother had not borne me: I am very 
proud, revengeful, ambitious, with more offences at 
my beck than I have thoughts to put them in, 
imagination to give them shape, or time to act them 
in. (3.1.125-6) 
This may sound like an empty boast uttered out of his tortured self-defense in the face of 
Ophelia's little lie and infidelity (`Rich gifts wax poor when givers prove unkind'). But 
this grandiose opinion of himself and his powers, this princely magnanimity, certainly is 
a real feature of Hamlet. After The Mousetrap, he lingers on with Horatio, praising his 
own aptitude for theatre business, relishing Claudius' wounded retreat, even again 
making fun of Rosencrantz and Guildenstem, and then Polonius - without realising that 
at this very minute Claudius can already be finalising his plan to eliminate Hamlet 
(which he indeed is doing at the moment) and that he might not have enough time even 
to see the king again, let alone to consider how to go about the revenge itself, before 
someone is going to make an attempt at his life. He does not stop to think that the 
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invitation to visit Gertrude's chamber may already be a trap. And he certainly does not 
stop to consider whether his stumbling upon Claudius in prayer, who is unarmed and 
oblivious of anyone's presence, may be his only chance. Instead, he thinks that there will 
be other, more appropriate moments like `When he is drunk asleep, or in his rage, /Or in 
the incestuous pleasure of his bed; /At gaming, swearing, or about some act/That has no 
relish of salvation in't'. Surely, Hamlet quickly envisages these moments but again, 
crucially, makes no provisions to secure that he will have access and means to execute 
his revenge intention when these moments arise. By contrast, Claudius, as was already 
noted, goes to prayer only after he has made his provisions about Hamlet, so, in a sense, 
he can indeed be praying peacefully now: he knows that his nephew will soon be on his 
way to England and death (and Richard certainly knows that Clarence is secured in the 
Tower). 
Instead of making similar provisions, Hamlet, when he stumbles over Claudius, 
is focused on the meaning of the obligation to his father which indeed seems to preclude 
that he takes the offender 'in the purging of his soul, /When he is fit and season'd for his 
passage' - in other words, in the very state which Claudius' act deprived his father of by 
his surreptitious crime. Despite what the critics have said about this excuse, it makes 
perfect sense within the limits of Hamlet's speech. Greenblatt is certainly right to single 
out this moment in Hamlet in Purgatory as hinting at a paradoxically true example of the 
remembrance of the father in the given circumstances (221), as opposed to the bloody 
and rash deeds, by Hamlet, Fortinbras, and Laertes, which follow one after the other in 
the later half of the play. 
Nevertheless, Hamlet's sparing Claudius in the prayer scene cannot be simply 
explained in these terms. It does indeed constitute, as suggested above, the basis of 
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Hamlet's human appeal because he does seem to recognise the potency and sacral nature 
of guilt, penitence, and prayer by shying away from stabbing an unarmed, kneeling man 
in the back. While Hamlet is talking to himself behind Claudius' back, he does give him, 
inadvertently, a real chance at purging his soul - that is, at least at starting this process 
by `assuming virtue' as he puts it later to Gertrude. However, the above noted irony of 
the text here is certainly that, after Hamlet finishes his speech on the decision to 
`prolong' Claudius' `sickly days', the latter confesses to himself (and the audience) that 
he cannot pray. This is an extraordinarily subtle challenge to Hamlet himself who since 
the end of Act 2 has been energetically trying to convince himself of Claudius' guilt. At 
that moment he did not want to take the Ghost's word at face value, did not want to 
listen to his own intuition and general disgust that he felt towards his uncle. He decided 
to put the appearances to the test using The Mousetrap, during which, as we saw, he 
convinced himself more than he got an irrefutable proof of Claudius' guilt. And now in 
the prayer scene he must still be convinced about the effect of his play on his uncle: he 
takes what he sees for the inner truth that he has been looking for. He is certainly not 
very far from it at all, but being a conscientious perfectionist in what concerns the 
meaning of his revenge, he paradoxically does not really pursue the matter of the 
contrast between appearances and inner truth in his object. He does not stay beside 
Claudius and listen to what Claudius must be muttering to himself. Being such a shrewd 
observer of the people around him, Hamlet reveals himself, especially in this Act, to be 
peculiarly incapable of empathy: he takes the posture of the praying man to be self- 
explanatory, he equates the desire and ability to pray, without pausing to imagine what it 
would be like trying to pray if he were Claudius (which certainly introduces a serious 
modification to the identification thesis of the psychoanalysts) - while he does stop to 
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speculate that Claudius' soul will definitely go to heaven simply because he is praying. 
Moreover, Hamlet certainly himself acknowledges in the same speech that the destiny of 
souls after death cannot really be known, even in spite of circumstantial evidence he has 
from the Ghost. All this seems to add up to the impression that Hamlet is acting out of 
well-meant convictions - remembrance of his father plus the desire not to be taken in by 
the possible devil's provocations - but that he has not really considered his situation and 
his steps carefully enough. Precisely because of the strength of these convictions, the 
absorption in a given moment, the amount of ad hoc reflection that he is always engaged 
in, he does not have the time to do it. 
The climactic confirmation of it in this Act (and the whole play) is certainly the 
murder of Polonius which follows almost immediately after the prayer scene. The first 
question that is suggested by the comparison of these two episodes is not too far from 
Gertrude's `0 me! what hast thou done? ' (3.4.34). Indeed, if Hamlet was so 
conscientious about making sure that Claudius' soul went to Hell, in conjunction with 
the implicit meaning of the Ghost's command, why did not he draw the arras away and 
make sure that the man behind it is `the king'? The question, of course, may seem 
irrelevant, but then he does virtually answer it in response to Gertrude `Nay, I know not. 
Is it the king? ' (3.4.33, emphasis added). Indeed, he does not know whom he has killed. 
He might have been sure about it just as he became sure of Claudius' genuine praying a 
moment ago. He was certainly ready to do it, but `readiness', contrary to what he says 
later on in Act 5, is far from `all' in a murderer's business. It is more impossible than not 
to imagine Claudius getting carried away to the point of mistaking the hour in the 
orchard and poisoning a gardener instead of his brother. Thus what Hamlet possibly 
wrote or selected from the actual Murder of Gonzago to include in the role of his player- 
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king - `Our thoughts are ours, their ends none of our own' (3.2.16 1) - is catching up 
with him. And Hamlet's nature is certainly quite akin to that of the player-queen in the 
strength of his feelings, intentions, in which the player-king sees the very source of this 
paradox. 
In this context the appearance of the Ghost in Gertrude's closet, already 
discussed above with regard to the Ghost's overall impact on the plot, can also be seen 
as a direct response to this peculiarity of Hamlet's behaviour. On the one hand, Hamlet 
has just killed a man who, he thought afterwards, was the king; on the other, he did it 
literally on the spur of the moment. There is nothing to suggest that he is concentrated 
on a murder when he enters Gertrude's closet. He may be very forward with the queen 
whom he seems to be physically preventing from going away - 
Come, come, and sit you down; you shall not budge; 
You go not till I set you up a glass 
Where you may see the inmost part of you. 
(3.4.24-6) 
- but he certainly does not mean to `murder' her, as she thinks. In fact, what seems to 
matter to the Ghost, and certainly for the plot, is that he has just left, quite 
improvidently, his primary target and thereby lost the only ideal opportunity he had to 
`drink hot blood' in the way that the Ghost presumably wanted him to. Therefore, the 
Ghost's visitation which is `but to whet' Hamlet's `almost blunted purpose' can be 
entirely justified, and Hamlet's intuition does not deceive him ('Do you not come your 
tardy son to chide, /That, lapsed in time and passion, lets go by/The important acting of 
your dread command? 0, say! ' 3.4.122-5). 
Hamlet's remaining scene with Gertrude is quite engrossing, and it does seem to 
follow the Ghost's urging to `step between her and her fighting soul'. However, as was 
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already noted above, the Ghost's very visitation comes at the moment when Gertrude is 
about to acknowledge her guilt completely ('0 speak no more Hamlet! ') and therefore 
problematises this acknowledgement. More fundamentally, the visitation emphasises the 
fact that Hamlet's actions have been consistently straying from his revenge duty; that the 
fact that he is in Gertrude's chamber at that particular moment in the play and that he is 
about to leave for England does not correspond to what the Ghost intended him to do at 
all. It is also quite remarkable that Hamlet does nothing to return to the supposedly main 
course of his action towards the end of this scene. He is completely absorbed in his 
desire to resuscitate his mother's virtue, to prevent her from laying `that flattering 
unction to your soul, /That not your trespass, but my madness speaks' (3.4.165-6) and 
thus to minimise the impact of the Ghost, who remained invisible to Gertrude. He does 
manage to extract an oath from her at the end that she will not disclose to Claudius the 
truth that Hamlet is mad but in pretense. However, in the context of the scene, Gertrude 
will hardly find it difficult to agree with Hamlet's plea: for the most part of it she does 
believe that her son is mad. Therefore, her anxious retelling of the scene to Claudius at 
the start of the next Act is hardly a sign of Gertrude's full conversion to Hamlet's cause, 
especially given the fact that she can hardly connect Hamlet's murder of Polonius with a 
premeditated attempt at Claudius' life. This is certainly not the least because, 
characteristically, it did not seem as if Hamlet himself were planning the move and knew 
who was behind the arras. 
The ending of his scene with Gertrude is no exception to this feature of his 
character. Not only does he know already that he `must to England' but he also seems 
completely reconciled with the idea. Moreover, in Q2 he also knows that it is his `two 
schoolfellows' that are escorting him (from whom he must indeed have learned about 
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the voyage on his way to his mother's closet) and that they have the `mandate' to 
`marshal him to knavery' (3.4.187,188). He makes no mention of revenge. Instead, he 
closes the Act with some farewell, particularly insensitive, quipping at Polonius' dead 
body, which, just as in Act 2, suggests that his mind is again overtaken with the 
grotesque trivia of the moment and thus with oblivion of his supposed purpose. This is 
particularly remarkable because Hamlet does get to see Claudius two scenes later, in Act 
4 scene 3, right before his departure. He is certainly closely guarded and can do nothing 
but keep quipping - fortunately Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are still alive and help 
him to keep up the mood: 
Hamlet A man may fish with the worm that hath eat of a 
läng, and eat of the fish that hath fed of that worm. 
Claudius What dost you mean by this? 
Hamlet Nothing but to show you how a king may go a 
progress through the guts of a beggar. 
(4.3.27-31) 
`Somewhere half-buried here' may indeed lie `a death threat against the usurper-king', 
as Greenblatt thinks ('Purgatory', 241). But this threat now can indeed be only very 
general and tentative ('how a king may go') because Claudius has no more doubts about 
Hamlet's intentions, despite Gertrude's apparent fidelity to her oath, and is taking no 
chances with him. For the same reason Hamlet's antic disposition from this point on is 
quite useless as means of dissimulation. Hamlet may want to use it still to demonstrate 
his defiance up to the last minute - calling Claudius his `mother' - but this is now 
irrelevant to his revenge task. Quite characteristically again, in Q2 he uses up his last 
apparent opportunity for escape and thus a possibility to fulfil his duty, while his escorts 
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leave him alone and he is still on native soil, to deliver his last extended soliloquy on 
revenge, when faced with Fortinbras' advancing army. Overall, the soliloquy largely 
repeats the one at the end of Act 2, except that now Hamlet is blaming himself, his 
`thinking too precisely on the event', rather than the Ghost. The diagnosis may be quite 
true or only scraping the surface by psychoanalytic or any other critical standards relying 
on a detached study, but the fact of that moment is that Hamlet is not trying to run away 
from his escorts or to change the course of the events in any way, even though, in Q2, he 
knows perfectly well the purpose of their trip and is perplexed as to the nature of his 
inaction. Thus this very soliloquy is itself a prime example of thinking too precisely on 
the event. And again as at the end of Act 2 this excessively `precise' thinking, this 
bestial oblivion, becomes apparent to Hamlet quite suddenly, right at the moment when 
he finally emerges from the immediacy of the situation that surrounded him throughout 
Act 3- the situation which for him was certainly not full of languishing and apathy. He 
indeed was ready to drink hot blood, he even killed a man who could have been a king; 
he almost reformed his mother. But now in the face of the trip to England all those 
moments are certainly not good enough, the ends of his thoughts proved to be not his 
own. 
This fact acquires a specific poignancy at the end of Act 3 because of Polonius' 
death. It is not only quite undeserved, but it is the very proof of Hamlet' s inadequacy as 
a revenger. Hamlet's irreverent parting with his remains 
Indeed this counsellor 
Is now most still, most secret and most grave, 
Who was in life a foolish prating knave. 
(3.4.235-7) 
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is not only unwarranted but spectacularly blind to the fact that it can serve perfectly well 
as Hamlet's own epitaph. To be sure, in his final soliloquy on revenge, mentioned 
above, Hamlet berates himself quite harshly and still hopes to change ('0, from this time 
forth) My thoughts be bloody or be nothing worth' 4.4.70-1), but he certainly cannot 
appreciate the fact that his accidental killing of Polonius effectively seals his own and 
everyone else's fate - primarily because this has removed the benign schemer that stood 
between him and Claudius' guilty murderousness. It is Polonius indeed who unwittingly 
afforded Hamlet the last portion of time in the world of infinite possibilities by urging 
the king to allow him to spy on Hamlet once again in Gertrude's closet. It is on the way 
to that closet that Hamlet had his unique, seemingly accidental, chance to end the play 
with a single death as he promised Ophelia; the chance that he owed Polonius' 
unfortunate, even foolish, but also essentially quite touching insistence on `love' as the 
`origin and commencement' of Hamlet's `lunacy' as much as he owed it to his own 
emotions and intellect; the chance that he certainly had to miss, given the fundamental 
affinity between his mind and Polonius' when it came to empathy. 
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3.7 Wounded Names 
Hamlet's success at forcing Claudius to show his anxiety during The Murder of 
Gonzago, and then in turning Gertrude's eyes into the very core of her soul and 
eventually cleaving `her heart in twain', may suggest that he does not lack empathy 
completely. However, these are, indeed, examples of forcing, cleaving one's way into 
someone's soul, not of subtle sounding of its depths. Admittedly, in the case of hardened 
sinners this sounding may not have seemed appropriate to Hamlet. Nevertheless, he does 
attempt it in the prayer scene, while he is `scanning' the situation and the subtlety of his 
empathy certainly falls short of the complexity of its object. 
This failure does make Hamlet, objectively, more humane towards Claudius at 
that moment. However, he exhibits essentially the same lack of subtlety towards Ophelia 
which, being certainly correlative to his performance in the prayer scene, practically 
nullifies the humane effect. Hamlet did think it possible that the apparently hardened 
murderer and adulterer like Claudius was capable of genuinely praying and thus 
advancing his soul to heaven, while in the previous two scenes he did not think it 
possible to see enough innocence in Ophelia's behaviour to forgive her. Hamlet may be 
a very self-conscious lover, only too aware of the awkwardness of the Italianate 
commonplaces in which he expresses his feelings -'To the celestial and my soul's idol, 
the most beautified Ophelia' (2.2.120) - but, nevertheless, these commonplaces appear 
to be quite faithful expressions of his feelings. Judging by the nunnery scene, he 
certainly takes his love and Ophelia's apparent change of loyalty seriously enough to 
condemn her as `wanton'. Even if the real addressee of his tirade is Gertrude, it is indeed 
Ophelia who is the first to trigger and receive the brunt of it. 
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In her first mad appearance in Act 4 scene 5, while she is more or less able to 
respond to questions, Ophelia sums up her plight with a brief reflection based on a 
folktale: `They say the owl was a baker's daughter. / Lord, we know what we are, but 
know not what we may be. God be at your table! ' (4.5.37-8). It provides a quasi-Biblical 
but no less poignant counterpoint to the main theme of sudden, undeservedly painful 
reciprocation, evident in her funeral and bawdy songs. According to the Norton editors, 
the folktale she refers to features Christ turning a baker's daughter into an owl because 
she did not recognise him for who he was and gave him `only a small loaf (in other 
contemporary variants cited in The Variorum Shakespeare edition of the play Christ is 
replaced by a fairy). Hamlet's emphasis on the `nunnery' in his major scene with 
Ophelia, and his continued railing against her as an embodiment of frailty, certainly 
make the Norton gloss on this tale more apposite to the context. Thus despite her 
distracted state Ophelia is quite aware of its inducing factor - the failure to come up to 
the unusually high and even purposefully unmeetable expectations. Her bawdy song in 
the same scene about the lover, who first promised to marry her only if she came to his 
bed and then turned her away precisely because she did, is certainly a further elaboration 
on the same theme, recalling Hamlet's own playing on Ophelia's feelings in the nunnery 
scene: `I loved you once... You should not have believed me... I loved you not' (3.1.121- 
4). It is understandable that Hamlet, as was suggested above, is trying to break through 
Ophelia's innocence and ignorance which is unwittingly covering the `devil', but it 
certainly never crosses his mind that she has been chosen as a cover precisely because of 
her perfect innocence, both about Hamlet's feelings (she does confess to Polonius 
already in Act 1 that she does not 'know what to think' about Lord Hamlet) and 
certainly about the nature of Claudius' scheme. 
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The second and larger part of Act 4, after Hamlet's departure for England, is 
dominated by the poignant outcome of this mismatch. First, it is certainly Ophelia's 
madness and then it is her accidental suicide. Laertes who, in secret has come from 
France, shows himself quite capable of the oblivious absorption in the moment, 
`thinking too precise on the event', which has become so characteristic of the play's 
action in Acts 2 and 3 while he was away. To be sure, he is swept by the righteous and 
daredevil anger against the murderer of his father: 
How came he dead? I'll not be juggled with: 
To hell, allegiance! vows, to the blackest devil! 
Conscience and grace, to the profoundest pit! 
I dare damnation. To this point I stand, 
That both the worlds I give to negligence, 
Let come what comes; only I'll be revenged 
Most thoroughly for my father. 
(4.5.108-14) 
And then he is even more shaken by his sister's pitifully distracted state: 
O heat, dry up my brains! tears seven times salt, 
Burn out the sense and virtue of mine eye! 
By heaven, thy madness shall be paid by weight, 
Till our scale turn the beam. 0 rose of May! 
Dear maid, kind sister, sweet Ophelia! 
O heavens! Is't possible, a young maid's wits 
Should be as mortal as an old man's life? 
Nature is fine in love, and where 'tis fine, 
It sends some precious instance of itself 
After the thing it loves. 
(4.5.138-147) 
This turbulence of emotion is repeated throughout Ophelia's two remaining entrances in 
this scene. Indeed, Laertes does not fail to link Ophelia's state to his revenge ('Hadst 
thou thy wits, and didst persuade revenge, / It could not move thus' 4.5.150-1). But what 
becomes remarkable in view of Ophelia's end, announced by grief-stricken and amazed 
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Gertrude at the end of the next scene, is that Laertes is so much concentrated on 
vengeance that he forgets that his sister needs care now. He, who would not trust her to 
exchange letters with Hamlet while his father was alive and she herself was still sane, 
has just let her out alone in her current state: according to the stage directions, Ophelia's 
exit itself after her last song (at 4.5.161) is hardly noticed in itself- Laertes at this 
moment is apparently looking up at heavens to ask, `Do you see this, 0 God? ' (4.5.162). 
This can certainly be hardly held against him, but it does underscore the lack of empathy 
which led to this situation in the first place. Hamlet, who is about to claim that he loved 
Ophelia more than forty thousand brothers in her very grave, certainly is not there to 
save her from drowning. Ironically, while he can see in his cause the `portraiture' of 
Fortinbras' and Laertes' respective causes (as he puts it after his return in Act 5), he is 
unable to appreciate Ophelia as his most poignant counterpart in her obvious obedience 
to her father's will and therefore to forgive her in time. Laertes' thoughts of revenge 
drive him very far indeed from the still living reality; it seems that having seen Ophelia 
in her mad state, he has buried her already in his mind when he appeals to God instead 
of her. 
It is perhaps then not entirely paradoxical that Claudius proves to be the most 
empathetic character of those remaining alive by the end of Act 4- which must certainly 
be attributed, first of all, to the increasing level of apprehension in which he fords 
himself. He spends most of Act 4 and the beginning of Act 5 on the successful 
manipulation of both Laertes and Hamlet into his final scheme against his nephew's life. 
However, it is also true that by this point in the play each of the three antagonists 
involved proves too anxious to let the scheme run smoothly. 
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Claudius' initial plan - to have Laertes' sword simply unbated and rely on his 
swordsmanship - is certainly the most sound because it would have aroused the least 
suspicion. But his desire to make sure that Hamlet does become the `living monument' 
to Ophelia's grave (5.1.185) is too great not to be tempted by Laertes' idea of the 
poisoned sword to the extent that it prompts him to the idea of the poisoned chalice. This 
will certainly amplify suspicions much more than a poisoned sword, but no one at that 
moment has time to consider calmly the relative merits of all the options. 
The contrast between the plotters and the newly arrived Hamlet is again most 
striking. He left in Act 4 with a crushing sense of underachievement as a revenger, but 
when he comes back, due to perhaps the most accidental miracle in the play, the pirates, 
he does nothing to sweep to his task. Instead, he proceeds to engage in his favourite 
activity of meditation on death. Surely, he does mention that now, after he has 
discovered the king's plot against his life, he has even more reasons than ever to kill the 
läng - 
Does it not, think'st thee, stand me now upon - 
He that hath kill'd my king and whored my mother, 
Popp'd in between the election and my hopes, 
Thrown out his angle for my proper life, 
And with such cozenage - is't not perfect conscience, 
To quit him with this arm? and is't not to be damn'd, 
To let this canker of our nature come 
In further evil? 
(5.1.70-7) 
- but he again does not hurry to start considering ways to do it. Not only is he simply 
content to have the extra reason for the time being, but he is also content to engage in a 
fencing match with Laertes, the man who has just tried strangling him. Hamlet does 
acknowledge that he has serious misgivings about this affair ('But thou wouldst not 
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think how ill all's here about my heart: but it is no matter. ' 5.2.143). Yet he brushes it off 
as `foolery' more worthy of a `woman' (5.2.145) and defies `augury' referring to the 
well-known passage in Matthew 10: 29125: 
Not a whit, we defy augury. there's a special 
providence in the fall of a sparrow. If it be now, 
'tis not to come; if it be not to come, it will be 
now; if it be not now, yet it will come: the 
readiness is all: since no man has aught of what he 
leaves, what is't to leave betimes? 
(5.2.147-8) 
Psychoanalysts, traditional and modem, seem certainly right in their skepticism 
regarding Hamlet's air of religious illumination with which he seemed to return from the 
voyage. For a man who appears to have become religiously reconciled to the 
impropriety of revenge and to the overarching providence of the Father, Hamlet 
becomes too much interested in the match. 
At its start, Hamlet outwardly acknowledges and also simultaneously distantiates 
himself from his guilt towards Laertes, aligning himself with the wronged party against 
his `madness': 
Give me your pardon, sir: I've done you wrong; 
But pardon't, as you are a gentleman[... ] 
Was't Hamlet wrong'd Laertes? Never Hamlet: 
If Hamlet from himself be ta'en away, 
And when he's not himself does wrong Laertes, 
Then Hamlet does it not, Hamlet denies it. 
Who does it, then? His madness [... ] 
Sir, in this audience, 
Let my disclaiming from a purposed evil 
Free me so far in your most generous thoughts, 
That I have shot mine arrow o'er the house, 
And hurt my brother. 




This certainly sounds very gentle, but he knows that Laertes cannot forgive him; indeed, 
the speech sounds more like a gentlemanly disclaimer of the purpose of the evil' `so 
far' as his `madness' is concerned, but not as a refusal to pay for it. Laertes' reply 
confirms this double meaning by referring to his `revenge' and refusal to reconcile `Till 
by some elder masters, of known honour, /! have a voice and precedent of peace' 
(5.2.173-4), while also acknowledging the receipt of Hamlet's 'offer'd love as love' in 
the meantime. Both Hamlet and Laertes know perfectly well that the only `elder master' 
of authority left alive would certainly not encourage any reconciliation, and both are 
sure that the dead `elder masters' to whom they pledged themselves respectively - 
especially Old Hamlet but also quite possibly Polonius - would not encourage it either. 
Thus they both seem to enter into the match with the understanding that their 
reconciliation is only temporary. 
However, the fact that Hamlet heedlessly plunges into the match, scoring hits, 
urging Laertes not to `dally' and `pass' at him with his `best violence' (5.2.234-5) seems 
to suggest that Hamlet does not see the quite conspicuous threat in Laertes' overtly 
gentlemanly answer which plainly says that Hamlet's love will be accepted as love at 
the same time as Laertes is waiting for some elder master to reconcile them - therefore, 
accepted as love but returned as hate. In other words, Hamlet does not seem to realise 
that their reconciliation is not only provisional but is also only an appearance to cover 
the plot against his life which is already under way. While he did recognise the affinity 
between Laertes' and his own situation with regard to their fathers immediately before 
the match, he cannot seem to contemplate the possibility that Laertes, unlike him, is 
capable of plotting a straightforward, that is covert and dishonourable, revenge. He 
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indeed professes to `love' him ever and presents him to Horatio as a `very noble youth' 
earlier in the Act. In Hamlet himself, as the whole play shows, the honour, 
remembrance, and revenge have always been at odds, and he is clearly considering 
Laertes to follow the same pattern (unlike his two schoolfellows whom he had the 
chance to size up) - i. e. waiting for an ideal opportunity at which these three motivations 
will coincide while at present being, as Claudius characterises him to Laertes in 
preparation for their plot, `remiss, /Most generous and free from all contriving' (4.6.147- 
8). 
Because Claudius' estimate of Hamlet is essentially right, the success of his 
scheme seems perfectly sure. Only the third chain of pure accidents (after the arrival of 
the actors in Act 2 and the intrusion of the pirates in Act 4) - the shuffling of the rapiers 
and the queen's insistence on drinking from the poisoned cup - decisively turn the tide 
against Claudius. This purely coincidental outcome of the final scene and the whole play 
demonstrates again that, while it certainly has been influenced by the psychology of the 
chief characters in the drama, its final shape can in no sense be seen as straightforwardly 
predetermined by them. Hamlet's elliptical dying request to Horatio is indeed motivated 
by the finally formed awareness of virtually a complete lack of achievement on his part, 
of the immense gap between what has really happened in the five Acts and what Hamlet 
was hoping to accomplish, of the wounds which his acts have left unhealed in his 
father's and his own name, as well as in the names of the other innocent victims. It is 
certainly easy to agree with psychoanalytic critics that Hamlet's failure to reconcile 
honour, remembrance, and revenge without tainting his mind and making the conflict 
uncontrollable is paradoxically the most faithful remembrance of the Ghost's message. 
That message not only already doubted Hamlet ('taint not thy mind', `remember me') 
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but through the figure of the Ghost itself, armed but incorporal, indeed represented the 
impossibility of revenge - that is, in the state of being woken up by death when any 
action is already too late. The fact that Hamlet dies not from the traditional, honest, 
almost instantly fatal sword wound but, quite like his father, from a poisoned scratch 
which leaves him enough life only to feel the hardening grip of death certainly brings 
back the memory of the Ghost. 
However, there certainly are important differences between Hamlet's case and 
his father's. First of all, he does manage to take the culprit together with him and thus 
clears the throne (and the royal bed) of Denmark from the'daninbd incest' and 
fratricide. Secondly, he does manage to realise the huge 'imperfections' of his progress, 
to prevent the only informed witness, Horatio, from committing a solidarity suicide, and 
pledge him to remembrance. However, unlike the obligation between Hamlet and his 
father, there is no revenge and no secrecy involved in this pledge for Horatio because 
indeed everyone, both guilty and innocent, is already dead. This inseparability of one 
group of deaths from the other, which for the psychoanalysts and traditional critics, 
spells the suspension of redemption and entrenchment of trauma contains in fact the very 
hope for the reversal of this outcome. It is not because the plot makes it easier to believe 
that Ophelia will indeed become an `angel', as Laertes prophesies, or that 'angels' will 
sing Hamlet to his rest (as they should, then, have done for Polonius), as Horatio wishes. 
It is precisely because the play makes such a belief more challenging that it makes it also 
more valuable and desirable. It does not reinstate the formulas of justice and plausibility 
by presenting characters who set out to erase them systematically and more or less 
consciously, thus bringing ruin upon themselves (like Richard III or lago). On the 
contrary, its characters come to grief because they are trying to follow these formulas to 
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the best of their abilities (even Claudius is quite an unwilling villain compared to the 
examples above). Their desires which are both motivated by these formulas and 
constantly led astray from them in the immediacy of their interaction with each other 
constitute the basis for the seductive impression that they are better than the sum of their 
failures, formulas, and desires. Their plea for suspension of equivalence in judgment and 
for tarrying with their story therefore pertains to the very possibility of redemption. 
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4. Conclusion 
So, what is exactly the place where Freud, Oedipus, and Hamlet meet? In terms 
of the above analysis, it is certainly the place of primal seduction - the place that, while 
possessing a multiplicity of concrete shapes within respective epochs and genres, 
transcends their historical and aesthetic contingency. 
However, this transcendence is not that of Freud's phylogenesis which strives to 
achieve an absolute degree of transcendence by endowing the pre-historic scenarios of 
the so-called primal horde with the status comparable to that of Kant's a priori concepts. 
Such a conceptualisation of determination of experience not only results in the problem 
of infinite regression and 'things-in-themselves' (both for Kant and Freud) but, 
specifically in Freud's case, replicates the very act that it purports to analyse: primal 
repression. The momentous events of the human and even biological pre-history (such as 
the primal patricide in Totem and Taboo and the evolution of life from primal 
nothingness in Beyond the Pleasure Principle) are certainly neither events nor 
categories. Like the material in the unconscious, they are devoid of historical and logical 
consistency. 
Nevertheless, it is this metastatic development of uncertainty both at the thematic 
and structural level of Freud's thought after 1897 - which Laplanche came to designate 
the `unfinished Copernican revolution' - that, as we have seen, has served as the 
necessary intuitive medium for grasping the specificity of the studied object. For the 
opponents of psychoanalysis this development has certainly been metastatic in the 
narrow, clinical sense of uncontrollable invasion and depredation into other areas of 
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social and individual cultural activity. But what becomes unavoidably clear after 
investigating the logic of Freudian evolution and the relationship between 
psychoanalysis and literature is that in this case psychoanalysis itself is, at least no less, 
an object of invasion. Tragedy- the paradigmatic object of psychoanalytic attention - 
predates not only Freud by several millennia but indeed the human subject of the 
recorded history. Moreover, tragedy itself always thematically insists on its absolute 
preceäence in the form of the daimonic presence (be it a classical Greek deity or a 
ghost). Ascribing these typical features to the either subjectively authorial or objectively 
formed acquiescence in genre tradition does nothing to reduce its imposition. Narrowing 
the plot to a more precise set of coordinates - clinical, intellectual, political - is equally 
unhelpful in explaining not only the emergence of the tragic (and in general artistic) 
phenomenon as such but, more specifically, its power over the audience - irreducible to 
auto-stimulation and straightforward catharsis. 
Sophocles' Oedipus may present a revelation that is more painful than clear, but 
its ambiguity and pain only increase the effect of the daimonic presence, sending 
`convulsions' through the Chorus (Gould, 1307). Hamlet almost dies in vain, and 
practically brings down with him his whole kingdom, thus seemingly dissolving the last 
remnant of his father's glory; it is Fortinbras who comes to Elsinore to claim the rights 
of his memory. Yet this destruction and complete surrender of the duty by the 
protagonist only amplifies the presence of the Ghost of Hamlet, now covering indeed the 
whole kingdom. It is the story of this Ghost - and his own father - that Fortinbras sits 
down to listen to. 
The respective plots, as was argued above, are thus fundamentally displaced with 
regard to what should be their central axes - the protagonists. The latter do not 
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exclusively determine the development either of their plots or the constitution of their 
narrative traditions, although as the characters representing inspired and incisive 
individuals they strongly try to. Instead, it is indeed the figure of the murdered and thus 
absent (ghostly) father that constitutes the other, significant gravitational force. The 
maternal element is no less important. It has a crucial influence in the establishment of 
the father as the centre of the conflict; however, it acquires its dramatic/traumatic 
significance only through its implication in the father's predicament. 
This feature in Sophocles and Shakespeare' treatment of the source material does 
not lead to what Laplanche calls a `Ptolemaic recentring' of the plot simply on another 
dramatic character. On the contrary, through the father's characteristic detachment and 
vulnerability the emphasis on his plight that serves as a starting point for Oedipus and 
Hamlet's progression through the plot results in a thoroughly dualist, other-centred 
vision of the conflict (characteristic of Laplanche's conceptualisation of primal 
seduction). The father captures the imagination of the protagonist - and evidently, the 
audience and playwrights - as the figure that, par excellence, consists of and represents 
the other's message. As much as it can be the figure of authority and tradition, it is also 
thoroughly dependent for its constitution on these cultural and familial formations; its 
identity and its very being is determined not only by the acts of the father himself but 
even more substantially by the acts of the others upon him and his memory. This 
significant passive dimension in no way diminishes the influence of the father figure. 
The crucial insight with which Sophocles' and Shakespeare's father figures are created 
is indeed in their ability to provoke action and development through the enigma of their 
detached, displaced status with regard to those with whom they interact and with regard 
to the status of the father as such. Thus, the displacement of the protagonists with regard 
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to the main axis, the message, of the plot (affecting certainly all the other characters) is 
the result of the interaction with the father's message - the interaction that catalyses the 
accession to the `primordial split' between the other and the message that he or she 
carries, which Laplanche designates as the sine qua non of seduction (or more 
particularly transference), and thus development of the human subject. The father's 
traditional male, heterosexual attributes here - in Laplanchean rereading of Freud as 
well as in a careful reading of tragedy - are clearly relegated to contingency: what 
remains is the relationship of a subject to the enigmatic message which, precisely 
because of its primordial split from the human subject, comes, like the oracle or the 
Ghost, in what appears as the third, neutral person (`it'). 
It is this kind of transcendence -'transcendence of transference', as Laplanche 
calls it with regard to the subject's attempts to translate the enigma into a personalised 
message - that the above analysis has attempted to articulate with regard to Oedipus and 
Hamlet in the context of Freud's psychoanalysis. It is the transcendence that, just like 
the tragic experience, can never quite escape the seemingly contingent, traumatic 
circumstances from which it springs. There is practically no hope of `curing' the 
primordial split, the fundamentally alienated, paternal condition of the subject. No one 
can restore Oedipus' vision and Hamlet's `noble mind'. However, there certainly is 
freedom and endurance in their spectacular failure. 
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